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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(j). This 
appeal was transferred from Court of Appeals to the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Trial Court was correct when it granted Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment for $5,000 for her Exempt Property Allowance. 
A. Whether Appellant is entitled to the Exempt Property Allowance. 
B. Whether the Trial Court was correct in relying on Appellant's accounting filed 
with the Court in determining the value of assets otherwise passing to Appellee. 
C. Whether the Trial Court was correct when it found that Decedent's estate was 
sufficient to satisfy Appellee's Petition for Exempt Property. 
2. Whether the Trial Court was correct when it granted Appellee's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment concerning the interpretation of five provisions in the Trust. 
A. Whether the Trust entitles the Appellant to a restricted life estate in the Mobile 
Home and provides no disposition of the remainder to the Appellant. 
B. Whether the Trial Court was correct in construing the Trust to provide all of the 
Remainder of the Trust should ultimately be distributed to Appellee. 
C. Whether the fall-back dispositive provisions of the Trust provide that the 
remainder of the Trust be distributed to Appellee. 
D. Whether the Trial Court was correct in determining that the term "income" is 
not ambiguous and is limited to the interest generated by the Trust Principal. 
E. Whether Appellant was not entitled to use Trust principal for any purpose, 
including moving the Mobile Home. 
F. Whether Appellant was not entitled to use Trust principal to pay her attorney' s 
fees where the expenses are based on a contest between beneficiaries of the 
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Estate and Trust, and where a beneficiary seeks redress for the Trust for mis-use 
of Trust principal. 
G. Whether Appellant improperly utilized principal from the Trust by spending 
$7,034.67 of the Trust principal in payment of an encumbrance associated with 
Decedent's Van because the Trust does not contain an exoneration clause. 
III. Whether the Trial Court was correct when it granted Appellee's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and refused to receive extrinsic evidence to determine the Testator's 
intent. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on an Appeal from the granting of a motion for summary 
judgment is that the Supreme Court accords no deference to the Trial Court's legal 
conclusions of law which are reviewed for correctness. See Schurtz v. BMW of No. Am., 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). The reviewing court may affirm a grant of Summary 
Judgment on any ground available to the Trial Court, even if it is one not relied upon below. 
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Richard D. Snow (hereinafter the "Decedent"), died on January 28th, 1998, leaving 
assets in his Estate and Trust. The Decedent named Appellant as his Personal Representative 
of his estate and Successor Trustee of his Trust. Appellant was named as Personal 
Representative of the Decedent's Estate. On June 2, 1998, the Appellant filed an Inventory 
of assets held by Decedent's Estate. 
A dispute arose between Appellee and Appellant, over the distribution and 
management of the Decedent's assets and on January 20,1999, Appellee filed her Petition for 
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Appointment of Special Administrator, Removal of Successor Trustee, and Request for 
Accounting of Estate and Trust Assets. On March 3, 1999, Appellant filed an Objection to 
Appellee's Petition. On July 14, 1999, Appellee filed her Claim of Exempt Property under 
Section 75-2-403 of the Utah Code. Appellant disallowed Appellee's Claim for Exempt 
Property on July 27, 1999. On November 24, 1999, Appellant filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Appellee's Claim of Exempt Property and Appellee filed a Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment on December 12, 1999. 
On February 25,2000, after the Trial Court heard oral arguments from the parties, the 
Trial Court rendered a memorandum decision granting Appellee's motion for Summary 
Judgment and awarding her a $5,000.00 Exempt Property Allowance. Appellant submitted 
a Motion to Reconsider on April 7, 2000 and the Trial Court denied the Motion and issued 
its order awarding Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and Exempt Property 
Allowance on April 17, 2000. 
On June 8,2000, the Court allowed Appellee to amend her Petition to include a request 
that the Trial Court construe the Decedent's Trust and Trust Amendment. Shortly thereafter, 
on June 19,2000, Appellee filed her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for construction 
of the Decedent's Trust and Trust Amendment. After all briefs were submitted on Appellee's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment a hearing was held on July 31,2000 wherein the court 
granted Appellee' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. After the Trial Court granted 
Appellee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Trial Court denied Appellants previous 
Motion to Reconsider the Exempt Property Allowance. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
3 
Law were entered and Order for Partial Summary Judgment was granted on August 22,2000. 
Thereafter, the parties stipulated to the Final Judgment in this case regarding damages. The 
Appellant then filed this Appeal. 
Throughout this case both parties performed discovery including depositions of all 
necessary witnesses. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Decedent duly executed the Last Will and Testament of Richard D. Snow, 
dated November 8, 1993 ("Will"), the Richard D. Snow Family Trust dated, November 8, 
1993, ("Trust"), and the First Amendment to Trust, dated September 15, 1995, ("Trust 
Amendment") (R. 10-27). The Decedent's Trust is attached hereto as Exhibit "B", and 
Decedents Trust Amendment is attached hereto as Exhibit"C". 
B. The significant disputes between the parties surround the construction of 
Article VII, of the Trust and Trust Amendment Titled *** Special Provisions*** of the Trust 
(R. 17, Exhibit "B") and Trust Amendment (R. 26, Exhibit "C"). 
3. The Trust Amendment did not specifically revoke the original Trust (R. 26, 
Exhibit "C"). 
4. Appellee is the sole surviving child of the Decedent (R. 49). 
5. Appellant was named as Personal Representative for the Estate of the 
Decedent, Richard D. Snow (R. 29). Appellant has mistakenly stated no probate was filed. 
6. On or about June 2,1998, Mrs. Womack, acting as Personal Representative and 
Trustee of Decedent's Estate and Trust, issued a signed and notarized Inventory under oath 
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(hereinafter the "Inventory") (R.116-120, Exhibit "D"). There is no dispute of fact relating 
to the Inventory. 
7. According to Appellant's inventory, the Decedent left at least $44,000.00 in 
assets in the Decedent's estate. (R. 118, Exhibit "D" at 4). 
8. The miscellaneous personal effects owned by the Decedent, have little or no 
value. (R. 119, Exhibit "D" at 4). 
9. The Decedent, prior to his death, owned a 1995 Chevrolet Custom Van ("Van") 
(R.110, Exhibit "D"). 
10. Upon the Decedent's death, the outstanding debt on the Van amounted to 
$7,034.67, secured by the Van (R. 120, Exhibit "D"). 
11. The Decedent, through the Trust Amendment, specifically devised the Van to 
the Appellant (R. 26, Exhibit "C"). 
12. The Appellant used principal from the Trust to pay off the encumbrance on the 
Van (R. 120, Exhibit "D"). 
13. The Decedent owned a Guredon mobile home upon his death (R. 119, Exhibit 
"D"). 
14. The Decedent devised a limited life estate interest to the Guredon mobile home 
to the Appellant (R. 17, Exhibit "B": R. 26 Exhibit "C": R. 482-487, Exhibit "E"). 
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15. The Appellant put the title of the Guredon mobile home into her own name, and 
not in the name of the Trust. (R. 279, Exhibit "F"). 
16. The Appellant used at least $18,687.35 of the Trust principal to move the 
Guredon mobile home. (R. 489-491, Exhibit "H": 478-481 Exhibit "G"). 
17. Appellant used at least $11,557.11 of the Trust principal to pay for personal 
attorney's fees. (R. 490, Exhibit "H"). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court properly granted Appellee's respective Motions for Summary 
Judgment. In Appellee's first Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the Exempt Property 
Allowance of Section 75-2-403, the Trial Court correctly held that Appellee was entitled to 
the allowance and that the assets of the Estate were sufficient to satisfy Appellee's Petition 
for Exempt Property. The factual determinations used by the Court were based upon 
Appellant's own Inventory filed with the Court. 
In Appellee's second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Trial Court was 
correct in holding that the Trust and Trust Amendment, are clear and unambiguous and 
therefore did not allow extrinsic evidence to interpret the document. Furthermore, the Trial 
Court was correct in finding that Appellant was only an income beneficiary of the Trust, and 
as such, was not entitled to the use or benefits of trust principal. Undisputed facts showed that 
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Appellant had mis-applied trust principal for her own benefit and therefore should be ordered 
to re-pay such principal and cease all use of trust assets until further order of the Court. 
Further, the court ruled correctly that Appellant should be removed as Trustee. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED AS THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS CORRECT WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR $5,000 FOR HER EXEMPT PROPERTY 
ALLOWANCE. 
A. Appellant is Entitled to the Exempt Property Allowances. 
The rights of the beneficiary are the same, whether a devise is granted under the terms 
of a Will, or is granted as a matter of law. The beneficiary is "entitled" to the beneficial 
interest, and is not required to make a "claim" against the estate. If the beneficiary does not 
automatically receive their interest, they can petition the Court to enforce their rights. 
Appellee's Petition for Exempt Property was based on section 75-2-403 of the Utah 
Code, which reads: 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving spouse of a decedent who 
was domiciled in this state is entitled from the estate to value not exceeding 
$5,000 in excess of any security interests therein in household furniture, 
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. If there is no 
surviving spouse, children of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same value. 
If encumbered chattels are selected and if the value in excess of security 
interests, plus that of other exempt property, is less than $5,000, or if there is 
not $5,000 worth of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or children are 
entitled to other assets of the estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up 
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the $5,000 value. Rights to exempt property and assets needed to make up a 
deficiency of exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate, 
except reasonable funeral expenses, and the right to any assets to make up a 
deficiency of exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit prior payment 
of the reasonable funeral expenses, homestead allowance, and family 
allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to the 
surviving spouse or children by intestate succession, but is chargeable against 
any share passing by the will of the decedent unless the will provides otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-403 (emphasis added). Utah Code Section 75-2-403, makes it clear 
that an allowance for exempt property is a right or entitlement. In addition, the rights to 
exempt property takes " . . . priority over all claims", thus defining it as a "right," and 
differentiating it from "claims" and even giving it priority over devises or shares in a will. 
As the sole surviving child of the Decedent with no surviving spouse of the Decedent, 
Appellee was entitled to this allowance. When it was denied by Appellant, Appellee 
petitioned the Trial Court for the allowance. The Trial Court was then required to make 
certain determinations, which it did, and awarded judgment to Appellee for $5,000.00. The 
Trial Court was correct in doing so. 
This Court examined the definition of a claim against an estate in a case entitled In Re 
the Estate of Edward W. Sharp. 537 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975). In Sharp a daughter of the 
Decedent asserted that a piece of property held by the estate was previously conveyed to her 
in a real estate purchase contract. This Court specifically looked at the term claim under a 
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statute that was the 1953 predecessor to section75-3-803. This Court ruled that an action for 
specific performance on a contract is not included in the definition of a claim, as a claim ". 
. . refers to debts or demands against the Decedent which might have been enforced in his 
lifetime, by personal actions for the recovery of money; and upon which only a money 
judgment could have been rendered". Id. at 1037. This Court in Sharp continued by 
explaining that the petitioners were not making a claim as creditors,"... but seeking specific 
performance of contracts to convey property which they claim as their own, thus they cannot 
be called creditors of the estate." Id-
The principle that an individual who requests an allowance granted by statute is not 
making a claim against the estate is echoed in other jurisdictions. In Parson v. Parson, 56 
Cal.Rptr.2d 686, (Cal Ct. App. 1996), the California Court of Appeals looked at whether a 
surviving spouse's petition for family allowance was equivalent to a creditor's claim, making 
the funds held in the Decedent's trust available for the family allowance. In their 
determination the court stated, "the obligation to pay a family allowance is not a iiability of 
the deceased settlor. . . .' It is an obligation that arises only after death and after an 
appropriate order is made." Id. at 689 (citations omitted). In the case at hand, the exempt 
property allowance petitioned for by Appellee is not a debt or demand against the Decedent 
which might have been enforced in his lifetime and therefore, Appellee's Petition for Exempt 
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Property is not a claim against the estate. Thus, Appellant's application of section 75-3-803 
is inappropriate. 
In addition to applying the wrong statute to Appellee's Petition for Exempt Property, 
Appellant misinterprets the inapplicable statute by positing a three month time limitation 
where it does not exist. Appellant claims that Utah Code Section 75-3-803 contains a three 
month statute of limitations from the date of death of the Decedent preventing an Exempt 
Property Allowance. This is not the law. The only three month statute of limitations 
contained in section 75-3-803 is placed on creditors claims made against an estate which are, 
" . . . based on a contract with the personal representative " Utah Code Ann.§75-3-803(3). 
The only other reference to a three month time limitation is a portion of the statute which 
refers to claims made by creditors made three months after the claims arise. 
In the case at hand, not only does section75-3-803 not apply to Appellee's Petition for 
Exempt Property as she is not a creditor of the Estate, but the only three month limitation 
contained in the statute refers to claims made on the estate regarding contracts entered into 
with the Personal Representative and other creditor claims three months after the debt arises. 
Not only is Appellee not a creditor of the Estate, but she made no contract with Appellant, and 
she does not assert a claim against the estate for which any three month time limitation would 
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apply. Appellant's assertion that any petition for allowance made more than three months 
after a Decedent dies is void, is not only illogical, but is contrary to law. 
Appellant mistakenly relies on Jones v. Tax Com'n.. 104 P.2d 210 (1940), in support 
of her theory that section 75-3-803 limits petitions for exempt property to three months after 
the death of the Decedent. The Jones case involved a question as to whether an administratix 
could deduct amounts paid to creditors, who presented no claims against the estate, from the 
gross taxable estate. Although the court in Jones stated that claims regarding creditors not 
made within the requisite time are barred, the Jones case can be easily distinguished from the 
case at hand. The court in the Jones case properly applied the predecessor section to section 
75-3-803, as the Jones case involved creditors of the estate who's debts arose during the life 
of the Decedent. The case at hand involves a child of the Decedent who wishes to assert an 
allowance. There was no attempt in the Jones case to deduct dispositions made to heirs on 
the estate return. Yet that is the nature of Exempt Property Allowance. 
An allowance is comparable to an inheritance. It is automatically allowed. Appellant's 
position, if granted, would also require heirs of the estate to petition for their inheritance 
within the limitations periods. This is not the law. The Trial Court's decision finding that 
section 75-3-803 statute applies only to creditors and not to allowances should be affirmed. 
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B. The Trial Court Relied on Appellant's Accounting Filed with 
the Court in Determining the Value of Assets Otherwise 
Passing to Appellee. 
In deciding how the Exempt Property Allowance should be paid, the Probate Court 
must first make a determination whether there are sufficient personal effects to provide for 
the allowance. In this instance the Trial Court necessarily determined that the personal effects 
of the Decedent had no value. Appellant, as Personal Representative, supplied the Trial Court 
with an Inventory, sworn to be true and correct, under oath, that the personal effects of the 
Decedent had no value (R. 116-120, See Exhibit "D"). Appellee has never disputed this, nor 
has Appellant ever filed any document under oath disputing the Inventory. 
Peculiarly, Appellant now attempts to argue that the personal effects of the estate are 
worth a considerable sum. Also peculiarly, Appellant has provided no facts other than the 
Inventory, no valuation other than the Inventory, and no disputed facts under oath which could 
be used to support her argument the Summary Judgment was not proper. Through all of the 
proceedings, notwithstanding that Appellant wants to say that the personal effects may have 
value, it has been Appellant's duty and in her control to make a determination of the value of 
the effects. Appellant has never filed an affidavit which modified the inventory to add value 
to the personal effects. There are no other facts regarding the value of the inventory other 
than "unknown". 
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Moreover, Section 75-2-405 of the Utah Code, clearly states, "[i]f the estate is 
otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised may not be used to satisfy rights to 
homestead allowance or exempt property." As shown in the Inventory the Decedent's Estate 
was valued by the Appellant at a minimum of $44,000.00, which is more than sufficient to 
provide for Appellee's Exempt Property Allowance. As the Decedent's estate is otherwise 
sufficient, the property which may have been specifically devised to Appellee is not to be 
included in the calculations of her exempt properly allowance. Further, although the Exempt 
Property Allowance is "chargeable" against a share passing to a beneficiary under a will, if 
the specific devises of personal effects, as valued by the Appellant as Personal Representative, 
have no value, then they would be subtracted from the allowance. 
The Trial Court correctly determined the property received by Appellee had no value 
and required no reduction of the allowance. Therefore, the Trial Court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
C. The Trial Court Was Correct When it Found That Decedent's 
Estate Is Sufficient to Satisfy Appellee's Petition for Exempt 
Property. 
Where there is not sufficient personal effects available in an estate to satisfy the 
Exempt Property Allowance it must then be satisfied from other assets. Appellant's Inventory 
established the estate assets at $44,000.00. Since at least $44,000.00 was left in the 
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Decedent's Estate this was more than sufficient to satisfy Appellee's Petition for Exempt 
Property. The undisputed facts show that on or about June 2, 1998, Appellant submitted a 
signed and notarized Inventory verifying under oath, the property in Decedent's estate, and 
the value thereof. (R. 116-120, Exhibit "D"). According to the Inventory, the Decedent at 
his death had property titled in his name valued by Appellant in at least the amount of 
$44,000.00. (R. 118, Exhibit "D"). As previously explained Appellant attributed no value 
to any of the miscellaneous personal effects owned by the Decedent. (R. 119, Exhibit "D"). 
The property in the Decedent's estate valued at $44,000.00 is sufficient to cover Appellee's 
Exempt Property Allowance of $5,000.00. 
The undisputed facts show that the Decedent's Estate is amply sufficient to satisfy 
Appellee's allowance for exempt property. As there is no material issue of fact regarding the 
sufficiency of the Decedent's Estate, the Trial Court was correct in granting Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and awarding Appellee her allowance of $5,000.00. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEE'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE 
INTERPRETATION OF FIVE PROVISIONS IN THE TRUST. 
On June 19,2000, Appellee filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requesting 
that the Court read and construe portions of the Trust regarding the disposition of the Trust 
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Estate. On July 31,2000, the Court granted Appellee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and Appellant has challenged the legal determinations made by the Court. 
A. The Trust Entitles the Appellant to a Restricted Life Estate 
in the Mobile Home and Provides No Disposition of the 
Remainder to the Appellant. 
Where a Trust or Will uses dispositive language limiting or defining the interest to 
coincide with the life of the person, or other events, and no absolute disposition is given of 
the complete interest in the estate or trust, Courts have routinely construed such dispositions 
to convey limited interests or life estates. This Trust clearly creates a restricted life estate in 
the Appellant in one of the major assets of the Trust estate, namely the Decedent's Mobile 
Home. The key dispositive language with regard to the mobile home is as follows: "RUBY 
WOMACK MAY LIVE IN THE MOBILE HOME, GUREDON, AS LONG AS SHE 
DESIRES OR UNTIL SHE REMARRIES OR DIES." (R. 17, Exhibit "B": R. 26; Exhibit 
"C"). 
We agree with the admissions of the Appellant in this respect, that the interest of 
Appellant is terminated upon the death, remarriage, or her desire to cease living in the mobile 
home. (R. 303). This literally defines a restricted life estate. 
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Despite her limited life estate interest in the mobile home, the Appellant changed the 
title of the mobile home into her name. In discussing her actions regarding the mobile home 
in her deposition, the Appellant answered: 
Q. Is the mobile home in your name now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it in your name as the trustee? 
A. I don't think so. I think it's just in my name. 
Q. And why didn't you put it in the name of the trust? 
A. I don't know. I don't know, I can't answer that. 
(R. 279, Exhibit "F" at 3-11). When she was questioned further the respondent stated: 
Q. Isn't the mobile home an asset of the trust? 
A. I guess it is. 
Q. So shouldn't it be titled in the name of the trust? 
A. We could do that. 
(R. 279, Exhibit "F" at 19-24). Even though the Appellant recognizes her life estate in the 
mobile home and recognizes that the mobile home belongs in the Trust, she improperly 
removed the mobile home from the Trust by putting it into her name. 
Furthermore, there is no part of the Trust or the Trust Amendment which provides that 
the remainder of the Trust Estate is to be distributed to Appellant in some absolute form, and 
in particular, the Guredon Mobile Home is never referred to again. The only language 
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relating to the remainder of the Trust Estate is contained at Paragraph 3 of the "Special 
Provisions" section of the Trust Amendment, to wit: 
"THE REMAINDER OF THE TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE HELD IN TRUST TO 
PROVIDE RUBY WOMACK WITH INCOME. RUBY SHALL HAVE COMPLETE 
DISCRETION IN THE USE OF THE TRUST ESTATE." 
(R. 26, Exhibit "C"). Appellant mistakenly argues that because the foregoing Paragraph 3 
contains the word "remainder", she is entitled to the remainder interest in trust. When read 
in context of the whole sentence, this provision clearly states that after previous dispositions, 
the remainder shall be held in trust. This provision can in no way be read to provide that the 
Appellant is entitled to the remainder interest and in fact, specifically provides the opposite, 
that the assets "...shall be held in trust...", not given outright to the Appellant. The last 
sentence of Paragraph 3 "Ruby shall have complete discretion in the use of the trust estate." 
likewise provides no disposition of any remainder interest to Appellant. The actual effect of 
this sentence will be more fully discussed at Article II, Section E of this Brief. However, it 
is clear that the Trial Court's decision should be affirmed that neither the Trust, nor the Trust 
Amendment can be read to provide a remainder interest in the mobile home to Appellant. 
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B. The Trial Court Was Correct in Construing the Trust to 
Provide all of the Remainder of the Trust Should Ultimately 
Be Distributed to Appellee. 
A Trust or will or contract is not ambiguous solely because it is difficult to construe, 
or because there are multiple portions of the document that must be read together to construe 
the document. Further, rules of construction for interpretation of documents is axiomatic. 
Appellant seems to argue that using statutory definitions and rules of construction are not 
allowed if another theory of construction can be imagined and testimony can be produced. 
Document construction by Courts of law would be no better than a roll of the dice if this 
approach was utilized. 
Appellee was and is the sole remainder beneficiary when the Trust and Trust 
Amendment are read together. The effect of the Trust Amendment on the original Trust, 
requires the Court to examine the Trust and the Trust Amendment together to determine the 
Decedent's intent from the language he used. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 974 
(Utah Ct. App 1994)("In construing a will, we are bound by the fundamental principle that 
a court must look to the testator's intent as expressed in the will"). When a court construes 
the meaning of a trust, the court applies the same general rules of construction used in will 
construction. Makoff v. Makoff 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974) (stating "The general rules 
of construction of written instruments apply to the construction of trust instruments, and those 
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rules require a determination of the intention of the settlor." This rule of construction is stated 
more specifically in other cases. See, In re Estate of Mclnernv, 682 N.E.2d 284,289 (111. App. 
Ct. 1997) (holding "When construing trusts, the court will apply the same rules of 
construction it applies when it construes wills."); see also, In re Estate of Sanders, 929 P.2d 
153 (Kan. 1996); Barron v. Snapp. 468 N.W.2d 841 (Iowa App. Ct. 1991); First Interstate 
Bank of Washington v. Lindberg. 746 P.2d 333 (Wash. App. Ct. 1987). 
The Utah legislature has provided specific rules of construction for wills in 
determining when a subsequent document revokes a prior document. Section 75-2-507, of 
the Utah Code reads, "[a] will or any part thereof is revoked: by executing a subsequent will 
that revokes the previous will or part expressly or by inconsistency " (Emphasis added). 
According to this statute, in order to revoke a prior will or part of a prior will, the writing 
must expressly state that it revokes the prior will or be inconsistent with the prior will. 
Based on the foregoing cases, this same rule must apply to trusts. Thus, in order to 
revoke a trust in whole or in part, the subsequent trust or amendment to the trust must 
specifically state that it revokes the previous trust or provisions of the trust, or the subsequent 
trust or amendment to the trust must be inconsistent with the previous trust or provision. 
The Trust Amendment does not expressly state that the prior provision is revoked by 
the amendment and the amendment is not wholly inconsistent with the original trust 
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provisions. (See R. 26; Exhibit "C"). Looking specifically at Article VII of the Trust, at the 
section titled "****SPECIAL PROVISIONS****", paragraph 1., reads: 
RUBY WOMACK MAY LIVE IN THE MOBILE HOME, GUREDON, AS 
LONG AS SHE DESIRES OR UNTIL SHE REMARRIES OR DIES, AT 
THAT TIME THE MOBILE HOME SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO 
MARCIA ELLINGSON, PER STIRPES. THE SAID MOBILE HOME 
SHALL NOT BE SOLD, LEASED, OR RENTED BY RUBY WOMACK. 
(R. 17; Exhibit "B"). 
Paragraph 1., of the Trust Amendment in comparison reads: 
RUBY WOMACK MAY LIVE IN THE MOBILE HOME, GUREDON, AS 
LONG AS SHE DESIRES OR UNTIL SHE REMARRIES OR DIES. 
(R. 26, Exhibit "C"). 
While both of these provisions give the respondent a life estate in the Decedent's 
mobile home, they are not inconsistent. The Trust provision is certainly more specific than 
what appears to be the same provision in the Trust Amendment. However, the Trust 
Amendment does not provide for a remainder disposition of the mobile home, and eliminates 
unnecessary language regarding whether the mobile home may be sold, leased or rented. The 
latter language is unnecessary because the original grant only included the right to live in the 
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mobile home as long as she (i) desires, (ii) lives, or (iii) until remarriage. It is significant that 
no remainder disposition is made. 
In fact, in review of the entire Trust Amendment, the material differences that exist 
between the Trust Amendment and the Trust is that the Trust Amendment specifically devises 
the respondent the Decedent's Van instead of a motor home (See R. 26, Exhibit "C" 
Paragraph 3.), the Trust Amendment modifies what happens for the balance of the estate 
(providing income to Appellant from the Trust, See R. 26, Exhibit "C'Paragraph 3.), and the 
Trust Amendment makes no further disposition of the remainder of Trust assets after the death 
of Appellant. In fact, because it does not deal with the remainder of the trust estate (after the 
death of Appellant), it makes an incomplete disposition unless harmonized and construed with 
the un-amended Trust. 
The Trust Amendment should be construed and harmonized in conjunction with the 
Trust. Section 75-2-507 of the Utah Code reads: 
The testator is presumed to have intended a subsequent will to supplant rather 
than replace a previous will if the subsequent will does not make a complete 
disposition of the testator's estate. If this presumption arises and is not rebutted 
with clear and convincing evidence, the subsequent will revokes the previous 
will only to the extent that the subsequent will is inconsistent with the previous 
will; each will is fully operative on the testator's death to the extent they are not 
inconsistent. 
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The Trust Amendment does not make a complete disposition of the Trust assets as it 
provides no residuary beneficiary. This raises the presumption created in section 75-2-507, 
that the amendment is merely intended to supplant rather than replace the Trust. Therefore 
only those provisions of the Trust Amendment which are directly inconsistent with the Trust 
provisions should be deemed to replace any part of the Trust, otherwise the two documents 
must be read together and harmonized. The only provisions of the Trust Amendment which 
are directly inconsistent with the Trust are the provisions of Paragraphs 1., and 2.; (regarding 
the disposition of the Decedent's Van, and the income to be paid to Appellant). Otherwise 
the two instruments can and should be read in conjunction with one another. Thus, the 
remainder disposition of the Guredon Mobile Home to Appellee under the Trust, Article VII, 
Special Provisions Paragraph 1 should remain as the dispositive provision. Likewise, the 
language of Paragraph 3 can be harmonized by simply construing the Trust Amendment as 
modifying the time when Appellee would have received the distribution of the balance of the 
trust estate, and requiring that this would occur only after the death of Appellant. 
There is some language in the Trust Amendment which can possibly be construed as 
"expressly" revoking the "Special Provisions" portion of the Trust. The following statement 
is found at the end of the provisions marked "Special Provisions" in the Trust Amendment: 
"THESE ABOVE SPECIAL PROVISIONS SUPERSEDE ALL OTHERS IN THIS 
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TRUST". However, this same language is found at the end of the same "Special Provisions" 
Section found at Article VII of the Trust. Thus, since even this section of the Special 
Provisions was not actually amended by the Trust Amendment, we can only conclude that this 
language was not intended to amend or revoke any part of the Trust. Regardless, the same 
result is obtained as set forth at part C below. 
There are no factual issues necessary to be reviewed in construing the Trust and Trust 
Amendment. They must simply be read and a legal determination must be made. As there 
are no material issues of fact regarding the Trust Amendment and its affect on the original 
Trust granting Appellee a remainder interest in the Trust, the Trial Court was correct in 
granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. The Fall-Back Dispositive Provisions of the Trust Provide 
that the Remainder of the Trust be Distributed to Appellee. 
Without question, this Trust and the Trust Amendment were not artfully drafted. 
However, they very clearly did provide for a complete and final disposition. If the Court 
determines that the "Special Provisions" section of Article VII of the Trust Amendment is 
inconsistent with the original Trust "Special Provisions" or otherwise revokes the provision 
naming Appellee as the remainder beneficiary of the Trust, Appellee is still the sole remainder 
beneficiary of the Trust. If the remainder beneficiary provisions of the "Special Provisions" 
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are revoked, the Court must then examine the Trust and see if any other provisions provide 
for a disposition of the remainder. Turning to Article III B. of the Trust (R. 12-14; Exhibit 
"B"), the Trust provides that the remainder of the trust estate shall be divided into two shares, 
one for each of the Decedent's surviving children. Id. If the Decedent's children did not 
survive him, then the deceased child's descendants were to take the deceased child's share per 
stirpes. Id. The Decedent had two children, Appellee and Patricia Sprouse. Unfortunately, 
prior to having any children, Patricia Sprouse passed away before the Decedent. Thus 
according to Article III B. of the Trust, Marcia Snow is the sole remainder beneficiary of the 
Trust. 
Using the same rules of construction applied in Section B., above, the Court must 
arrive at only one conclusion. The Trust language is clear and either way the Court examines 
the issue, Appellee is the sole remainder beneficiary. There are no material issues of fact 
regarding Appellee's status as the sole remainder beneficiary of the Richard D. Snow Family 
Trust, as amended, and this Court should affirm the Trial Court's award of judgment to this 
entitlement as a matter of law. 
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D. The Trial Court Was Correct in Determining That the Term 
"Income" Is Not Ambiguous and Is Limited to the Interest 
Generated by the Trust Principal. 
When Decedent, and the drafters of his Trust and Trust Amendment used the term 
"income" to describe the various dispositions in the Trust, it was not to provide some 
amorphous benefit equivalent to any lifestyle a beneficiary desired. The term was used in the 
normal legal context, with no modifiers. "Income" is a term defined by Utah Statute. Utah 
law provides that trusts shall be governed by the Utah Revised Uniform Principal and Income 
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-15. Within this Act, the Utah legislature defined income as, ". 
.. the return in money or property derived from the use of principal...." Utah Code Ann. § 
22-3-4(1). There is no ambiguity in the term "income" and Appellant's attempt to inject 
ambiguity cannot be taken seriously. Paragraph 3 of the Trust Amendment, "Special 
Provisions," provides Appellant an income benefit as follows: 
"THE REMAINDER OF THE TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE HELD IN TRUST TO 
PROVIDE RUBY WOMACK WITH INCOME" (R. 26, Exhibit "C"). This can only be 
construed in accordance with Utah law and other provisions of the Trust. The Grantor, 
Richard D. Snow, and the drafters of the Trust presumably knew what was intended with the 
term income. They used it numerous times in the Trust. 
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There are no less than ten instances in the Trust in which the term "income" is followed 
by the term "principal", making it clear that Grantor was distinguishing between the two 
terms. Listed below are five such instances. For example, Article II, paragraph 2 states: 
. . . the Trustees shall pay to the Undersigned all to the net income of this Trust, in 
monthly or other convenient installments, but at least annually. The Trustees, shall also pay 
the Undersigned as much of the principal of the Trust . . . (R. 11, Exhibit "B") 
Article 111(B)(1) states: 
The Trustees may use and expend or apply so much or all of first, the income, and 
second, the principal of the trusts . . . (R. 13, Exhibit "B"). 
Article IV states: 
After any of the trusts created herein become irrevocable, the interests of each 
beneficiary in income and principal shall be free from the control or interference of any 
creditor . . . (R. 15, Exhibit "B"). 
Article VIII(C) states: 
From the income of the trusts hereby created, or, if that be insufficient, from the 
principal thereof, the Trustees shall pay . . . (R. 21, Exhibit "B"). 
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And finally another clear and unambiguous distinction between income and principal is found 
in Article XIII(A) which states in part: 
. . . that he has contributed, in whole or in part, including the principal and the present 
or past undisbursed income from such principal... (R. 23, Exhibit "B"). 
It is abundantly clear that if the Grantor had intended that Appellant receive 
distributions of "principal," he would have said so. Appellant's apparent confusion arises 
because of the language of Paragraph 3 relating to discretion in the use of trust assets. 
Following the clear grant of income only, it cannot be seriously contended that the Grantor 
intended that Appellant had carte blanche to do anything and everything she wanted with the 
assets, including give them away. Yet this is the heart of Appellant's contention. 
Although the Appellant was ordered to produce an accounting of the Trust, the 
Appellant has provided nothing more than a bald assertion that the Trust would have 
generated little income, amounting to only $300 and the decedent could not have intended 
such a little amount. However, had the Appellant not taken the $18,687.35 to move the 
mobile home, the $11,557.11 to pay attorney's fees, and the $7,034.67 to pay off the Van, 
there would have obviously been more income generated from the principal. 
Furthermore, the Appellant mistakenly relies on Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797 (Utah 
1974), in support of her theory that the Trial Court should have looked to extrinsic evidence 
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to determine the Decedent's intent in using the term income. The Makoff case involved a 
question as to whether the term "issue" included an adoptive child. The term "issue" was not 
a statutorily defined term at that time, and in order for this Court to interpret what the term 
"issue" meant, it actually did not allow extrinsic evidence, but looked to the law that existed 
when the trust was created to define the term. This court stated that: 
In the year 1956 when the trust was created, the law was well 
settled that an adoptive child could not inherit from the parents 
of its adoptive parents. That was the law as Samuel E. Makoff, 
Sr., undoubtedly understood it, and that is the law that must 
govern the interpretation of the trust before us now. 
LI at 799. 
Our case is similar to Makoff in that the law was well settled in its definition of income 
when the Trust was created and the Court must look to that definition when interpreting the 
term. The Trust was created on November 8, 1993. (R. 25). Section 22-3-4(1), which 
defines income as, ". . . the return in money or property derived from the use of principal. . 
. ." Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-4(1), has remained unchanged since being enacted by the 
Legislature in 1979. The definition the Trial Court used to interpret the meaning of "income" 
was the law as the Decedent and drafters of the trust, undoubtedly understood it, and that is 
the law that must govern the interpretation of the trust before us now. 
There being no ambiguity in the term "income", the Decedent's intent can be derived 
from the documents and the Court does not need to resort to extrinsic evidence in this matter. 
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Moreover, the term "income" as correctly interpreted by the Trial Court was the law when the 
Trust was created. Therefore, the Trial Court's decision should be affirmed as there is no 
ambiguity in the term "income". 
E. Appellant Is Not Entitled to Use Trust Principal for Any 
Purpose, Including Moving the Mobile Home. 
The grant of discretionary powers to a Trustee must necessarily be used, and it is 
presumed, that the Trustee will use those powers, as a fiduciary, and not as a way to raid the 
Trust for the benefit of a Trustee who is also a beneficiary . The words in the Trust 
Amendment which render the Appellant to be an income beneficiary are found at Paragraph 
3., "Special Provisions" and reads: "THE REMAINDER OF THE TRUST ESTATE SHALL 
BE HELDINTRUSTTO PROVIDE RUBY WOMACKWITH/A^COMJ?." (R. 26; Exhibit 
"C")(emphasis added). The next sentence was conveniently mis-used by Appellant to raid the 
Trust principal. It reads (Paragraph 3., "Special Provisions"): RUBY SHALL HAVE 
COMPLETE DISCRETION IN THE USE OF THE TRUST ESTATE. (R. 26; Exhibit "C"). 
Reading both sentences together, Paragraph 3., "Special Provisions", cannot be read as an 
outright disposition of the assets of the Trust to Appellant, but merely a life estate given to the 
Appellant to provide her with income generated from the trust. Such an interpretation would 
29 
vitiate the directions in the first sentence thereof, giving exclusive direction to the second 
sentence. 
The Decedent directed that the remaining Trust assets be held in trust to provide the 
Appellant with income. If the Decedent wished to make an outright disposition of the Trust 
Estate, including principle, he would have done so. The Decedent clearly provided an 
absolute disposition in Paragraph 2, "Special Provisions" of the Trust Amendment which 
reads, "THE 1995 CHEVROLET CUSTOM VAN (OR WHATEVER VEHICLE THE 
GRANTOR OWNS AT HIS DEATH) SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO RUBY WOMACK." 
(R. 26 Exhibit "C"). Likewise in Section D above, there are numerous instances where the 
Decedent did in fact refer to disposition of principal. It is not insignificant that the Decedent 
did not grant a distribution of principal in Paragraph 3. 
Unfortunately, Appellant as an income beneficiary to the Trust, mis-used the grant of 
discretionary authority to raid the principal of the Trust. The Appellant used approximately 
$18,687.35 of the Trust funds to move the Guredon mobile home to a new location in the 
valley, and has not yet provided a full accounting for this mis-use of funds. (R. 489). 
In section75-7-402 of the Utah Code, a trustee is given broad powers in performing 
their duty as a trustee. The Decedent merely re-stated these powers by providing that 
Appellant had complete discretion over the use of the assets Trust Estate. This authority 
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granted by the Decedent can only be read as allowing Appellant to use the Trust Estate in any 
manner she wishes to produce income and fulfill the purposes of the trust. The Decedent 
could not have intended to allow the Appellant to waste the principal on non-income 
producing activities, or worse, to raid the Trust for her own benefit. 
Appellant relies on Ward v. Nationsbank of Virginia, N.A., 507 S.E.2d 616 (Va. 
1998), which reiterates what section 75-7-402 states. However, the court in Ward stated that 
"even though a trustee's discretion is generally broadly construed, 'his actions must be an 
exercise of good faith and reasonable judgment to promote the trust's purpose.'" Id. at 436 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
In Ward, the purpose of the Trust was to provide for the education of the Grantor's 
grandchildren. The court found that the trustee, by allowing a purchase option on a piece of 
property, appeared to have rendered greater financial benefit to the beneficiaries than an 
outright sale of the property would have rendered. In the case at hand, the Appellant as 
Trustee did not promote the Trust's purpose, but only furthered her own personal interests. 
One of the purposes of the Trust was to provide the Appellant with "income"generated from 
the principal. The Appellant depleted the principal by moving the mobile home, and thus, 
frustrated one of the purposes of the Trust. The second purpose of the Trust was to provide 
the Appellee a remainder interest in the Trust. The unauthorized action of the Appellant in 
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taking $18,687.35 of the principal to move the mobile home, did not promote the remainder 
interest of the Appellee, it merely promoted the personal interest of the Appellant to be closer 
to her family. 
As the Appellant is merely an income beneficiary of the Trust and has improperly spent 
the principal of the Trust, this Court must uphold the Trial Court's award of judgment against 
Appellant for at least $18,687.35, and requiring Appellant to render a full accounting, in 
accordance with her fiduciary duties. There is no material issue of fact. The award of 
judgment was based on undisputed facts. The construction of the Trust is a legal issue. There 
being no material issue of fact, the Trial Court was correct that Appellee is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, providing that the Appellant is an income beneficiary only, and 
that Appellant must repay any improper use of Trust principal. 
F. Appellant Is Not Entitled to Use Trust Principal to Pay Her 
Attorney's Fees Where the Expenses are Based on a Contest 
Between Beneficiaries of the Estate and Trust, and Where a 
Beneficiary Seeks Redress for the Trust for Mis-use of Trust 
Principal. 
Appellee brought this action to correct the abuses of Appellant. First, to obtain a legal 
entitlement (the Exempt Property Allowance); second to construe the trust as to the rights of 
Appellant as a beneficiary; and third to stop the raiding and mis-use of trust principal by 
Appellant and obtain redress for the Trust. The expenses of the Appellant are not 
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administrative expenses of the Trust but are personal and incurred solely in her efforts to 
preserve or use all assets of the trust for her own benefit. The Trial Court was correct, after 
reviewing the attorneys fee billings for the Appellant, that the fees and expenses paid were 
solely for the benefit of Appellant and provided no benefits to the Trust Estate. 
This issue was addressed in the Utah Court of Appeals case Estate of Ashton v. Ashton 
(Ashton II), 898 P.2d 824 (1995). In the Ashton II case, the surviving spouse was named 
Personal Representative of the estate and a dispute arose over the dispositions and 
interpretation of the Decedent's will. In the dispute, the wife asked that her attorney's fees 
be paid from the estate as an administrative expense. The court denied the wife's request for 
attorney's fees as administrative expense, stating that the wife,"... incurred her attorney fees 
in her role as a claimant with interests that conflict with other heirs to the estate, not as 
Personal Representative for the estate. Id. at 826. Appellant likewise has incurred attorney's 
fees and other expenses in the protection of her role as a beneficiary and asserts these are an 
expense of the trust against the objections of Appellee. The Appellant has paid for the 
attorney's fees and other expenses from the trust. These expenses are her personal expenses 
and not administrative expenses of the trust. As the Appellant is not allowed to have the Trust 
pay her own personal expenses, the Trial Court's decision must be affirmed. 
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Appellant mistakenly relies on Sundquist v. Sundquist 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981), in 
support of her theory that a trustee can be reimbursed attorney's fees, despite the trustee's 
personal interest in the outcome of the case. The Sundquist case involved a question as to 
whether the Trial Court correctly decreed termination of the trust. Sundquist narrowly held 
that "[a] trustee has the fiduciary duty and the concomitant power to defend the trust from the 
depletion of its assets by decrees oftermination or invalidity'" Id at 188 (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-7-402(1), (3)(x) and (y)) (emphasis added). The case at hand does not deal with 
the termination or invalidity of the trust. Appellant was not defending the trust from decrees 
of termination or invalidity, but was defending her personal interest as a beneficiary. Indeed, 
Sundquist could certainly be relied upon by Appellee in obtaining her own award of attorney's 
fees, as Appellee is defending against the deletion of the Trust assets against the Trustee. 
G. Appellant Improperly Utilized Principal from the Trust by 
Spending $7,034.67 of the Trust Principal in Payment of an 
Encumbrance Associated with Decedent's Van Because the 
Trust Does Not Contain an Exoneration Clause. 
Appellant as, Trustee may not use her position to mis-use trust principal and pay 
encumbrances on property devised to her as a beneficiary. Appellant was specifically devised 
a 1995 Chevrolet Van which was encumbered with indebtedness in the amount of $7,034.67 
at the time of Decedent's death. The Trust made no provision for the repayment of this 
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encumbrance. Appellant mis-used principal of the Trust for her own benefit and paid the 
indebtedness to clear the encumbrance, thereby obtaining an unintended principal distribution. 
The use of Trust Principal in this fashion was improper because (1) Appellant is only 
an income beneficiary and according to the Utah Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 
payments of an indebtedness on trust assets are to be paid out of principal and not income and 
(2) the Trust does not contain a provision, such as an exoneration clause, to allow the Van to 
be distributed to Appellant free of encumbrances. 
The Utah Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act states: 
2. The following charges shall be made against principal: 
(b) . . . the payments on principal of an indebtedness (including a mortgage 
amortized by periodic payments of principal)... 
Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-14(3)(b) (2000). As heretofore determined, Appellant is merely an 
income beneficiary. The Appellant, as an income beneficiary, is only entitled to the income 
generated by the principal of the Trust and not the Trust principal itself. The Utah Code 
defines an income beneficiary as a," . . . person to whom income is presently payable or for 
whom it is accumulated for distribution." Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-2 (2000). Appellant 
acknowledges that the income she would have received was insufficient to pay off her Van 
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debt. To benefit herself, and to the detriment of Appellee as remainder beneficiary, Appellant 
used principal which she was not entitled to and paid off any encumbrance on the Van. The 
Appellant's actions once again depleted Trust principal to her benefit when she is only an 
income beneficiary. 
In order to have a debt associated with a specific devise exonerated, the governing 
instrument must have an exoneration provision. Neither the Trust nor Trust Amendment has 
an exoneration provision. When a court construes the meaning of a trust, the court applies the 
same general rules of construction used in will construction. Makoff, 528 P.2d at 798 
(holding that the general rules of construction of written instruments apply to the construction 
of trust instruments.). This rule of construction is stated more specifically in other cases. See 
In re Estate of Mclnernv. 682 N.E.2d 284 (111. App. Ct. 1997) (stating "When construing 
trusts, the court will apply the same rules of construction it applies when it construes wills."); 
see also, In re Estate of Sanders, 929 P.2d 153 (Kan. 1996); Barron v. Snapp. 468 N. W.2d 841 
(Iowa App. Ct. 1991); First Interstate Bank of Washington v. Lindberg. 746 P.2d 333 (Wash. 
App. Ct. 1987). The Utah Uniform Probate Code specifically provides for the non-
exoneration of liens on specific devises. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-609. Section 75-2-609 
states: "A specific devise passes subject to any security interest existing at the date of death, 
without right of exoneration, regardless of a general directive in the will to pay debts." Id. 
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A devise is defined as "a testamentary disposition of real or personal property and when used 
as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal property by will." Id. at §75-1-201. Section 
75-3-814 allows the Personal Representative to pay encumbrances of devises in certain 
circumstances. See id- at § 75-3-814. However, the editorial board comment to this section 
clarifies its reach. The comment provides: "Section 75-2-609 establishes a rule of 
construction against exoneration. Thus, unless the will indicates to the contrary, a specific 
devisee of mortgaged property takes subject to the lien without right to have other assets 
applied to discharge the secured obligation." Id. Editorial Board Comment (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the Decedent owned a Chevrolet Custom Van, which he specifically 
devised to the Appellant in his Trust Amendment. (R. 119, Exhibit "D"). In the specific 
devise of the Van, the Trust Amendment does not provide that the estate assets may be used 
to pay off the loan for the Van. (R. 26-27, Exhibit "C"). The silence as to the use of assets 
of the estate and trust to pay off the loan brings the facts within the grasp of the rule on non-
exoneration. When the Decedent died, there was an outstanding loan on the Van in the 
amount of $7,034.67, which Appellant paid off using principal from the Trust. (R. 120, 
Exhibit "D"). Appellant was not entitled to use assets of the Decedent's estate or Trust to pay 
off the loan for the Van. Therefore, the Trial Court's decision awarding judgment against 
Appellant for $7,034.67 should be affirmed. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEE'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REFUSED TO 
RECEIVE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE TESTATOR'S 
INTENT. 
Although not artfully drafted, the Trust and Trust Amendment can be properly 
construed when they are read together, and using standard rules of construction. Appellant 
mis-states the law when she invited the Court to review extrinsic facts instead of using 
standard common law and statutory rules of construction. Appellant made a valiant, but 
fatally deficient argument that because Appellant can imagine a new definition for income, 
extrinsic evidence should have been used to construe the Trust. However, the Trial Court 
noted that the word "income" was not ambiguous "when the Trust and the amendment are 
read in conjunction with the [statutory] definition of income," and using standard rules of 
construction. (R. 583 p. 32 lines 1-3). In reading the Trust and the Trust Amendment, the 
Trial Court was referring to the fact that the term "income" is followed by the term "principal" 
in ten separate instances, clearly indicating the Decedent could distinguish between the two 
terms. As to the statutory definition, the Trial Court used section 22-3-4(1) where "income" 
is defined as ," . . . the return in money or property derived from the use of principal—" Utah 
Code Ann. §22-3-4(1). 
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Moreover, the statute defining income was in place at the time when both the Trust and 
Trust Amendment were created, and was the law as the Decedent and drafters of the trust 
undoubtedly understood it to be. As provided in previous argument, the word "income" as 
contained in the Trust and Trust Amendment is clear and unambiguous and therefore the Trial 
Court was correct in not allowing extrinsic evidence as to testator's intent. 
Secondly, the Trust is clear and unambiguous as it relates to the word "remainder". 
The Appellant attempts to argue that because Paragraph 3, "Special Provisions" of the Trust 
Amendment contains the word remainder, she is somehow entitled to the remainder interest 
in Trust and therefore causes the Trust to be ambiguous. The actual language of the Trust 
Amendment reads, "THE REMAINDER OF THE TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE HELD IN 
TRUST TO PROVIDE RUBY WOMACK WITH INCOME." (R. 26, Exhibit "C") 
(emphasis added). This provision clearly states that after previous dispositions, the remainder 
shall be held in trust. The remainder is to be held in trust to provide Appellant with income. 
With the income being the interest returned on principal, it becomes even more clear that the 
principal, or remainder, is held in the trust to provide interest. The remainder interest 
thereafter going to Appellee. 
As the Appellant is only an income beneficiary, the Decedent instructed that the 
remainder of the Trust Estate be held in Trust. Id. The Decedent knew that in order to earn 
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income, or interest, there must be principal. As such, the Decedent provided that the 
remainder, or principal, be held in trust. The Appellant is merely given a life estate in the 
Trust to provide Appellant with income generated from the Trust. 
The Appellant mistakenly relies on Estate of Ashton v. Ashton (Ashton I), 804 P.2d 
540 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), in support of her theory that because part of the Trust uses the word 
"remainder" in the same sentence with the word "income", that the Trust is ambiguous. The 
court in the Ashton I case involved a sentence which was facially ambiguous. The first 
sentence seemed to be a disposition of a fee interest. The sentence immediately following 
then seemed to provide a restricted use of the very same assets. This is not the case here. The 
Ashton I court held that this provision seemed "to devise the entire estate to Mrs. Ashton in 
fee simple, while the last sentence suggests a life estate,...". The provision was ambiguous 
on its face. The Ashton I case dealt with one provision containing two separate meanings. 
However, the case at hand does not involve one provision containing two separate meanings, 
but clear drafting relating to retention of the remainder in trust to provide income to 
Appellant. Certainly no extrinsic evidence was necessary to read that sentence. 
The Appellant also mistakenly argues that the trial court erred by not allowing extrinsic 
evidence of the decedent's intent with regards to statements made by witnesses. However, 
there were no witnesses testimony presented relating to intent at the time the Trust or the Trust 
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Amendment was executed. Specifically, the Appellant relies on the affidavits of two 
witnesses, Chris Welch and Jim Goss, to support her contention, but, neither affidavit speaks 
to the intent at the time of execution, only long after the Trust and Trust Amendment were 
executed. Also, the Appellant states that the Appellee was unloved and un-favored by her 
father, but contrary to Appellant's assertion, the Decedent named Appellee as Successor 
Trustee in the Trust Amendment. 
The Trial Court's decision to exclude such extrinsic evidence and to award Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court properly held that under section 75-2-403 of the Utah Code, that an 
allowance for exempt property is a right or entitlement, therefore authorizing the Appellee to 
receive the $5000 Exempt Property Allowance. In addition, the Trial Court properly made 
the determination, based on the Appellant's own Inventory, that the Estate was sufficient to 
provide the Appellee with the allowance authorized by Utah Code section 75-2-403. 
According to the Appellant's Inventory, the estate assets were valued at $44,000. This fact 
is undisputed and therefore the Trial Court was correct in determining that the Decedent's 
Estate was more than sufficient to satisfy the Appellee's Petition for Exempt Property. 
Moreover, the Trial Court properly held that section 75-3-803 deals strictly with "Creditor's 
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Claims" and is not applicable to restrict beneficiaries of an estate from obtaining their rightful 
share and benefits. 
The Trial Court properly held the Trust and Trust Amendment did not revoke the Trust 
and that the Trust and Trust Amendment should be read together where not inconsistent. 
When read together, the Appellant is only entitled to a restricted life estate in the mobile home 
and is not entitled to a remainder interest in the Trust creating a remainder interest in 
Appellee. The Trial Court properly held that the term"income" is not ambiguous based on the 
definition given it by statute, a reading of the clear and unambiguous language in the Trust 
and Trust Amendment, and on the term income as defined by law when the Trust and Trust 
Amendment were created. As such, the Trial Court properly held the Appellant is only an 
income beneficiary of the Trust. The Appellant raided principal of the Trust Estate, to pay 
off a Van that had been devised to her, to pay her attorney's fees in defense of her beneficiary 
status, and to move the mobile home for her personal benefit. The Trial Court properly held 
that because the Appellant is only an income beneficiary of the Trust she was not entitled to 
the use or benefits of trust principal and therefore must repay any improper use of trust 
principal. 
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LEXSEE 1990 Utah App. LEXIS 204 
In the Matter of the Estate of Kenneth Dale Ashton, Plaintiff and 
Appellee, v. Steven Ashton, Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 900275-CA 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
804 P.2d 540; 151 Utah Adv. Rep. 27; 1990 Utah App. LEXIS 204 
December 31,1990, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
[** 1] Third District, Salt Lake County The Honorable Raymond S. Uno. 
DISPOSITION: 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the Court being sufficiently advised in 
the premises, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district court be, and the 
same is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in the 
opinion filed herein. 
COUNSEL: 
Robert H. Wilde, Midvale, for Appellant. 
John J. Borsos, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge. Norman H. Jackson, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge, concur. 
OPINIONBY: 
GARFF 
OPINION: 
[*541] Appellant, Steven Ashton, appeals the order determining the heirs of his father, Kenneth Dale 
Ashton, claiming that the operative language of the will conveys only a life estate. The court, in an order 
dated December 1, 1989, determined that Ruth Elizabeth Ashton, the deceased's second wife, took the 
estate free and clear of all claims of the children. We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
Decedent, Kenneth Dale Ashton, and his first wife, Thelma, had four children. After Thelma died, Mr. 
Ashton married Ruth Elizabeth Ashton on August 30, 1985. On March 12, 1986 he executed a will. The 
relevant portion of the will, section v, reads [**2] as follows: 
I give, devise and bequeath all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of whatever nature or wherever 
situated, which I may own or have the right to dispose of at the time of my death to my beloved wife, Ruth 
Elizabeth Ashton. She shall have the full enjoyment of the estate for as long as she desires or shall live. 
On January 5, 1989, Mr. Ashton died and the will was admitted to probate. Mrs. Ashton objected to 
the appointment of the children as personal representatives because she was named in the will and was 
therefore preferred under the Utah statute. The court then appointed Mrs. Ashton as personal 
representative. The trial court concluded that Mr. Ashton, through his [*542] will, left his entire estate to 
Mrs. Ashton "free and absolute of any claim of any other heir." 
Steven Ashton appeals the court's conclusion that Mrs. Ashton inherited a fee simple interest rather 
than a life estate. 
AMBIGUITY AND TESTATOR'S INTENTIONS 
We focus our attention on section v of the will and what appears to be ambiguous wording. The 
threshold question of whether a writing is ambiguous is one of law. Because the initial determination of 
whether a writing is ambiguous does not require resort [**3] to extrinsic evidence, we accord the trial 
court's interpretation no particular deference and we review for correctness. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 
790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Grayson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989). 
If the will is ambiguous, any rule of construction normally used in other writings must yield to the 
intention of the testator as revealed in the instrument. In re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 P. 748, 749 
(Utah 1924); In re Poppleton's Estate, 34 Utah 285, 97 P. 138, 140 (1908). The factual issue of the 
decedent's intent is one we review with deference to the trial court's findings, if adequate, and we reverse 
only upon a finding of clear error. In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). In order to show clear error, the appellant "must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneouse.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
In construing a will, [**4] a court must look to the testator's intent as expressed in the will. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-2-603 (1978); In re Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah 1980). The intent may 
be "ascertained not alone from the provision itself, but from a scrutiny of the entire instrument of which it 
is a part, and in the light of the conditions and circumstances in which the instrument came into existence." 
Poppleton, 97 P. at 140 (quoting Adams v. First Baptist Church, 148 Mich. 140, 111 N.W. 757, 11 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 509, 515 (1907); accord, Gardner, 615 P.2d at 1217. Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used to 
ascertain what the testator intended. 
Once a court determines intent, it must then "find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon ...." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). With some minor exceptions, failure to make 
findings on all material issues constitutes reversible error. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987). The findings "must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is 
supported by, the evidence.'" Id. (quoting Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986)). The findings 
also '"should be sufficiently [**5] detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" Acton, 737 P.2d at 999 (quoting Rucker 
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). 
The first sentence of the disputed passage appears to devise the entire estate to Mrs. Ashton in fee 
simple, while the last sentence suggests a life estate, making the clause ambiguous on its face. While the 
court did make findings in the present case, those findings pertain only to the dates of marriage, execution 
of the will, signing of an addendum, and of the death. The findings make no mention of the testator's intent 
or the conditions and circumstances surrounding the making of the will. Nor do the findings include 
subsidiary facts showing the steps leading to the court's conclusion that the decedent intended that Mrs. 
Ashton be the only heir, taking the estate free and absolute of any claim of any other heir. 
Because the findings are insufficient to allow for adequate review, we remand for the trial court to 
make explicit, detailed findings as to the conditions and circumstances surrounding the making of the will, 
[*543] the nature of the estate, nl and finally [**6] the decedent's intent, and how that intent supports the 
court's conclusion. 
nl A life estate, while sensible in the context of real estate, would be quite anomalous in the 
context of, say, cash. Other pertinent facts include that the testator called his attorney to specifically 
add the second sentence to the key provision after he reviewed it in draft; that no provision is made, 
in a will otherwise quite detailed and complex, for distribution of any life estate remainder interest; 
and that the decedent made ample provision for his wife through nontestamentary means such as 
insurance and joint tenancy. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
LEXSEE 1995 Utah App. LEXIS 66 
In the matter of the Estate of Kenneth Dale Ashton, Deceased; Ruth E. 
Ashton, Appellant, v. Steven Ashton, Kim Ashton, Mark Ashton, and 
Linda Ashton Manis, Appellees. 
Case No. 940696-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
898 P.2d 824; 267 Utah Adv. Rep. 59; 1995 Utah App. LEXIS 66 
June 29,1995, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
[**1] Third District, Salt Lake County. The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis. 
DISPOSITION: 
Reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
COUNSEL: 
John J. Borsos and Gary J. Bell, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
John K. Rice, Midvale, for Appellees. 
JUDGES: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge, James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge, Michael J. Wilkins, Judge. 
OPINIONBY: 
RUSSELL W. BENCH 
OPINION: 
[*825] OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Ruth Elizabeth Ashton appeals the trial court's decision to include in Kenneth Dale Ashton's estate 
property that was jointly held by her and Mr. Ashton. We reverse in part, and remand. 
FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Ashton were married in August 1985. Mr. Ashton had four adult children from a 
previous marriage and Mrs. Ashton had three adult children from a previous marriage. During their 
marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Ashton held title to various properties as joint tenants, tenants in common, or in 
their individual names. Mr. Ashton died on January 5, 1989. 
Following Mr. Ashton's death, the trial court appointed Mrs. Ashton as personal representative of Mr. 
Ashton's estate and subsequently ruled that Mrs. [**2] Ashton was the sole heir of Mr. Ashton's estate. 
Mr. Ashton's children appealed the trial court's ruling that Mrs. Ashton was the sole heir of Mr. Ashton's 
estate. This court reversed and remanded for findings with respect to "the conditions and circumstances 
surrounding the making of the will, the nature of the estate, and finally the decedent's intent...." Estate of 
Ashton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540, 542-43 (Utah App. 1990). This court recognized that Mr. Ashton had 
"made ample provision for his wife through nontestamentary means such as ... joint tenancy." Id. at 543 
n.l. 
On remand, the case was assigned to a different judge and consolidated with another case brought by 
Mr. Ashton's children who also sought an injunction that would prohibit Mrs. Ashton from rewriting her 
own will or wasting any of the property in Mr. Ashton's name. The trial court issued a bench ruling 
denying Mrs. Ashton a fee simple interest in the estate and denying her request that her attorney fees be 
paid by the estate as administrative expenses. In its written judgment, findings of fact, and conclusions of 
law, the trial court ruled that Mr. Ashton's estate included all properties that were held [**3] by Mr. [* 
826] and Mrs. Ashton as joint tenants. Mrs. Ashton appeals the trial court's ruling with respect to the 
property held in joint tenancy and its denial of her request for attorney fees. 
ANALYSIS 
Joint Tenancy 
Mrs. Ashton argues that the trial court erred by including in Mr. Ashton's estate property that, at the time of 
his death, was held by ho*h parses ?s joinf tenants with full right of survivorship. We agree. 
When title to property is held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, a rebuttable presumption 
arises that the title holders intended to create a valid joint tenancy. See Spader v. Newbold, 29 Utah 2d 433, 
435, 511 P.2d 153, 154 (1973); Culley v. Culley, 17 Utah 2d 62, 63, 404 P.2d 657, 658 (1965). A party 
challenging the validity of a joint tenancy bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that at the time title was taken by the joint tenants there was no intent^,x to create a valid joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship. Spader, 511 P.2d at 154; Culley, 404 P.2d at OD8 n.l; see also 48A C.J.S. Joint 
Tenancy § 3 (1981) ("in view of the presumption of donative iiuent in favor of the survivor of a joint 
tenancy, one [**4] claiming against such survivor mast prove the absence of donative intent by clear and 
convincing evidence such that no reasonable doubt is left in the mind of the trier of fact.") 
In the present case, Mr. and Mrs. Ashton held properties that each brought into the marriage, as well as 
after-acquired property, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The trial court's findings focus on Mr. 
Ashton's intent when he created his will and not on his intent when the joint tenancies were created, nl 
Mrs. Ashton does not challenge the findings of fact, but instead argues that the findings do not support the 
court's conclusion that property held in joint tenancy should be included in Mr. Ashton's estate. Because 
Mrs. Ashton does not challenge the findings, we assume that "the record supports the findings of the trial 
court. ..." Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). 
nl Mr. Ashton's intent when he executed his will does not rise to the level of clear and 
convincing evidence that he did not intend to create the joint tenancies. See Spader, 511 P.2d at 
154; Culley, 404 P.2d at 658 n.l. 
[**5] 
The trial court's findings must be adequate to support its ultimate conclusion that joint tenancy 
property should be included in Mr. Ashton's estate. See, e.g., Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 
App. 1990) (holding that findings must be adequate to demonstrate that trial court considered relevant 
factors in making its ultimate conclusion). Because the trial court's findings address only Mr. Ashton's 
intent when he created his will, the findings do not support its conclusion that Mr. Ashton did not intend to 
create the joint tenancies. Id. 
We conclude that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that Mr. Ashton did not intend 
to create the joint tenancies. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred by including the joint tenancy 
property in Mr. Ashton's estate. 
Administrative Expenses 
Mrs. Ashton argues that the trial court erred by denying her request to have Mr. Ashton's estate pay her 
attorney fees as administrative expenses payable to the personal representative. We disagree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 (1993) provides that "if any personal representative or person nominated 
as personal representative defends or prosecutes any [**6] proceeding in good faith, whether successful or 
not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred." Id. In the present case, Mrs. Ashton incurred her attorney fees in her 
role as a claimant with interests that conflict with other heirs to the estate, not as personal representative for 
the estate. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Mrs. Ashton's [*827] request 
that the estate pay her attorney fees as administrative expenses. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by including property in Mr. Ashton's estate that was held in joint tenancy. The 
trial court did not err by denying Mrs. Ashton's request that the estate pay her attorney fees as 
administrative expenses. n2 
n2 Mr. Ashton's children request attorney fees and costs on appeal; however, they provide no 
legal basis for their request. The request for attorney fees and costs on appeal is therefore denied. 
Reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings [**7] consistent with this opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
CONCURBY: 
JAMES Z. DAVIS; MICHAEL J. WILKINS 
CONCUR: 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
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[**1] Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Max R. Werling, Judge. 
Appellants challenge district court's finding that the term "child" in a trust agreement was 
unambiguous. 
DISPOSITION: 
AFFIRMED. 
COUNSEL: 
John A. Templer, Jr., of Shearer, Templer & Pingel, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellants. 
Robert N. Downer and Timothy J. Krumm of Meardon, Sueppel, Downer & Hayes, Iowa City, for 
appellee. 
JUDGES: 
Oxberger, C.J. Schlegel, J., concurs. Sackett, J., specially concurs. 
OPINIONBY: 
OXBERGER 
OPINION: 
[*842] The facts giving rise to this appeal stem from the various family trees left by Gene Harold 
Snapp, Sr., following his four marriages. Gene, Jr. is Gene, Sr.'s son from his third marriage. That marriage 
ended by dissolution and Gene, Sr., obtained custody of Gene, Jr. pursuant to the dissolution decree. Jane 
L. Fleck, with whom Gene, Jr. was raised, is the daughter of Gene, Sr.'s fourth wife, Elaine E. Snapp. 
Gene, Sr. legally adopted Jane. Carol D. Barron is Gene Snapp, Sr.'s daughter from his second marriage, 
which only lasted a shon period of time. Carol was bom in Oklahoma in 1948 shortly before Gene, Sr. and 
her mother divorced. Pursuant to the dissolution decree, Gene, Sr. paid child [**2] support for Carol for a 
few years after the dissolution. Carol's mother remarried when Carol was six. When Gene, Sr. learned of 
the marriage he stopped making child support payments. Although Carol used the last name of her mother's 
second husband, Byrle Dunn, he never adopted her. 
Gene, Sr. died on May 31, 1981, leaving a significant estate. Gene, Sr.'s 1979 will which was admitted 
to probate contained a pour over provision whereby the bulk of Gene, Sr.'s estate passed to a trust created 
in 1975. Gene, Jr. who is a certified public accountant and lawyer, drafted Gene, Sr.'s 1975 Trust 
Agreement. He drafted the agreement using standard forms obtained from the accounting firm where he 
worked in 1975. These standard forms did not direct defining the term "child" by using specific names. 
Gene, Jr. and the Davenport Bank and Trust Company serve as co-trustees of the Trust. 
Gene, Jr. maintains he did not know of Carol's existence at the time he drafted the Trust Agreement. 
He also testified that at the time he drafted the Trust Agreement Gene, Sr.'s will named only Gene, Jr. and 
Jane as his "beloved children." Gene, Sr.'s 1979 will did not name any of his children, other than naming 
Gene, [**3] Jr. as executor, and added a provision giving some stock in one of his business enterprises to 
Dale Snapp, his brother. Gene, Jr. testified he drafted the Trust Agreement to take advantage of changing 
tax laws and he based calculations on distributions to two children. The Trust Agreement divides the estate 
into two parts: "A" and "B". Part "A" defines the marital deduction trust fund under which Elaine Snapp is 
the beneficiary. Part "B" defines the nonmarital trust fund. Its income and principal are to be made 
available at the co-trustees' discretion to Elaine and Gene, Sr.'s children. 
[*843] We review the interpretation of the Trust Agreement de novo. In re Estate of Nagl, 408 
N.W.2d 768, 771 (Iowa App. 1987). We give weight to the findings of fact made by the trial court, but are 
not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(7). 
The general rules of construction apply when interpreting wills and trusts. In re Work Family Trust, 
260 Iowa 898, 901, 151 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1967). We resort to technical rules or canons of construction 
only if the language of a trust is ambiguous or if the settlor's intent is for any reason uncertain. See Estate 
of Christensen, 461 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa App. 1990) [**4] (authorities omitted). Where we find the 
terms of a trust unambiguous, we are precluded from interpreting those terms. In re Estate of Kiel, 357 
N.W.2d 628, 630 (Iowa 1984). 
The disputed provision of the 1975 Trust Agreement states: 
Upon the death of the Settlor's wife, or her written renunciation of all interest in Trust Fund B, the Trustees 
shall divide the balance remaining of Trust Fund B into equal separate shares of such number so that one 
such share shall be then distributed to each then surviving child of the Settlor and one such share shall be 
distributed, per stirpes, to the descendants of each then deceased child of the Settlor. 
The appellants do not dispute Carol is the natural child of Gene, Sr., and was never adopted by Byrle 
Dunn. The appellants argue that in the circumstances of this case the term "child" is ambiguous and the 
circumstances surrounding the creation of the Trust Agreement make it clear Gene, Sr. did not intend to 
include Carol as a beneficiary of his trust. 
The trial court found the term "child" as used in the Trust Agreement an unambiguous term. We agree. 
In oral argument the appellants relied on the recently decided case [**5] Estate of Christensen, 461 
N.W.2d 469 (Iowa App. 1990) as support for their contention the trial court erroneously failed to find 
Gene, Sr. did not intend to benefit Carol. We find this reliance misplaced. In Christensen we found an 
obvious mistake in draftsmanship of a will which allowed us to go beyond the words of the will to search 
for the intent of the testator. We do not find a similar scrivener's mistake in this case. 
In Christensen, the testator executed a contract providing she would take a life estate in all of her 
husband's estate instead of the share he left her in his will. Three of her children forewent their share in 
their father's estate in consideration for their mother's agreement to execute a will leaving all the property 
to them at her death. The contract specifically named the three children but the will referred only to "my 
children." The dispute revolved around whether the testator intended to exclude the heirs of a deceased 
child who had received a specific cash bequest in their grandfather's will. 
We found in Christensen the testator clearly intended to benefit only her children named in the 
contract executed in conjunction with [**6] her will. Id. at 471. This case does not arise simply as the 
result of a scrivener's mistake. Gene, Sr. clearly knew Carol existed and she was his daughter even though 
he apparently did not attempt to maintain any relationship with her. If he did not want her to be a 
beneficiary of his Trust, he could have specifically excluded her. The term "child" in the Trust Agreement 
is not ambiguous. We find no reason to exclude one of the settlor's daughters merely because he did not 
maintain a relationship with her during his lifetime. Parents cannot simply rid themselves of their children 
by passive omission. 
In light of this decision we need not address the appellant's contentions regarding Gene, Sr.'s intent. 
The Trust Agreement does not require interpretation with respect to the term "child." 
AFFIRMED. 
CONCURBY: 
SACKETT 
CONCUR: 
[*844] SACKETT, J. (specially concurring). 
I concur with the majority in all respects except, rather than distinguishing Estate of Christensen, 461 
N.W.2d 469 (Iowa App. 1990), I would overrule it for all the reasons set forth in my dissent in Christensen, 
461 N.W.2d 471-72. [**7] 
LEXSEE 1987 Wash. App. LEXIS 4367 
First Interstate Bank of Washington, as Trustee, Respondent, v. William 
B. Lindberg; Barbara Lindberg; Martha Ann Lindberg; Von 
Reichbauer; William H. Lindberg; Isabel Lindberg; The Lawful issue of 
William Lindberg; Irene Prescott; Loren Prescott; D. Clinton Prescott, 
Jr.; John Prescott; Ann Prescott Maxwell; Carol Prescott Harris; et al, 
Appellant 
No. 9492-4-II 
COURT OF APPEALS OF WASHINGTON, Division Two 
49 Wn. App. 788; 746 P.2d 333; 1987 Wash. App. LEXIS 4367 
December 2,1987, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: 
Reconsideration Denied January 12, 1988. Review Denied by Supreme Court May 4, 1988. 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 83-2-03568-1, D. Gary Steiner, J., on 
December 19, 1985, entered a judgment allocating the trust assets and requiring the trustee to reimburse the 
trust for one-half the proceeds of insurance policies that the trustee had not collected. 
DISPOSITION: 
Holding that trustor's trust amendments and exercise of a power of appointment were effective, that the 
beneficial interest of the former wife of the trustor's son was personal to her and was not waived by a 
property settlement agreement, that the trustee's failure to provide annual accountings to the son was 
harmless, and that the trial court had properly exercised its discretion in awarding costs and attorney fees, 
but that the son was entitled to interest on a bequest, and that the trustee had no duty to collect the proceeds 
of the insurance policies, the court affirms the judgment except as to the interest on the bequest and the 
award of one-half the proceeds of the insurance policies, which are reversed, and remands the case for a 
determination of costs and attorney fees [***2] on appeal. 
HEADNOTES: 
[1] Trusts — Amendment — Irrevocability — Effect. The fact that a trust is irrevocable does not prevent it 
from being subject to amendment so long as any amendment does not have the effect of revoking the trust. 
[2] Trusts — Construction — Superfluous Provisions. A court construes a trust by giving meaning to all 
of its language. 
[3] Wills — Powers of Appointment — Execution — Reference in Will — Necessity. The exercise of a 
testamentary power of appointment can be brought about by any language in a will that clearly indicates 
the intent of the holder of the power to exercise it. A power can be exercised even though it is not 
specifically mentioned in the will. 
[4] Trusts — Beneficiaries — Nature of Right — Personal or Derivative. A trust distribution provision 
that identifies a beneficiary by name as well as by status confers a distributive right on the named person as 
an individual and is not affected by his loss of the status mentioned. 
[5] Contracts - Costs - Attorney Fees - Contractual Right - "Bring" an Action - What 
Constitutes. For purposes of a contract provision allowing an attorney fee award in an action brought to 
enforce the contract, a party whose pleadings make an issue of the contract "brings" the action even if he 
did not initiate the lawsuit himself. 
[6] Appeal — Findings of Fact — Review — In General. Findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. 
[7] Trusts — Attorney Fees — Test. In an action necessary for the proper administration of a trust, the trial 
court has discretion to award from the trust estate that portion of each party's attorney fees incurred for 
asserting positions that benefited the trust. 
[8] Trusts — Construction - Considered as a Whole. A particular trust provision is construed in the light 
of all the trust language as a whole. 
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WORSWICK 
OPINION: 
[*790] [**335] In 1966, Hilding and Isabel Lindberg created an inter vivos trust naming First 
Interstate Bank (then known by another name) as trustee. The Lindbergs placed into the trust almost all of 
their community property, worth about $ 11 million and consisting of real estate, securities and personal 
property. The Lindbergs amended the trust instrument twice during Hilding's lifetime. The trust provided 
that if Hilding died first, the trustee was to hold and manage the trust assets, pay income to Isabel during 
her lifetime, and make a scheduled distribution of the remaining assets upon her death. The distribution 
schedule allocated a substantial portion of the final distribution to William [***3] Lindberg, Isabel's and 
Hilding's son. 
When Hilding died in 1971, the Bank divided the trust into the "deceased spouse's share" (the 00 
account) and the "surviving spouse's share" (the 02 account) in accordance with the terms of the trust. The 
assets initially were divided by allocating one-half interest in each asset to each account. However, in 
order to raise cash to pay Hilding's [*791] death taxes, the Bank later sold all of the 00 account's real 
estate, including the interest in the family home, to the 02 account. Thereafter, all of the real property 
except the family home was sold to third parties. Isabel had prior notice of these sales and was 
instrumental in causing them. 
After Hilding's death, Isabel several times amended the trust as it applied to her [**336] share. She 
stated, in the eighth and last amendment (her sixth amendment), that "since the execution of all but the 
Seventh Amendment to said Living Trust, the Trustor has been alienated by the statements and conduct of 
William B. Lindberg, so that the Trustor no longer wishes him as an heir, beneficiary or devisee of her trust 
estate;..." She then directed that her interest in the family home be distributed [***4] to Irene Prescott, her 
sister-in-law. 
When Isabel died in December 1982, a dispute arose, primarily instigated by William, as to how the 
trust assets should be distributed. To resolve the conflict, the Bank filed a declaratory judgment action, 
naming as defendants all of the residual beneficiaries. William generally contested the Bank's interpretation 
of the trust, and he counterclaimed against the Bank for trust mismanagement and negligence. Also, he 
specifically acknowledged in his answer that he had contested the proposed distribution to his former wife, 
Barbara, and he affirmatively prayed that the court determine that she was not entitled to any distribution. 
The trial court tried the case in three phases: (1) issues concerning trust interpretation; (2) issues 
concerning the interest of William's former wife, Barbara; and (3) issues concerning trust management. In 
phase one, the court held that the trust agreement gave Isabel the power to amend the distribution schedule 
as to her share. It also held that in her will Isabel had exercised a power of appointment given her by the 
trust. In phase two, the court held that Barbara was a trust beneficiary in her own right, and [***5] that 
she had not waived her interest by entering into a property settlement agreement with William. The court 
held in [*792] phase three that the Bank had failed to protect the trust's interest in Isabel's life insurance 
policies, to marshal certain assets into the trust accounts and properly to sell certain real property. It 
entered money judgments against the Bank accordingly. The court rejected all other contentions of 
negligence and mismanagement by the Bank. Finally, the court awarded the parties percentages of their 
attorney fees and costs and designated the specific trust accounts from which these should be paid, nl 
nl The trial court allowed the following: 
| First interstate Bank [T7% of its attorneys fe~e~s~; 15% of its costs trom 
Prescotts 
William Lmdberg 
Guardian ad litem 
Barbara Lindberg 
Dorothy Engum 
;p r i nc1- ~^ 
ipal of the residuary trust estate of the 
;surviving spouse. 
i68% tees, 60% costs, from principal 
of the residuary 
;trust estate of the deceased spouse. 
:80% tees & costs trom principal 
jot the residuary trust 
{estate of the surviving spouse. 
120% tees Sc costs from principal 
iot the residuary trust 
jestate of the deceased spouse. 
$ 78,265 fees and costs, other 
;than expert tees, from 
1 principal of the residuary trust 
iestate ot the deceased 
;spouse. 
|$ 31,306 tees and costs to be 
ipaid by the Bank. 
i 25% of William Brown's expert 
;fees to be paid by the 
:BanK. 
i25% of Ed Greer's and William 
'Brown's expert fees j 
:trom principal ot the deceased 
spouse's residuary trust. j 
;Balance ot expert witness tees 
to be paid £>y William 
;Lindberg individually. 
50% ot tees and costs from 
1 principal of deceased 
1 spouse's residuary trust. 
;50% trom principal ot 
;surviving spouse's residuary j 
itrust. 
;Approximately $ 8,500 attorneys 
tees to be paid by Wil-
liam. 
50% of remaining tees trom i 
income in deceased 
spouse's share, and 
50% trom principal account of 
deceased spouse's share. 
50% of tees and costs trom 
principal account of residu-
ary trust estate of the deceased spouse. 
[***6] 
William appeals every finding of fact, conclusion of law and portion of the judgment adverse to his 
contentions against the Bank and Barbara Lindberg. The Bank cross-appeals the court's conclusions and 
judgment concerning [*793] the insurance policies. We affirm on William's appeal except for one item; 
we reverse on the Bank's cross appeal. We will discuss most of the issues raised in phase one, both issues 
raised in phase two, and selected issues raised in phase three. As to any issues not discussed, we agree with 
the trial court's resolution and adopt the position of the responding party. n2 
n2 We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, consisting of a 2,500-page verbatim 
report of proceedings, over 350 exhibits, several volumes of clerk's papers and 73 pages of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. We also waived the page limit for briefs and, as a result, received 
briefs totaling over 500 pages. 
[**337] Phase One: Trust Interpretation 
A. Amendments 
William first contends that, [***7] because the trust became irrevocable when Hilding died, the trial 
court erred in holding that Isabel's trust amendments were effective. The court did not err. 
William points to article 9 of the trust agreement as originally executed, which states: 
Amendment or Revocation 
As long as both of the Trustors are living, they reserve the right, without the consent of the Trustee or 
any other person, to withdraw from the trust all or any portion of the trust property or any net income 
therefrom, to amend or revoke this instrument in whole or in part, but the Trustee's duties and 
responsibilities shall not be increased without its consent. Upon the death of either of the Trustors, or upon 
either being incapable of handling his own affairs, this agreement shall become irrevocable. 
William correctly observes that this language makes the trust irrevocable. However, article 13 provides: 
Disposition of Surviving Spouse's Share 
A. Income. Trustee shall pay such portions of the net income to the surviving spouse and at such times as 
he may request. 
B. Principle. 
1. In the event Wilmer Hilding Lindberg shall be the surviving spouse, he shall have the power to 
[***8] invade the principal at any time, in any amount, for his own benefit [*794] or for any purpose 
whatsoever. In the event Isabel Prescott Lindberg shall be the surviving spouse, the Trustee may invade 
the principal in order to maintain the surviving spouse in that standard of living to which she has been 
accustomed. 
2. The remainder shall be distributed as he or she shall appoint by his or her Last Will or as he or she 
may herein designate and upon his or her failure to appoint or designate, shall be added to the deceased 
spouse's share. 
(Italics ours.) William fails to distinguish between revocation and amendment. A trust can be 
irrevocable but still subject to amendment so long as the amendment does not accomplish the result of a 
revocation. In re Estate of Tyler, 109 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1940); Avery v. Bender, 119 Vt. 313, 126 A.2d 99 
(1956). Amendment, not revocation, is what we have here. Isabel did not attempt to revest the trust assets 
in herself or otherwise to destroy the trust by amending it; she simply altered the distribution of her share 
of the assets. The distribution of Hilding's share was unaffected. 
We are satisfied [***9] that the language of article 13(B)(2) empowers Isabel to amend the 
distribution of her assets as she did. First, the provision contemplates that the surviving spouse could 
designate his or her share beneficiaries at any time up through the probate of his or her will, because 
designation was to be either in the trust or in the will by exercise of a power of appointment. Reference to 
the power to designate in the trust would be superfluous had the trustors only intended that the surviving 
spouse have a power of appointment with no power to amend the trust. We prefer to construe the trust so 
as to give meaning to all words used. Wagner v. Wagner, 95 Wn.2d 94, 621 P.2d 1279 (1980); Seattle-
First Natl Bank v. Westlake Park Assocs., 42 Wn. App. 269, 711 P.2d 361, review denied, 105 Wn.2d 
1015 (1985). Next, the existence in the trust of a power of appointment fortifies our conclusion, because it 
would be senseless to give the surviving spouse such a power while withholding the power to accomplish 
the same result by simply amending the trust. Finally, the language of article [*795] 13(B)(2) permitting 
designation of [***10] beneficiaries only could mean that such designation could be accomplished by 
amendment, because at the time the trust agreement was signed, a designation already had been made in 
the schedules, and it would have been pointless to refer any [**338] farther to a designation that could not 
be accomplished by amendment. n3 
n3 William also argues that the trust agreement is a binding contract or mutual will between 
Hilding and Isabel. However, the trust expressly gave Isabel the right to amend her share as well as 
the power of appointment. The Bank correctly notes that because of that right to change the 
distribution scheme, Hilding and Isabel did not agree on the "ultimate disposition" of their property. 
Therefore, the trust was not a mutual will. See Newell v. Ayers, 23 Wn. App. 767, 769, 598 P.2d 3, 
review denied, 92 Wn.2d 1036 (1979). 
B. Power of Appointment 
William concedes that the trust agreement gave Isabel a power of appointment by will over her share 
of trust [*** 11] assets. Also, it is apparent that she attempted to exercise it because of her uncertainty as 
to the validity of her trust amendments. William contends that either she did not attempt to exercise it at 
all, or that her attempt to do so was ineffective. Although we need not discuss this issue because of our 
conclusion as to Isabel's power to amend the trust, we elect to do so. We hold that had the trust 
amendments been ineffective, Isabel's attempt to exercise the power of appointment would have been 
effective. 
Isabel's will stated in part, as follows: 
Article III 
I have transferred to a Living Trust established with the Pacific National Bank of Washington, as trustee, 
all of my real and personal property, and it is my intent that said property shall be held, administered and 
distributed to my heirs and devisees as provided in said trust instrument, and the unrevoked amendments 
thereto. 
Article IV 
If I have failed to convey to my said Trustee any item of real or personal property and the same 
remains in my probate estate, or in the event for any reason my Living Trust of September 28, 1966 and the 
First, Second, [*796] Third, and Eighth Amendments thereto [***12] should be held to be invalid or 
inoperative, I direct my Executor hereinafter named, to distribute all my estate both real, personal and 
mixed to the [First Interstate Bank] as Trustees, with instructions to distribute the assets of said trust estate 
in accordance with the terms of said trust instrument of September 28, 1966 and the First, Second, Third 
and Eighth Amendments thereto. 
(Italics ours.) William contends that this language was not an effective exercise of the power because (a) 
there is no specific reference to the power as given by the trust, and (b) the language must be construed 
simply as "pouring over" into the trust Isabel's assets that were not already there. We disagree. 
The law does require that the intent to exercise a power be clear. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt, 
267 N.C. 173, 148 S.E.2d 41 (1966). However, the will need not expressly mention the power if the intent 
to exercise it is manifested otherwise. 62 Am. Jur. 2d Powers § 47 (1972). References in the will to the 
property subject to the power or to the instrument creating it can supply the necessary intent to exercise the 
power. This is especially [***13] true when the testator's appointed interest is the only interest she can 
devise. Annot., Power of Appointment — Execution, 15 A.L.R.3d 346, 365-67 (1967). Isabel's intent was 
clear: her assets were to be distributed as she wanted them to be, either by the trust or by her will. She 
knew the trust gave her a power of appointment. She could not have intended to do anything but to 
exercise it, albeit on a contingent basis, should her trust amendments be found invalid. 
It is true that article 4 of the will operated to "pour over" into the trust any remaining assets; the first 
sentence, preceding the comma, says as much. However, that is not all it says. The disjunctive "or," 
following the comma, makes plain the language that follows: all of the assets under Isabel's control were to 
be distributed in accordance with her intent as expressed in the trust as she had amended it. 
[*797] [**339] Phase Two: Barbara Lindberg's Interest 
A. Barbara's Rights 
The Bank proposed to distribute a share of trust assets to Barbara Lindberg pursuant to the following 
portion of article 15: 
H. All the rest, residue and remainder of the Trust Property shall be held [***14] by the Trustee in a 
special trust to be known as the "Residuary Trust Estate" and shall be administered with the trust powers 
set forth in Article VII and distributed in the following manner: ... 
2. The balance of the Residuary Estate shall be held by the Trustee and the net income therefrom shall 
be distributed in the following proportions and amounts: ... 
(e) Seventy percent (70%) distributed as follows: 
To William B. Lindberg and his wife, Barbara Lindberg, or the survivor, 70% of such income, and 
10% of said income to each of their children, namely, Martha Ann, William H., and Isabel. 
(Italics ours.) William and Barbara were married in 1943 and divorced in 1977. A precipitating cause of 
this litigation was William's insistence that Barbara either had no rights under the trust or had waived any 
such rights by entering into a property settlement agreement. William now contends that the trial court 
erred in holding that Barbara was entitled to a distribution and that her rights were unaffected by the 
property settlement agreement. We find no error here. 
William's argument comes down to the assertion that Barbara's rights under the trust were derivative, 
[***15] i.e., arising from her relationship to him and having no vitality unless she remained his wife. This 
is not so. Although no Washington cases have dealt with the question, courts in other jurisdictions have 
held that a distributive provision in a will that identifies a beneficiary by name as well as by status confers 
the right to distribution upon the named person as an individual. See In re Estate of McGlone, 436 So. 2d 
441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In re Estate ofBreder, 105 Misc. 2d 444, 432 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1980); Porter 
v. duPont, 41 Del. Ch. 336, 194 A.2d 565 (1963). Principles [*798] of construction applicable to wills 
also apply to trusts. In re Work Family Trust, 260 Iowa 898, 151 N.W.2d 490 (1967); Hart v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 237 Miss. 1, 112 So. 2d 565 (1959). We adopt these principles and hold that Barbara's rights under 
the trust were personal to her and were not derivative. 
William next argues that even if Barbara had an interest in the trust, she waived it by signing a 
property settlement agreement containing the following language: 
Except as herein provided, [***16] both Husband and Wife do hereby waive, release and quit claim to the 
other all rights or claims which he or she now has or may hereafter have as Husband, Wife, Widow or 
Widower, or otherwise, by reason of the marital relationship now existing between the parties. 
(Italics ours.) This argument is quickly dispatched. The rights Barbara waived in the property settlement 
agreement were only those derived from her marriage. Her rights under the trust were personal to her, not 
derivative, and therefore were not waived. 
B. Barbara's Attorneys Fees 
William next contends that the court erred in requiring him to pay Barbara a portion of her attorneys 
fees for litigating this issue. The property settlement agreement provided that 
In the event that either Husband or Wife brings any action for the enforcement of the terms of this 
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be awarded judgment against the other party, in addition to any other 
relief, for all costs and expenses incurred by the prevailing party, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(Italics ours.) William contends that this provision does not apply because he brought no action to enforce 
[***17] the agreement. We disagree. 
[**340] Although William did not start this case as plaintiff, his answer admits that he was largely 
responsible for instigating it by resisting the Bank's proposed distribution. His pleadings specifically raised 
the issue as to the effect of the [*799] property settlement agreement, and he prayed for relief on that 
basis. He was solely responsible for the litigation of that issue. Accordingly, we hold that he brought an 
action to enforce the property settlement agreement within the meaning of that agreement. 
Phase Three: Trust Management 
In this phase of trial, the court ruled on William's multiple contentions of mismanagement and breach 
of fiduciary duties by the Bank, as well as on an insurance issue that principally affects the Bank and Irene 
Prescott, and it awarded and allocated attorneys fees. Many of William's contentions are factual. As to 
these, we are satisfied that substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings in each instance. See In 
re Snyder, 85 Wn.2d 182, 185-86, 532 P.2d 278 (1975). We are also satisfied that the court correctly 
applied the law regarding all issues that we elect not to discuss. [***18] n4 We will discuss four issues: 
annual accountings; interest on a distribution to William; the insurance question; and the trial court's award 
of attorneys fees. 
n4 We elect not to discuss William's contentions concerning: the Bank's duty to retain specific 
real estate; the Bank's power to sell assets; the Bank's power to divide assets; sale by the Bank of 
assets from Hilding's share to Isabel's share; the Bank's failure to sell securities to pay taxes; sales of 
assets to third parties; the Bank's investment policy; the Bank's failure to notify William of 
proposed sales of assets; the status of Isabel's jewelry; the Bank's standard of care as trustee; the 
Bank's negligent draftsmanship of the trust agreement; whether the Bank should be removed as 
trustee; payment of dollar bequests from Hilding's share; and the propriety of Isabel's income 
account. 
A. Annual Accountings 
Article 3 of the trust agreement provided, in part: 
Accounting to Beneficiaries 
Trustee shall render an annual accounting to each adult [***19] beneficiary and the legal guardian of 
any minor or incompetent beneficiary then receiving payments.... 
William correctly contends that the trial court erred in holding that this language did not require that he be 
given an annual accounting. Contrary to the Bank's argument, this accounting requirement was not limited 
to adult beneficiaries [*800] actually receiving payments. The phrase "then receiving payments" only 
qualifies the last antecedent, "legal guardian." State v. Lodge, 42 Wn. App. 380, 711 P.2d 1078 (1985), 
review denied, 105 Wn.2d 1021 (1986). 
However, the error was harmless. William does not and cannot show that receipt by him of annual 
accountings during Isabel's lifetime would have made any difference. He had no right to a distribution 
until her death, and, as the result of this litigation demonstrates, had he asserted a claim against the Bank 
for mismanagement, he would have achieved only a modest success. 
B. Interest on William's Cash Distribution 
Article 15 provides for a $ 150,000 cash distribution to William upon the death of both trustors. This 
distribution was not made on Isabel's death. William contends [***20] that the trial court erred in holding 
that he was not entitled to interest on this amount from the time it was payable until payment. The Bank 
contends that interest is not payable because the distribution was a general legacy, not a specific monetary 
bequest, and that it was payable only from the residuary estate, citing In re Estate of Eagle, 5 Wn.2d 254, 
105 P.2d 31, 109 P.2d 1072 (1940) and In re Estate ofDoepke, 182 Wash. 556, 47 P.2d 1009 (1935). The 
Bank concedes that a specific monetary bequest would entitle the beneficiary to the interest earned on the 
bequest to the date of payment, but contends that no interest is payable here because this was a general 
legacy, payable out of the residuary estate. The Bank also claims [**341] that the delay in payment was 
justified because of the litigation. 
We agree with the Bank that interest is not payable on a general legacy, but only on a specific 
monetary bequest; however, we agree with William that this distribution was such a bequest, and that he is 
entitled to the actual interest earned on this amount from the due date to the date of payment. Justification, 
if any, for nonpayment is irrelevant. [***21] 
This bequest appears in article 15(B) of the trust, which lists five specific bequests to William. In 
article 15(H), a [*801] separate section, the estate residue was defined and a detailed distribution thereof 
was provided for. 
We reverse the trial court on this issue. On remand, the trial court shall determine and award interest 
on this bequest to William. 
C. Attorneys Fees 
Finally, William, joined by the guardian ad litem, broadly attacks the trial court's award of attorneys 
fees and costs. His general position is that he was awarded too little, and that everyone else was awarded 
too much from trust assets. We conclude that the court's awards were reasonable and within its discretion. 
The law relating to these awards was summarized in Allard v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 99 Wn.2d 394, 406-
07, 663 P.2d 104 (1983) as follows: 
A trial court may allow and properly charge attorney fees to a trust estate for litigation that is necessary to 
the administration of the trust. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Jarvis, 58 Wn.2d 627, 632-33, 364 P.2d 436 (1961); 
Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Easterday, 56 Wn.2d 937, 951, 350 P.2d 444, 354 P.2d 24 (1960). [***22] The 
award of attorney fees against the trust estate is vested in the discretion of the trial court. Jarvis, 58 Wn.2d 
at 632; Tucker v. Brown, 20 Wn.2d 740, 839, 150 P.2d 604 (1944). A trial court's discretion to award 
attorney fees, however, is not absolute. The court must determine the litigation is indispensable to the 
proper administration of the trust; the issues presented are neither immaterial nor trifling; the conduct of 
the parties or counsel is not vexatious or litigious; and that there has been no unnecessary delay or expense. 
Jarvis, 58 Wn.2d at 632. Furthermore, the trial court must consider the result of the litigation. G. Bogert, 
Trusts and Trustees § 871 (2d rev. ed. 1982). 
The court's underlying consideration must be whether the litigation and the participation of the party 
seeking attorney fees caused a benefit to the trust. Estate ofBaird, 135 Cal. App. 2d 343, 287 P.2d 372 
(1955); Kronzer v. First Nat'l Bank, 305 Minn. 415, 235 N.W.2d 187 (1975). A trustee who unsuccessfully 
defends against charges of breach of fiduciary duties obviously has not caused a benefit [***23] to the 
trust. Therefore, a trial court [*802] abuses its discretion when it awards attorney fees to a trustee for 
litigation caused by the trustee's misconduct. Accord, Estate ofBaird, supra; Ellis v. King, 336 111. App. 
298, 83N.E.2d367(1949). 
The trial court's allocation and award of fees and costs in this case reflects a "cautious exercise of 
discretion" ( Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Jarvis, 58 Wn.2d 627, 632, 364 P.2d 436 (1961)), and a meticulous 
application of the Allard principles. Obviously, the litigation was necessary, indeed indispensable, to 
administration of the trust, for the ultimate distributions would not have been possible without it. The 
litigation was conducted with dispatch, without unnecessary delay or expense. The Bank was required to 
bear its own fees and costs, as well as those of William, in reasonable proportion to those matters as to 
which its acts were found improper. 
In varying degrees, the participation of each party benefited the trust by aiding the trial court in 
resolving the problems inhibiting the final distribution. The trial court was exceptionally astute in 
measuring the benefit [***24] conferred on the trust by each party and the extent to which trifling 
assertions and vexatious behavior intruded. 
[**342] We affirm the trial court's allocation and award of attorneys fees and costs with one 
exception. Because of our disposition of the insurance issue, discussed below, the Bank is entitled to 
charge the trust with all of its attorneys fees and costs attributable to this issue. On remand, the trial court 
shall make the necessary adjustment. 
D. Isabel's Life Insurance (Bank's Cross Appeal) 
Article 1 of the trust agreement identified, as "Trust Property," all assets listed in schedule A, and 
stated that all such assets were community property. Schedule A listed four insurance policies on Isabel's 
life, coupled with the statement that "trustor retains custody of the policies[.]" The policies were purchased 
in 1947 and 1948; thereafter, the premiums were paid with community funds. In 1966 the Bank was 
named the beneficiary, but the policies were [*803] never assigned to the trust. On Hilding's death, one-
half of the policies' cash surrender value was included on his estate tax return. After Hilding's death, Isabel 
paid the premiums from her separate [***25] funds; on August 30, 1976, she made Irene Prescott the 
beneficiary. Irene received all of the insurance proceeds on Isabel's death. 
The Bank's complaint alleged that Irene had received the insurance proceeds, and that William asserted 
a claim to them. William's answer averred that the proceeds belonged to the trust, and that the Bank's 
failure to collect them violated its duty as trustee. In the Prescotts' affirmative defense to this issue 
(erroneously labeled a counterclaim), it was averred that the Bank had advised Isabel that she was free to 
name the beneficiary of her choice. 
The trial court held that the Bank had been negligent in failing to procure an assignment of the policies 
and in failing to collect one-half of the proceeds. It held the Bank liable to the trust for $ 243,454.76, 
representing that one-half. It also concluded that the Bank was barred from recovering this amount from 
Irene Prescott by failing to assert a claim within a reasonable time. 
The Bank contends that the court erred, because the Bank had no duty to collect the proceeds. We 
agree. 
By instrument dated November 18, 1966, article 9 of the trust agreement was amended to read as 
follows: 
IX [***26] 
1. Amendment or Revocation . As long as the Trustors are both living, they reserve the right, without 
the consent of the Trustee or any other person, to withdraw from the trust all or any portion of the trust 
property or any net income therefrom, to amend or revoke this instrument in whole or in part, and as to 
policies, terminate, dispose of, exercise any option granted therein, borrow on, change the beneficiary, 
receive dividends, surrender value or other benefits, but the Trustee's duties and responsibilities shall not 
be increased without its consent. Upon the death of either of the Trustors, or upon either being incapable 
of handling his own affairs, this agreement shall become irrevocable. 
2. Trustee's Responsibility as to Policies. Trustee [*804] shall not be responsible for the validity, 
enforceability or payment of any premiums, assessments or other charges on any policies, but shall safely 
keep any policies delivered to it. Following the death of either of the Trustors, Trustee shall use its best 
efforts to collect the proceeds of all policies according to their terms but shall not be required to take any 
legal proceedings unless indemnified [***27] therefor to its satisfaction.... 
(Italics ours.) 
Although this amendment is hardly a model of clarity, we conclude, from a reading of the entire trust 
agreement as amended, that the policies in question did not ~ and were not intended to - come within the 
control of the Bank, and therefore that the Bank had no duty to collect proceeds that had become payable to 
a different beneficiary. 
[**343] Although schedule A identifies the policies as trust property, it also specifies that the trustors 
would retain them; no other provision of the trust requires that the policies be assigned or physically 
transferred to the Bank. Article 5, prescribing the trustee's general powers, lacks any provision for 
enforcing a right to such assignment, if any existed. 
While both were alive, the trustors were free to do anything at all with the policies. Thus, the Bank 
would have no way of knowing the status of the policies when the first trustor died. For this reason, the 
article 9 amendment absolved the Bank from all responsibility for the policies during the life of the 
insured, except for a duty to safeguard policies physically delivered to it. Consistent with this, the Bank's 
[***28] duty to collect proceeds applied only to policies under which it was the beneficiary. This is the 
only sensible reading of article 9(2), because the Bank was not required to sue to recover proceeds, and it 
strains credulity to suggest that it was required to collect the proceeds on behalf of a different beneficiary. 
This is not to say that the trust has no interest in the proceeds of Isabel's policies. As a residuary 
beneficiary under Hilding's will, it presumably has an interest in any property in his estate. A share of the 
insurance proceeds is [*805] such property, for it is well established that such proceeds are community 
property to the extent that the premiums have been paid with community funds. See Porter v. Porter, 107 
Wn.2d 43, 726 P.2d 459 (1986); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 689 P.2d 46 (1984); 
Chase v. Chase, 74 Wn.2d 253, 444 P.2d 145 (1968); In re Estate ofLeuthold, 52 Wn.2d 299, 324 P.2d 
1103 (1958); Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn.2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947), overruled in part on other grounds in 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 657, 689 P.2d 46 (1984); [***29] Farver v. 
Department of Retirement Sys., 29 Wn. App. 138, 629 P.2d 903 (1981); Stephen v. Gallion, 5 Wn. App. 
747,491 P.2d 238 (1971), overruled in part on other grounds in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 
Wn.2d 652, 689 P.2d 46 (1984). However, it is for the personal representative of Hilding's estate, not the 
Bank as trustee, to marshal the assets of Hilding's estate, and we are not presently confronted with any 
issues that might arise from such a collection effort. We reverse the $ 243,454.76 judgment against the 
Bank. 
Attorneys Fees and Costs on Appeal 
A. Attorneys Fees 
William, the Prescotts, the Bank, and the guardian ad litem have requested attorneys fees on appeal 
and have substantially complied with RAP 18.1. These requests shall be determined by the trial court on 
remand pursuant to the following instructions: the court shall (1) determine the reasonableness of each fee 
requested; (2) make such awards, if any, to William, the Prescotts, and the Bank that it considers 
reasonable and appropriate under the standards for fees discussed in this opinion; (3) award the guardian ad 
litem a reasonable fee in its entirety; [***30] and (4) allocate the source of payment of each fee awarded. 
B. Costs 
For purposes of taxing costs in accordance with RAP Title 14, we make the following determinations 
(RAP 14.2): 
1. The Bank has substantially prevailed on all issues [*806] involving it raised in William's appeal; 
2. Barbara Lindberg and the Prescotts have substantially prevailed on all issues involving them raised 
in William's appeal; 
3. The Bank has substantially prevailed on its cross appeal. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, as indicated herein. Remanded for further proceedings consistent 
herewith. 
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[*973] OPINION 
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Gordon Dean Hamilton's sons, Stuart and Vincent Hamilton, appeal the trial court's final judgment 
awarding Mary Hamilton, Gordon Hamilton's widow, a life estate in the marital home subject to certain 
conditions, $ 4000 in cash, $ 43,394 in personal property, and a family allowance of $ 1000 per month for 
twenty-four months. Stuart and Vincent Hamilton further appeal the trial court's denial of their claim that 
Mary Hamilton be required to pay her pro rata portion of the inheritance taxes. We affirm in part, and 
vacate and remand [**2] in part. 
FACTS 
Gordon and Mary Hamilton were married September 26, 1986. Just prior to the marriage, both parties 
signed an antenuptial agreement. Section III of that document provides: 
A. The parties hereto have the intent and desire to define and set forth the [*974] respective rights of 
each in the property of the other after their marriage. 
B. The parties intend and desire that all property owned respectively by each of them at the time of the 
marriage, and all property that may be acquired by each of them from any source during the marriage, shall 
be respectively their separate property except as otherwise provided herein. 
Section IV states, in pertinent part: 
It is the intent of the parties to dwell at the residence located at 1907 Spring Oaks Drive, Springville, 
Utah. Said residence and the building lot upon which it is situated shall remain titled in the name of the 
respective husband. In the event, however, that Gordon predeceases Mary, it is the intent of the parties that 
she be given a life estate in the residence and building lot so long as she does not cohabit therein with any 
other person. 
Section V provides: 
It is understood by the parties hereto that Gordon D. Hamilton [**3] owns all stock in Hamilton 
Brothers Electric, Inc. Said stock is to remain his sole and separate property, and he may disburse as he 
sees fit to his children or any other persons whatsoever. In addition thereto, Hamilton Brothers Electric, 
Inc. of which Gordon is the sole stockholder, owns various other items of personal property as assets of the 
corporation. It is clearly understood by the parties that such assets shall remain so owned and titled. 
Finally, section VII states: 
All real and personal property owned by either of the parties at the time of their marriage, and all real 
and personal property that either may acquire from any source whatsoever during their marriage, shall be 
their respective separate property, except if unless specifically otherwise designated at the time of 
acquisition thereof, or other individual separate agreement of the parties. 
During the marriage, Gordon Hamilton purchased numerous items of personal property both 
personally and through Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc. 
On December 7, 1989, Gordon Hamilton executed his last will, ratifying therein the antenuptial 
agreement. Paragraph 3 of the will states, in part: "It is my intent to leave a life [**4] estate to my wife 
Mary M. Hamilton in the residence we have in Springville, Utah." Paragraph 4 grants his children any 
rights he has in his marital home "subject to a life estate my wife Mary M. Hamilton who [sic] shall have 
unless she remarries." However, the will makes no mention of joint tenancy in personal property to Mary 
Hamilton. Further, paragraph 5.1 of the will provides that: 
My unsecured debts, secured debts, administration expenses, funeral expenses, and all federal and state 
estate and inheritance taxes shall be paid out of my residuary estate. ... Provided further, it is my intention 
that all nonprobate property creating a federal or state estate or inheritance tax burden upon my estate will 
share proportionately with my residuary estate the respective burden of such taxes. Therefore, I direct that 
any of the hereinbefore described taxes payable by reason of the taxability of any gifts in contemplation of 
death, retained life estates, transfers taking effect at death, revocable transfers, annuities, joint tenancies, 
powers of appointment, life insurance proceeds, or other nonprobate assets shall be paid by the recipient of 
such assets and that any of such taxes payable [**5] because of the taxability of any part of my residuary 
estate shall be paid out of my residuary estate, subject to two exceptions: (1) The recipients of life 
insurance proceeds and power of appointment property shall pay their share of federal estate taxes as 
provided by federal law. (2) None of the hereinbefore described taxes shall be borne by my wife with 
respect to any probate or nonprobate assets passing to her and qualifying for the federal estate tax marital 
deduction. 
Gordon Hamilton died January 17, 1990, and his will was subsequently admitted to probate. 
During the course of the probate proceedings, Mary Hamilton testified that she and Gordon Hamilton 
had made gifts to each other of four bronzes: the Stage Coach, the Caba, the Little Boy, and the Little Girl. 
[*975] Mary Hamilton's testimony varied as to other items of personal property in the house. She claimed 
ownership of some of the property on the basis that she had bought it. However, she later claimed that she 
and her husband had jointly purchased the property. At another point, she claimed a right to use the 
property, so long as she had a life estate in the home. 
Additionally, two neighbors of Gordon and Mary Hamilton, [**6] Richard and Sandra Tretheway, 
testified at the probate proceedings that during a visit to the Hamilton home, Gordon and Mary Hamilton 
had indicated that they had given the four bronzes to each other as a Christmas gift. 
The trial court awarded Mary Hamilton a life estate in the home provided that she not remarry or 
cohabit with anyone in the marital home, $ 4000 in cash, $ 43,394 in personal property as joint tenancy 
property, and a family allowance of $ 1000 per month for twenty-four months. The court additionally 
denied Stuart and Vincent Hamilton's claim against Mary Hamilton for her pro rata portion of the 
inheritance taxes. 
Stuart and Vincent Hamilton appeal, challenging the trial court's determinations that: (1) Gordon 
Hamilton created a life estate in the marital home in Mary Hamilton barring remarriage or cohabitation on 
her part; (2) a joint tenancy agreement existed between Gordon and Mary Hamilton as to the marital 
home's furnishings; (3) Mary Hamilton is entitled to a family allowance; and (4) Mary Hamilton is not 
obligated to pay her pro rata share of the inheritance taxes. 
LIFE ESTATE 
Stuart and Vincent Hamilton argue that the trial court erroneously found that Gordon [**7] Hamilton's 
will granted Mary Hamilton a life estate subject to certain conditions. Specifically, they assert that since the 
will contains no clear and unequivocal granting language, Mary Hamilton is not entitled to any interest in 
the marital home. Mary Hamilton responds that the language of the will supports the trial court's finding 
that she is entitled to a life estate in the home, subject to certain conditions, and therefore, the trial court did 
not err in so finding. 
In construing a will, we are bound by the fundamental principle that "a court must look to the testator's 
intent as expressed in the will." Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah App. 1990) (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-603 (1978); In re Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah 1980)). 
Moreover, if the will is ambiguous, any rule of construction normally used in other writings must yield to 
the intention of the testator as revealed in the instrument. In re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 117, 228 P. 
748, 749 (1924); In re Poppleton's Estate, 34 Utah 285, 293, 97 P. 138, 140 (1908). [**8] The factual issue 
of the decedent's intent is one we review with deference to the trial court's findings, if adequate, and we 
reverse only upon a finding of clear error. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989). In order to show clear error, the appellant "must marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support 
as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d 
at 886 (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
A testator's intent may be '"ascertained not alone from the provision itself, but from a scrutiny of the 
entire instrument of which it is a part, and in the light of the conditions and circumstances in which the 
instrument came into existence.'" Poppleton, 34 Utah at 294, 97 P. at 140 (quoting Adams v. First Baptist 
Church, 148 Mich. 140, 111 N.W. 757, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 509, 515 (1907)); [**9] accord Gardner, 615 
P.2d at 1217; Ashton, 804 P.2d at 542. Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used to ascertain what the testator 
intended. 
In the case at bar, Gordon Hamilton's intent is plainly revealed in the language of paragraphs 3 and 4 
of the will. Paragraph 3 provides: "It is my intent to leave a life estate to my wife Mary M. Hamilton in the 
residence we have in Springville, Utah." Paragraph 4 states that his children's rights to the marital home are 
"subject to a life [*976] estate my wife Mary M. Hamilton who [sic] shall have unless she remarries." 
Additionally, the language of section IV of the antenuptial agreement states: "In the event, however, that 
Gordon predeceases Mary, it is the intent of the parties that she be given a life estate in the residence and 
building lot so long as she does not cohabit therein with any other person." Thus, even though the will does 
not contain specific granting language, strict construction must yield to Gordon Hamilton's intent, which is 
apparent from the language quoted above. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that Gordon Hamilton 
granted Mary Hamilton a life estate provided [**10] that she not remarry or cohabit with anyone in the 
marital home is not clearly erroneous. 
Stuart and Vincent Hamilton nonetheless argue that In re Estate of Hunt, 842 P.2d 872 (Utah 1992) 
and In re Estate of Lewis, 738 P.2d 617 (Utah 1987) compel reversal on this issue in the present case. We 
disagree. In Hunt, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determination that Hunt's will did not 
dispose of his assets on the ground that the language of the will "falls short of expressing any intent on the 
part of the testator" to leave his property to the parties named in the will. Hunt, 842 P.2d at 874. Such 
intent is clearly not lacking in the case at bar. Likewise, the supreme court found in Lewis that the language 
of the will was inadequate to determine the testator's intent. Lewis, 738 P.2d at 621. That problem is not 
present in this case; thus, both cases are readily distinguishable. 
Additionally, Mary Hamilton argues that appeal on this point is frivolous under Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 33(a). n2 A frivolous appeal is "one that is not grounded [**11] in fact, not warranted 
by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. 
App. P. 33(b). Moreover, this court has defined a frivolous appeal as one without reasonable legal or 
factual basis, Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah App. 1988), or "'one 
in which no justiciable question has been presented and ... is readily recognizable as devoid of merit in that 
there is little prospect that it can ever succeed.'" Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah App. 1992) 
(quoting Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990)). 
n2 Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) provides: 
Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or 
appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which 
may include single or double costs ... and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The 
court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
[**12] 
However, "'sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an 
improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.'" Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 
1352, 1355 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988)). "Egregious 
cases may include those obviously without merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success, and which 
result in the delay of a proper judgment." Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989) 
(citing Porco, 752 P.2d at 369). While we hold in favor of Mary Hamilton on this issue, we are unable to 
say that Stuart and Vincent Hamilton's appeal was obviously without merit or filed merely for the purpose 
of delay. Accordingly, we decline to award Rule 33 sanctions on this issue. 
JOINT TENANCY 
Stuart and Vincent Hamilton assail the trial court's finding that Mary Hamilton was entitled to a joint 
tenancy interest in the marital home's furnishings, asserting that there is no indication in the will or in the 
antenuptial agreement of the creation of a joint [**13] tenancy in the personal property of the home. Mary 
Hamilton concedes that the trial court's finding is not supported by the evidence, but argues that: (1) since 
she and Gordon Hamilton gave the four bronzes as a gift to each other, the trial court's finding as to the 
four bronzes is supported by the evidence and should be affirmed; and (2) as to the other property in 
question, this court should modify the trial court's ruling to provide [*977] her with a life estate in the 
marital home's furnishings. 
A trial court's findings of fact are not to be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). "Under this standard, we do not set aside the trial court's factual findings unless they are against the 
great weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been 
made." Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Western Kane County Spec. 
Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987)). Moreover, it is the 
responsibility of the party challenging a finding of fact to marshal the evidence supporting that finding and 
demonstrate [**14] that such finding is clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 88 (Utah 
1989). 
As to the four bronzes, both Mary Hamilton and the Hamiltons' neighbors, Richard and Sandra 
Tretheway, testified that Gordon and Mary Hamilton had given the four bronzes to each other as a 
Christmas gift, and Stuart and Vincent Hamilton have failed to marshal any evidence to the contrary. Thus, 
we must assume the record supports the trial court's finding that Mary Hamilton is entitled to a joint 
tenancy interest in the four bronzes, Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1992), and therefore 
conclude that such finding is not clearly erroneous. 
However, as to the remainder of the property, Mary Hamilton concedes that the evidence does not 
support the trial court's finding that she is entitled to a joint tenancy interest in the marital home's 
furnishings. In fact, section VII of Gordon and Mary Hamilton's antenuptial agreement specifically states: 
All real and personal property owned by either of the parties at the time of their marriage, and all real 
and personal property that either may acquire from any source whatsoever [**15] during their marriage, 
shall be their respective separate property, except if unless specifically otherwise designated at the time of 
acquisition thereof, or other individual separate agreement of the parties. 
Nevertheless, Mary Hamilton argues that we should modify the trial court's findings to indicate that 
she is entitled to a life estate in the furnishings of the marital home, other than the four bronzes. However, 
because we lack the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses testify, we are not in a position to make our 
own findings of fact. Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1278 (Utah 1988). Moreover, to do so would be to invade the province of the trial court. See Rucker v. 
Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) (holding that it is not an appellate court's function to make 
findings of fact). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's determination that Mary Hamilton is entitled to 
a joint tenancy interest in the furnishings of the marital home, other than the four bronzes, is clearly 
erroneous and therefore requires remand. n3 
n3 Furthermore, Mary Hamilton's argument fails because it is not properly before us. Mary 
Hamilton never challenged this finding below, nor appealed the finding to this court, but simply 
raised this contention for the first time on appeal after conceding that Stuart and Vincent Hamilton 
were correct that no joint tenancy interest existed in the furnishings of the marital home. 
[**16] 
FAMILY ALLOWANCE 
Stuart and Vincent Hamilton argue that the trial court improperly awarded Mary Hamilton a family 
allowance of S 1000 per month for twenty-four months following Gordon Hamilton's death. Mary 
Hamilton responds that the evidence before the trial court supports its award of a family allowance, and 
thus, such award should be affirmed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-403(1) (1993) provides, in pertinent part: 
In addition to the right to homestead allowance and exempt property, if the decedent was domiciled in 
this state, the surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent was obligated to support and 
children who were in fact being supported by him are entitled to a reasonable allowance in money out of 
the estate for their maintenance during the period of administration. 
[*978] In other words, section 75-2-403(1) entitles a surviving spouse to an allowance for his or her 
maintenance during the period of administration of the will. 
However, such an allowance is not an absolute right. In re Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 304, 241 
P.2d 462, 464 (1952). The trial court may, in its discretion, determine whether a family allowance is 
needed [**17] on the basis of the specific facts in the case before it. See id. The factors to be used in 
determining the amount of the family allowance during administration include the age of the surviving 
spouse, the surviving spouse's health, the surviving spouse's previous standard of living, the value of the 
estate, and the value and nature of the surviving spouse's own separate property. Id. Thus, we review the 
trial court's award of a family allowance to Mary Hamilton under the facts of this case for an abuse of 
discretion. 
In the case at bar, the trial court made the following findings of fact, which the parties do not dispute 
on appeal: (1) Mary Hamilton's net worth as of the date of Gordon Hamilton's death was $ 2215; (2) After 
Gordon Hamilton's death, Mary Hamilton received $ 50,000 in life insurance proceeds, $ 23,353 in pension 
benefits, and a $ 10,000 insurance settlement; (3) At the time of trial, Gordon Hamilton's estate was valued 
at $ 1,681,745; (4) During Mary and Gordon Hamilton's marriage, they traveled extensively and enjoyed "a 
handsome lifestyle"; (5) Following Gordon Hamilton's death, Mary Hamilton's claimed living expenses 
were approximately $ 2382 per month, [**18] which were not unreasonable in light of the lifestyle that 
the Hamiltons had previously enjoyed; (6) Mary Hamilton has disposable income of approximately $ 1300 
per month from her employment with Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc; and (7) "In order to obviate the 
necessity of depleting her capital assets, Mary Hamilton reasonably requires $ 1,000.00 per month in 
addition to her monthly income in order to support herself." These findings of fact clearly indicate that the 
trial court properly considered the relevant factors in determining that Mary Hamilton was in need of a 
family allowance. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mary 
Hamilton a family allowance under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-403(1) (1993). 
INHERITANCE TAXES 
Stuart and Vincent Hamilton argue that the trial court erred in denying their claim that Mary Hamilton 
be required to pay her pro rata share of the inheritance taxes. Specifically, they assert that if Mary 
Hamilton is entitled to a life estate in the marital home, she must pay her pro rata share of the inheritance 
taxes on her life estate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-916(6) (1993) provides, with our emphasis: 
No interest in income [**19] and no estate for years or for life or other temporary interest in any 
property or fund is subject to apportionment as between the temporary interest and the remainder. The tax 
on the temporary interest and the tax, if any, on the remainder is chargeable against the corpus of the 
property or funds subject to the temporary interest and remainder. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "there is a strong policy in favor of the equitable allocation 
of the tax burden provided in [section 75-3-916], and ... a direction to the contrary in a will or other 
dispositive instrument must be expressed in terms that are specific, clear, and not susceptible of reasonable 
contrary interpretation." In re Estate of Huffaker, 641 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1982). Thus, since section 75-3-
916 supports the trial court's determination that Mary Hamilton does not owe a pro rata share of inheritance 
taxes on her life estate in the marital home, we will reverse that determination only if there is specific and 
clear language in Gordon Hamilton's will directing that the tax burden should be otherwise divided. 
Section 5.1 of Gordon Hamilton's will states, [**20] with our emphasis: 
My unsecured debts, secured debts, administration expenses, funeral expenses, and all federal and state 
estate and inheritance taxes shall be paid out of my residuary estate. ... (2) None of the hereinbefore 
described taxes shall be borne by my wife with respect to any probate or nonprobate assets passing to her 
and qualifying [*979] for the federal estate tax marital deduction. 
Not only does this section of the will fail to clearly and specifically order division of inheritance taxes 
contrary to section 75-3-916, but it clearly and specifically supports that section's imposition of taxes on 
the corpus of the estate. This is especially true in light of Gordon Hamilton's apparent intent in section 5.1 
(2) to keep Mary Hamilton from having to pay inheritance taxes. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court 
correctly determined that Mary Hamilton did not owe a pro rata share of inheritance taxes. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly awarded Mary Hamilton (1) a life estate in the marital home subject to certain 
conditions, (2) a joint tenancy interest in the four bronzes, and (3) a family allowance under Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-2-403(1) (1993). Moreover, it correctly [**21] determined that Mary Hamilton did not owe a 
pro rata portion of the inheritance taxes. Accordingly, as to these issues, the trial court's final judgment is 
affirmed. We vacate and remand the trial court's joint tenancy determination as to the remainder of the 
marital home's furnishings for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Leonard H. Russon, Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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[*233] ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This case is before us on appeal from summary judgment in favor of defendants Salt Lake County, Dr. 
William Kuentzel, Sheryl Steadman, and the University of Utah. Plaintiff Kathy Lynn Higgins, who is 
suing individually and as guardian ad litem for her daughter Shaundra Higgins, argues that the trial court 
erred in ruling that defendants owed no duty to protect either her or her daughter from a potentially 
dangerous mental patient. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding no duty but affirm the lower 
court's summary judgment on the alternative ground that governmental immunity bars Higgins's action. 
Before [**2] we recite the facts, we note that in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
E.g., Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 
1991); Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). We 
state the facts in this case accordingly. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 215 (Utah 
1992). 
On April 10, 1984, Carolyn Trujillo, a voluntary patient at Salt Lake County Mental Health 
("SLCMH"), nl stabbed then ten-year-old Shaundra. Trujillo had been diagnosed as a paranoid 
schizophrenic with organic brain dysfunction and marginal intelligence. Her mental illness manifested 
itself when she was a teenager and was complicated by her abuse of illegal drugs. Prior to the stabbing, she 
had been an involuntary patient four times at the University of Utah Medical Center ("UMC") and twice at 
the Utah State Hospital. In late 1975, following Trujillo's [**3] release from her first hospitalization at 
UMC, Sheryl Steadman, a registered nurse, was assigned as Trujillo's primary therapist. 
nl Salt Lake County Mental Health consists of three mental health systems: Salt Lake, Granite, 
and Copper Mountain. Each system was established by Salt Lake County; the three were 
consolidated in approximately 1982 to form Salt Lake County Mental Health. 
In July of 1981, Ogden police charged Trujillo with assault and disorderly conduct after she struck a 
woman and a child. Trujillo pleaded guilty in an Ogden courx to -jisorderiy conduct. Before sentencing, 
however, she stabbed an elderly woman in the buttocks in Salt Lake City and was charged with aggravated 
assault. The Salt Lake court committed her to the Utah State Hospital for a thirty-day evaluation to 
determine her competency to stand trial. On December 1, 1981, she was found incompetent to stand trial 
on the aggravated assault charge and pleaded no contest to the reduced charge of simple assault several 
days later. She was placed [**4] on probation for one year. As a condition of probation, Trujillo was 
ordered to enter a residential mental health program at Salt Lake County's Adult Residential Treatment 
Unit ("ARTU") in Salt Lake City. 
In February of 1982, the Ogden court placed Trujillo on one year's probation in connection with the 
disorderly conduct charge. As a condition of probation, Trujillo was ordered to take her medications and 
continue her treatment at ARTU. In January of 1983, Trujillo's probation officer recommended that both 
the Ogden and Salt Lake City probation orders be terminated [*234] because Trujillo had complied with 
the conditions of both. Her probations in Ogden and Salt Lake City were subsequently terminated. 
In February of 1984, Trujillo superficially cut her wrists. Two days later, she and her mother went to 
the UMC emergency room and requested that Trujillo be hospitalized. The request was denied, allegedly 
due to a shortage of beds, but Katy Jones, a crisis specialist on the UMC staff, referred Trujillo to ARTU 
for a crisis stay. When Trujillo arrived at ARTU on that Saturday, Larry Romero, a crisis line operator 
who was not authorized to diagnose patients, created a treatment plan [**5] for Trujillo that called for a 
short stay to assess her living environment. Dr. Joy Ely, a part-time psychiatrist at ARTU, saw Trujillo the 
following Monday. Trujillo was discharged from ARTU on March 14, 1984, and was placed in an 
evening/weekend program, a move calculated to ease her transition from the institution to society. She 
attended several, but not all, sessions through the end of the month and last saw Steadman on March 21, 
1984. At this meeting, Steadman found Trujillo to be stable. 
On April 10, 1984, Trujillo was alone at her home when she heard voices telling her "to stab 
someone." She left the house and began walking toward a nearby alley. When she spotted Shaundra, a 
child she knew from the neighborhood, she followed the girl into the alley next to her house. Trujillo 
called to Shaundra and then stabbed the girl three times, severing her aorta and puncturing her abdomen. 
Despite her injuries, Shaundra survived the attack. 
Higgins claims that Trujillo had been brooding over and planning to hurt Shaundra for six months 
before the attack. However, in an interview with police detectives after the stabbing, Trujillo said that she 
had no particular victim in mind [**6] when she armed herself with a knife and left her room. She told the 
detectives that she intended to stab "just anybody." In a subsequent interview, Trujillo told a psychiatrist 
that even though she was not looking for Shaundra at the time of the stabbing, she believed that Shaundra 
had struck her six-year-old daughter. She also said that she hated Higgins because Higgins refused to give 
her cigarettes and was "a slut." 
Trujillo was found "guilty and mentally ill" of the charge of attempted criminal homicide, a second 
degree felony, and was committed to the Utah State Hospital. n2 Shortly thereafter, Higgins sued Salt Lake 
County and the University of Utah, claiming that they owed her and her daughter a duty to control and/or 
to treat Trujillo correctly and that if defendants had performed their professional duties properly, the 
stabbing would not have occurred. Higgins sought damages for her own emotional distress and for 
physical and emotional injuries to her daughter. 
n2 After spending approximately nine months in the Utah State Hospital, Trujillo appeared in 
court again and pleaded guilty to attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony. She was then 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years. 
[**7] 
Higgins asserted the following specific allegations of negligence as a basis for her suit. First, she 
contended that the University of Utah was negligent in its treatment of Trujillo in that UMC's crisis 
specialist, nurse Jones, was negligent in her diagnosis, treatment, and failure to have Trujillo involuntarily 
committed or voluntarily admitted to the hospital after her suicide attempt. Particularly, Higgins asserted 
that Jones (i) never reviewed Trujillo's medical records, (ii) did not involve qualified personnel in 
evaluating Trujillo, and (iii) never evaluated Trujillo's threat to others in the community. 
Second, Higgins contended that Salt Lake County was negligent in its diagnosis, supervision, 
treatment of, and failure to commit Trujillo. Specifically, she alleged that (i) therapist Steadman prescribed 
improper medication for Trujillo, (ii) crisis worker Romero was unqualified to diagnose or create a 
treatment plan, and (iii) Dr. Ely was unqualified to handle Trujillo's case and failed to review Trujillo's 
medical records or consult with qualified personnel. The trial court granted summary judgment [*235] 
for defendants on the ground that they owed no duty of care to either [**8] Higgins or her daughter. 
Higgins appeals. 
We first state the applicable standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c); Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 214; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159; Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 
P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, no deference 
is due the trial court's determination of the issues presented. However, we may affirm a grant of summary 
judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. See Hill v. Seattle 
First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). 
With this standard in mind, we turn to the issues on appeal, which are as follows: First, assuming that 
defendants may have failed to use reasonable care in treating, supervising, diagnosing, and not committing 
Trujillo, did defendants owe a duty to the Higginses, and if so, did such acts and omissions breach that 
duty? Second, even if there [**9] was such a breach of duty, does the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10, bar Higgins's claims? We discuss these issues in turn. n3 As the trial court 
recognized below, the proper sequence of analysis is to determine, first, whether defendants had a duty to 
the Higginses and, if so, whether they breached that duty, and second, whether governmental immunity 
shields defendants from suit. Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162 n.3. 
n3 Higgins also claims negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, we find no reason 
to address this claim because it is disposed of by Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 
1992). 
We begin with the question of defendants' duty to the Higginses. Duty is an essential element of 
negligence. E.g., Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159; Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); Beach v. 
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986). [**10] Unless defendants owed a duty to the 
Higginses, there is no cause of action. Higgins advances several theories upon which to base a finding of 
duty. These theories have two basic conceptual themes: first, that defendants owed a general duty to any 
third party foreseeably at risk from their negligence in treating and supervising Trujillo, and second, that a 
special relationship existed between defendants and Trujillo that gave rise to a duty by defendants to the 
Higginses. 
We reject the first of these grounds as being contrary to established precedents in this and other states. 
As we recently explained, "Because people are inherently less controllable than physical things, the 
common law has imposed no duty to control the conduct of others except in certain circumstances, as 
where a special relationship exists." n4 Trapp v. Salt Lake City Corp., 835 P.2d 161, 161 (Utah 1992). The 
soundness of this limitation on liability as it operates in the context of a patient/therapist relationship is 
plain. First, given the empirically demonstrated inability of trained healthcare professionals to reliably 
predict future dangerousness, the legal limitations [**11] on the involuntary confinement of mental 
patients, and the need for a confidential relationship between care providers and patients for therapy to 
succeed, the general duty that plaintiffs would have us impose would be both realistically incapable of 
performance and inconsistent with the basic relationship between therapist and patient. See Jerome S. 
Beigler, Tarasoff v. Confidentiality, 2 Behav. Sciences & L. 273, 277-79 (1984) [hereinafter Beigler]; John 
G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's [*236] Dilemma, 62 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1025, 1044-45 (1974) [hereinafter Fleming & Maximov]; Mark J. Mills, The So-Called Duty to 
Warn: The Psychotherapeutic Duty to Protect Third Parties from Patients' Violent Acts, 2 Behav. Sciences 
& L. 237, 241 (1984) [hereinafter Mills]; David L. Faigman, To Have and To Have Not: Assessing the 
Value of Social Science to the Laws as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L. Rev. 1005, 1076 (1989). 
n4 For similar reasons, we reject Higgins's related argument that we should extend the duty 
imposed on doctors for negligent treatment of infectious or contagious diseases to the 
psychotherapist's negligent treatment of a dangerous patient. This attempted analogy fails for the 
following reasons: First, infectious diseases are generally more identifiable than dangerous mental 
illness; second, there is more certainty of harm with an infectious disease than from a patient who 
may be labeled "dangerous"; and third, the means of preventing harm from an infectious disease are 
usually less restrictive of personal freedom than the means used to prevent harm from those with 
mental illness. 
[**12] 
Second, in part because the proposed duty is incompatible with the real world environment in which 
patients and health-care professionals coexist, this ill-defmed, amorphous duty would invite jury hindsight 
bias. See Robert F. Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due Care: 
Psychotherapists and Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, J. Psychiatry & L. 163, 165 (Summer 1989) 
[hereinafter Schopp & Wexler]. The resulting duty to the general public would "closely approximate a 
strict liability standard of care, and therapists would be potentially liable for all harm inflicted by persons 
presently or formerly under psychiatric treatment." Cooke v. Berlin, 153 Ariz. 220, 735 P.2d 830, 836 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1983), affd, 751 F.2d 
329 (10th Cir. 1984)); accord Abernathy v. United States, 773 F.2d 184, 190 (8th Cir. 1985). 
Finally, we note that these defendants are public entities or employees who are charged with protecting 
the well-being of the general public. See Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (Utah 
1971). [**13] However, "for a governmental agency and its agents to be liable for negligently caused 
injury suffered by a member of the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a duty owed him [or her] as 
an individual, not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the general public at large by the 
governmental official." Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 (emphasis added); accord Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 
1187, 1189 n.2 (Utah 1989). 
Higgins presents us with no persuasive reasons for departing from our precedents and sacrificing these 
important policy considerations. We refuse to adopt the general negligence scheme they propose. 
The second ground for the Higginses' claim of duty, the special relationship theory, requires more 
extended analysis. Higgins argues that defendants had a "special relationship" with Trujillo that gave rise 
to a duty to keep her from harming third parties that were foreseeably at risk from her, including the 
Higginses. Because an understanding of the special relationship doctrine is crucial to this discussion, we 
begin with a brief review of the concept. Section 315 of Restatement (Second) of Torts sets [** 14] out a 
formulation of this doctrine. It provides two exceptions to the general rule that one has no duty to control 
the conduct of third persons. Section 315 states: 
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him [or her] from causing physical 
harm to another unless 
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor 
to control the third person's conduct, or 
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1977). These exceptions are further elaborated upon in sections 314 
and 319 of the Restatement. See Rollins, 813 P.2d 1156. 
In Utah, we have applied the Restatement's special relationship exception to the general rule that there 
is no duty to control the conduct of third persons. See Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159. However, unlike the 
Restatement writers, we do not attempt in our duty analysis to rigorously maintain the artificial 
categorization that differentiates between cases based on whether the actor owes the duty to [**15] the 
victim or to the victimizer, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § § 314, 315, 319, nor do we apply the 
Restatement's precise formulation uncritically. Instead, we have taken a policy-based approach in 
determining whether a special relation should be said to exist and consequently whether a duty is owed. 
Rollins, [*237] 813 P.2d at 1161; Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151-52; Beach, 726 P.2d at 415; see Owens, 784 
P.2d at 1193 (Zimmerman, J., concurring specially, joined by Hall, C.J., and Howe, Assoc. C.J.). 
Determining whether the actor has a duty to prevent another's harm requires careful consideration of 
the consequences of imposing that duty for the parties and for society. Beach, 726 P.2d at 418. We are 
loath to recognize a duty that is realistically incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds with the 
nature of the parties' relationship. Id. Accordingly, in determining the existence of a duty, we examine 
such factors as the identity and character of the actor, the victim, and the victimizer, the relationship of the 
actor [**16] to the victim and the victimizer, and the practical impact that finding a special relationship 
would have. See Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1160. As we explained in Beach: 
It is meaningless to speak of "special relationships" and "duties" in the abstract. These terms are only 
labels which the legal system applies to defined situations to indicate that certain rights and obligations 
flow from them; they are "an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the 
law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." 
Beach, 726 P.2d at 418 (quoting William Prosser, Law of Torts 333 (3d ed. 1964)). 
In Beach, Ferree, and Rollins, we performed this sort of pragmatic, policy-based analysis in the 
context of claims that an injured party, as a member of a large undifferentiated group, such as a university 
student body (Beach) or the general public (Ferree and Rollins), was owed a duty by a defendant to protect 
the injured party from self-created dangers (Beach) or from injuries by third parties under the custody or 
control of the defendant (Ferree [**17] and Rollins). In each, we concluded that if the broad claim for a 
special relationship and the consequent duty was accepted, the defendant in question would be unable to 
perform the duty without either radically changing its character or drastically circumscribing the function it 
was charged with performing. Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1161; Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151; Beach, 726 P.2d at 419-
20. 
A general principle can be drawn from these cases. In the context of a claim that an actor having 
custody or control of another owed a duty to prevent harm to or by that other, our overriding practical 
concern is whether the one causing the harm has shown him- or herself to be uniquely dangerous so that 
the actor upon whom the alleged duty would fall can be reasonably expected, consistent with the practical 
realities of that actor's relationship to the one in custody or under control, to distinguish that person from 
others similarly situated, to appreciate the unique threat this person presents, and to act to minimize or 
protect against that threat. When such circumstances are present, a special relationship [**18] can be said 
to exist and a duty sensibly may be imposed. E.g., Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162. 
It is important to recognize that in the above-referenced cases, we did not reject the possibility of a 
duty flowing from these institutions to specific individuals or narrow classes of individuals who for some 
reason were distinguishable from the mass; we only rejected the claims for broad categories of special 
relationships which operatively seem to be indistinguishable from a general negligence theory. Id. at 1159-
62; Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151-52; Beach, 726 P.2d at 416. As we held in Rollins, this analysis produces 
results that appear to diverge from sections 314, 315, and 319 of the Restatement. 813 P.2d at 1161-62. 
However, we think our approach is more realistic than that which would result from a broad reading of the 
Restatement, especially when one considers the fact that at bottom, the issue is one of negligence — a lack 
of reasonable care — as opposed to what actions of others it would be nice to be insured against. n5 [**19] 
n5 Defendants correctly argue that many courts have identified the actor's legal ability to 
control the third person as the factor that determines the existence of a special relationship. See, 
e.g., Hokansen v. United States, 868 F.2d 372, 377 (10th Cir. 1989); Abernathy, 773 F.2d at 189-
90; Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1009 (D. Md. 1982); Cooke, 735 P.2d at 836; 
Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1215-16 (Colo. 1989); Johnson Estate v. Condell Memorial Hosp., 
119 111. 2d 496, 520 N.E.2d 37, 41, 117 111. Dec. 47 (111. 1988). Here, defendants contend that 
because Trujillo was a voluntary patient, they lacked the ability to control her and therefore could 
not have a special relationship with her. 
We have employed this legal-power-to-control analysis ourselves in certain cases. See Doe v. 
Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1985); Little v. Division of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 54-55 
(Utah 1983). At the same time, however, we have moved away from an exclusive reliance on this 
factor, just as we do not rely on the Restatement's mechanistic relational models in deciding 
whether a duty exists. Instead, we have concentrated on broader public policy concerns to 
determine whether the relationship gives rise to an affirmative duty to control another. See, e.g., 
Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1161-62; Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151; Beach, 726 P.2d at 418. The legal ability to 
control a third party may figure in this public policy analysis, but it is only one factor to consider 
and is not determinative of whether a special relationship exists. 
[**20] 
[*238] With this background in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. We begin with the question of 
whether defendants had a special relationship with Trujillo. Higgins argues that a special relationship 
exists between every therapist and every patient, the breach of which results in liability to anyone injured 
as a consequence. Therefore, she claims, each defendant has a special relationship with Trujillo that 
required committing or voluntarily admitting her. We reject this argument. Under the 
Beach/Ferree/Rollins analytical model, the fact that a relationship between one person and another can be 
characterized as "special" for some purposes does not determine whether that relation is special for 
purposes of imposing a tort duty in contravention of the general rule that one has no duty to control another 
person's actions. As we noted in Beach, the characterization of a relationship as special is a conclusion, a 
label that announces the results of a policy analysis, not a substitute for analysis. 726 P.2d at 417-18. 
Higgins offers no analysis beyond labels to support her argument. 
Higgins's second special relationship theory is that [**21] defendants owed her and her daughter a 
duty to control Trujillo, a dangerous person, because of Trujillo's special relationship to defendants. Our 
decision in Rollins, which built upon Beach and Ferree, sets the standard that governs this issue. There, in 
the context of an action against the state hospital for harm caused to a member of the public by an escaped 
patient, we held that before we would impose a duty on a hospital to those harmed by a patient, it must be 
shown that the custodian knew or should have known that unless steps were taken to protect others from 
the detainee, he or she was "likely" to cause bodily harm to persons who were "reasonably identifiable by 
the custodian either individually or as members of a distinct group." Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162. We 
elaborated that "for a person or group to be reasonably identifiable, the bodily harm caused will be of a 
type that the custodian knew or should have known the detainee was likely to cause if not controlled." Id. 
We reasoned that when the theoretical danger of the one in custody became sufficiently crystallized that it 
took on a specific object and means, it became reasonable [**22] to impose a duty for two reasons: First, 
the detainee has been distinguished from the remainder of the population, and second, the identification of 
a victim and a means has made it feasible for the custodian to take concrete steps to prevent the harm. Id. 
This same test seems suited to the instant case. Here, the patient may be voluntary, but the other 
characteristics of the parties' relationship are substantially similar to those in Rollins. The patient is 
mentally ill, presenting at least the potential of danger to self or others; the therapist is charged by his or 
her professional role to provide care for the patient in a confidential provider/patient relationship with a 
view toward recovery and return to normal life; and the therapist is legally restricted in using confinement 
to those situations in which the patient presents an identifiable danger to self or others and then must use 
the minimum level of confinement necessary. See Utah Code Ann. § § 62 A-12-222, -234(10)(d), -235(2), 
-241; [*239] O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975). 
Limiting the duty to third parties who are "reasonably identifiable by the [therapist] either [**23] 
individually or as [a] memberf] of a distinct group," Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162, permits us, in most 
instances, to uphold the public policies of protecting the traditional confidentiality of the provider/patient 
relationship, which is important both for privacy reasons and for the efficacy of the therapeutic 
relationship. At the same time, it ensures the minimum use of involuntary commitment consistent with 
protecting identifiable potential victims. See Schopp & Wexler at 183; Robert F. Schopp & Michael R. 
Quattrocchi, Tarasoff, the Doctrine of Special Relationships and the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, J. 
Psychiatry & L. 13, 23 (Spring 1984) [hereinafter Schopp & Quattrocchi]; Fleming & Maximov at 1032; 
Beigler at 277; Mills at 250-51. 
Moreover, by adopting this standard for voluntary and involuntary health-care provider/patient 
relationships, we limit the duty to take steps to protect others by imposing a high level of confinement upon 
the patient to situations in which it is arguably possible for the therapist to distinguish between those who 
do present a real danger and those who do not. Any broader duty would be realistically incapable [**24] 
of performance. This consideration is important and, to a degree, implicitly underlies our decisions in 
Ferree and Rollins. The empirical evidence that has come to our attention is almost unanimous that 
dangerousness cannot be predicted with any degree of success. See, e.g., Schopp & Quattrocchi at 23. 
"Not only have psychologists and psychiatrists been unable to predict dangerousness to a degree of 
accuracy which would justify infringing on a client's rights, they have been unable to predict any more 
accurately than have nonprofessionals." Id.; Robert M. Wettstein, The Prediction of Violent Behavior and 
the Duty to Protect Third Parties, 2 Behav. Sciences & L. 291 (1984); accord Beigler at 280-82. For this 
reason, we limit the imposition of a duty to protect to those situations identified in Rollins in which there is 
an overt indication that the one in custody or under treatment is distinguishable from the mass of those in 
custody or under treatment, all of whom might be said in general terms to be dangerous to someone. See 
Schopp & Wexler at 173. n6 
n6 Although we reach this holding solely on common law grounds, we note that this result is 
consistent with legislation enacted five years after Shaundra was stabbed. That statute provides, "A 
therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior of 
his [or her] client or patient, except when that client or patient communicated to the therapist an 
actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l) (emphasis added). 
[**25] 
Applying this standard to the facts before us, we find that Trujillo never actually distinguished herself 
from the other potentially dangerous patients by threatening an identifiable victim. Trujillo's stabbing of an 
elderly woman three years before her attack on Shaundra did not make Shaundra an identifiable victim or 
even a member of a distinct, identifiable class. As far as the record reveals, Shaundra and the elderly 
woman had nothing in common but gender. The entire undifferentiated female half of the population does 
not comprise a distinct, identifiable group. 
However, this conclusion does not end the matter. While Trujillo may not have identified Shaundra as 
a potential victim, Higgins contends that if defendants had performed their professional responsibilities 
properly, Trujillo would have revealed Shaundra as a potential target. Higgins argues that Trujillo did not 
reveal her obsession with Shaundra because of defendants' negligent treatment and therefore that 
negligence should not excuse defendants from a duty that would have arisen had they acted in accordance 
with the appropriate standard of care. Otherwise, they say, care providers would have an incentive to [** 
26] avoid diagnostically appropriate examinations that could reveal specific threats and give rise to a 
special relationship and the consequent duty to the potential victim. 
[*240] As stated in Rollins, we will find a special relationship and consequent duty when a defendant 
knew of the likely danger to an individual or distinct group of individuals or when a defendant should have 
known of such danger. n7 813 P.2d at 1162. In the context of the present case, if the steps taken by 
defendants were not reasonable in light of Trujillo's symptoms and if reasonable action would have 
revealed that Trujillo was likely to inflict grievous bodily harm on Shaundra, then a special relationship 
would arise. Higgins's factual allegation that proper examination and diagnosis would have disclosed that 
Trujillo was brooding over Shaundra and had targeted her for an attack presents a sufficient claim that a 
duty existed. Consequently, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment for defendants on 
the duty issue. 
n7 We emphasize here that the phrase "should have known" should not be construed to require 
that a health-care provider take measures not otherwise indicated by the apparent symptoms of the 
patient. As we noted earlier, we decline to impose any additional duty on the health-care provider 
that would distort the traditional relationship between the provider and patient and the provider's 
duty to that patient. 
[**27] 
Having concluded that the trial court erred in basing its summary judgment on the lack of duty, we 
must next address a question not reached by the trial court: Are defendants immune from suit under the 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act ("the Act")? 
In structure, the Act grants immunity to all persons performing governmental functions but then 
withdraws that immunity for certain persons under certain circumstances and with certain exceptions. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3. Both plaintiffs and defendants agree that UMC and SLCMH were performing 
governmental functions within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, they are immune from suit unless the 
Act waives that immunity and does not provide an applicable exception to that waiver. 
The Act waives immunity for an "injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury ...(b) arises out of assault, 
battery. ..." Id. § 63-30- 10(l)(b) (1986) (now codified at § 63-30-10(2)) (emphasis added). Defendants 
contend that the Act bars Higgins's claim because Shaundra's injuries and Higgins's mental distress arose 
out of Trujillo's assault and battery. [**28] Higgins responds that section 63-30-10 does not preserve 
immunity for injuries arising from an assault or battery if the assailant is not a governmental employee. 
Under the logic of Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(March 19, 1993), we find Higgins's argument to be without merit. First, by its plain language, section 63-
30-10 preserves immunity for negligence that results in an "injury ... [that] arises out of [an] assault, [or] 
battery. ..." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(l)(b) (1986) (now codified at § 63-30-10(2)). The statute simply 
does not contain the distinction on which Higgins stakes her claim. In fact, its language suggests that the 
legislature contemplated no such distinction. The section in question provides that the negligence of a 
governmental employee is not actionable when, as a result of that negligence, an assault or battery is 
committed by another. Nothing suggests that the one committing the assault or battery need be a 
government employee, and the entire focus of the subsection is upon the negligent government employee, 
not on the intentionally acting assailant. Because it is the negligence of [**29] the governmental 
employee upon which any claim of liability must rest, it would make no sense to engraft upon that waiver a 
limitation based upon the status of the assailant. 
We also note that Higgins cites no Utah authority for her position. Nor could she. When we have 
considered claims that the state's negligence permitted an assault by a person who was not a state 
employee, we have held uniformly that the state is immune. See, e.g., Ledfors, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5-6; 
Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Utah 1987); Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 
(Utah 1978); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 1976); Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 2, 483 P.2d [* 
241] 1296, 1297 (1971); Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 316-17, 445 P.2d 367, 368-69 (Utah 1969); 
see also Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Accordingly, we follow Ledfors and hold that section 63-30-10 bars a suit against a governmental [** 
30] entity for injuries alleged to have been caused by negligence that results in an assault or battery, 
whether or not the assailant is a government employee. Here, the injuries alleged to flow from the 
negligence of the governmental defendants all stem from a battery — Trujillo's stabbing of Shaundra. 
Consequently, section 63-30-10 bars this action. Therefore, although we hold that the trial court erred in 
basing a grant of summary judgment on the lack of duty, governmental immunity presents an independent 
ground for affirming the decision below. See Hill, 827 P.2d at 246. 
We affirm the judgment of the district court. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, concurs in the result. 
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OPINION: 
[*592] [**285] JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court: 
Petitioner Alicia Winkelman (Winkelman), guardian of Alice Lee Mclnerny (Alice), the beneficiary of 
a discretionary supplemental trust with a spendthrift provision, appeals from an order of the circuit court 
dismissing her petition for fees for herself as guardian and fees for the guardian's attorney. On appeal, 
Winkelman contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition because "guardianship fees are 
statutorily compensable and the nature of the Trust has been deviated." For the reasons set forth below, we 
affirm. 
On August 16, 1993, John F. Mclnerny (John) executed a declaration of trust. The trust named John as 
trustee during his lifetime, and provided that after his death, trust funds were to be distributed as indicated 
in the trust instrument. Specifically, the trust provided that, upon John's death, certain lump sum [***2] 
payments were to be disbursed to various individuals. The trust also provided for the needs of John's 
daughter, Alice Lee Mclnerny, as follows: 
"1. Commencing with my death and during the life of my daughter, ALICE LEE MC INERNEY [sic], 
the trustee shall expend such amounts from income and, to the extent necessary, from principal, as the 
trustee in the trustee's sole discretion deems desirable for the comfort of ALICE LEE MC INERNEY [sic], 
taking into consideration other income and cash resources known to the trustee to be available for such 
purposes, it being my intent that the trust property shall be used to provide ALICE LEE MC INERNEY 
[sic] with supplemental care above and beyond the care she was receiving at my death and thereafter 
becomes eligible to receive by reason of both her disability and her personal lack of assets from any state, 
federal or private agency that provides services or benefits to disabled persons. Any income not so spent 
shall be accumulated and from time to time added to principal." 
The trust further provided that at Alice's death, "any interest in the fund not effectively disposed of 
pursuant to the [trust] provisions [**286] [should] [***3] be distributed" to John's nephew, Robert 
Harney, and John's son, William, in equal portions. The trust also contained the following provision: 
"The interests of beneficiaries in principal or income shall not be subject to the claims of any creditor, 
any spouse for alimony or support or other, or to legal process, and may not be voluntarily or involuntarily 
alienated or encumbered. This provision shall not limit the exercise of any power of appointment." 
On December 11, 1993, John died, and respondent First National [*593] Bank of Evergreen Park was 
appointed the successor trustee of the trust (trustee). 
On March 3, 1994, Winkelman instituted proceedings for her appointment as Alice's guardian. A 
report was filed by Dr. Joel Leff which stated that Alice was unable to care for herself because she had 
"longstanding psychiatric problems" and "suffered from schizoaffective disorder, manic." The report also 
stated that Alice had been diagnosed with diabetes mellitus and was unable to follow a diabetic diet. On 
March 31, the trial court appointed Winkelman as Alice's guardian. 
On September 16, 1994, Winkelman filed a motion for withdrawal and substitution of attorney, 
substituting Deborah [***4] Helms as her attorney in place of the Bank's attorney, which the trial court 
subsequently granted. On the same day, Winkelman also filed a petition to approve her fees as guardian of 
Alice and fees for the guardian's attorney. 
In her petition, Winkelman stated that Alice lived with her in Winkelman's home, and required 
supervised care at a minimum of 10 hours per day. Alice's estate was valued at zero, and Alice had no 
annual income. Since undertaking guardianship services, Winkelman had been reimbursed by the trustee 
for certain out-of-pocket expenses such as mileage, clothing, shoes, eyeglasses, personal items, meals, and 
other miscellaneous expenses which were provided by the guardian to Alice. The petition also stated that 
since her appointment as guardian on March 31, 1994, Winkelman had expended 987.5 hours caring for 
Alice, which included time expended by Winkelman for grocery shopping, taking Alice to lunch, and 
taking Alice on vacation. Winkelman requested that she be compensated for this time at a rate of $ 20 per 
hour. Winkelman also requested reimbursement for attorney fees incurred by her in the total amount of $ 
3,310 and attorney costs in the amount of $ 59. Winkelman [***5] attached excerpts from the trust 
instrument, as well as a time and expense log of her activities while caring for Alice beginning on February 
23, 1994, and ending on August 3, 1994. Winkelman also attached a detailed report of her attorney's time 
and fees for work performed relating to Alice and Winkelman's guardianship of Alice. The daily entries in 
Winkelman's attorney's time sheet are dated beginning January 12, 1994, and ending on an unspecified date 
in 1994 (the last dated entry is September 12, 1994, and one other entry follows with the description "Court 
appearance on Petition"). 
On December 21, 1994, the trustee filed a motion to dismiss Winkelman's petition. The trustee argued 
that it had no authority to pay the requested fees and should not be forced to pay them because [*594] the 
trust contained a spendthrift provision which protected the trust from creditors' claims, and that 
Winkelman, as Alice's guardian, was a creditor. Winkelman filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss, in which she stated that during John's final illness, Alice was living with John in squalid 
conditions; after she discovered this fact, she began to care for Alice, taking her to an eye doctor, [***6] 
administering her diabetes and psychotropic medicines, monitoring her diet, and providing general care; 
despite her care, Alice continued to behave erratically and required constant attention; subsequent to her 
appointment as guardian, Alice had undergone surgery for skin cancer; according to Dr. Leff, Alice should 
be placed in a secure, structured living environment with supervision; and she was preparing to resign her 
guardianship, and the Public Guardian of Cook County had agreed to become Alice's guardian when she 
resigned. Winkelman further stated that applications in behalf of Alice for social security benefits, "SSI" 
benefits, and public aid were pending, social security [**287] benefits having initially been denied and 
subsequently appealed. 
Winkelman's memorandum further stated that the trustee refused to pay the fees for Alice's placement 
in a residential care facility, and until Alice begins receiving government aid, she must remain in 
Winkelman's care. Throughout her tenure as Alice's guardian, the trustee made one payment to Winkelman 
for her guardianship services, and paid a monthly allowance for Alice's room and board, medical needs, 
and miscellaneous needs. Winkelman argued [***7] that she should be awarded guardian and attorney 
fees because the trustee intended that Alice be provided necessary support, and the trust was Alice's only 
source of income and support until such time as public aid became available. She further argued that the 
settlor's intent that Alice's support be supplemented by the trust could not be fulfilled because Alice was 
not receiving any primary support. Winkelman contended that the trustee did not have complete discretion 
in disbursing funds, and guardians were statutorily entitled to compensation from the ward's estate. 
Winkelman further argued that she was not a common creditor, but rather was a necessary caregiver 
entitled to compensation for her services, and because Alice (the ward) had no estate, Winkelman should 
be compensated from the trust. 
On February 22, 1995, the trustee filed a memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss 
Winkelman's petition for guardian and attorney fees. In its memorandum, the trustee first argued that the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction and authority to compel payment to Winkelman because there was no estate 
from which to compensate [*595] the guardian as the trust was not a part of Alice's estate, and the [***8] 
trust instrument did not authorize such a disbursement. The trustee further argued that the trust's spendthrift 
provision prevented the trustee from making payments for guardian fees because the guardian was acting 
as a creditor. Lastly, the trustee argued that it could not pay Winkelman as Alice's guardian because the 
trust was a discretionary supplemental needs trust. The trustee contended that, under a supplemental needs 
trust, a state agency could not seek reimbursement from the trust and, as guardian, Winkelman should not 
be placed in a better position than a government agency seeking reimbursement for the same services. 
On April 5, 1995, the trial court held a hearing on Winkelman's petition for fees and the trustee's 
motion to dismiss, and made the following finding: 
"THE COURT: Okay. Thank you folks. I believe the motion to dismiss the petition should be allowed. 
This would certainly be different if this were inter-vivos trust, funds created from the ward-those are 
clearly subject to fees, no question about it. And even though this language were in there at the sole 
discretion of the trustee those would definitely be allowable. And I presume the trustee wouldn't have [*** 
9] any problem with it, they would be approved. But in this discretionary trust it seems above and beyond. 
So that is my order." 
The trial court then entered an order dismissing Winkelman's petition with prejudice. 
Winkelman filed a notice of appeal with this court on May 2, 1995. On October 17, 1995, while this 
appeal was pending, the trial court entered an order authorizing Winkelman to place Alice in Bourbonnais 
Terrace, a residential care facility. 
Winkelman first argues that under sections 27—1 and 1 la-17 of the Illinois Probate Act of 1975 
(Probate Act) (755 ILCS 5/27-1, 5/1 la--17 (West 1992)), guardianship fees are compensable from Alice's 
estate and, because Alice does not have an estate, she should be compensated from Alice's trust fund. 
Winkelman further argues that although the trust instrument indicates that the trustee retains discretion over 
disbursements, the trustee does not have complete discretion when disbursing funds for Alice's support 
and, therefore, the trial court can compel payment of Winkelman's guardian fees. * Winkelman further 
argues that her services are compensable because Illinois [**288] case law has established that services 
performed exclusively [***10] [*596] for the emotional benefit of the disabled adult are compensable 
from the ward's estate. 
* In the trial court and again on appeal, Winkelman simultaneously argues for guardian fees 
and attorney fees. 
The trustee argues that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to compel payment because guardian fees are 
only compensable from a ward's estate and the trust is not a part of Alice's estate. The trustee further argues 
that the trust is a discretionary supplemental needs trust, not a discretionary primary support trust and, 
therefore, the court cannot compel the trustee to pay for services provided to Alice which constitute 
primary support. The trustee also argues that section 5—105 of the Mental Health and Developmental 
Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/5-105 (West 1996)) provides that a parent is not required to support an 
adult disabled child during the parent's life, and "the settlor [in this case] was legally entitled to set up the 
John F. Mclnerny Trust to supplement the care of Alice Lee Mclnerny and owed no [***11] legal 
obligation to design the trust in a manner that would provide for the primary care of the beneficiary." 
It is well settled that where no genuine issues of material facts remain in dispute and a trial court has 
issued rulings of law, a reviewing court must use a de novo standard of review. Jackson v. Moreno, 278 
111. App. 3d 503, 505, 663 N.E.2d 27, 215 111. Dec. 277 (1996). Further, "the interpretation of statutory 
provisions is traditionally a question of law to which a deferential standard of review is inapplicable." 
Mellon Bank N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 265 111. App. 3d 859, 866, 638 N.E.2d 640, 202 111. Dec. 
772 (1993). "A guardian of *** [a] person has a duty to make necessary provision for his ward's 'support, 
care, comfort, health, education, and maintenance, and such professional services as are appropriate.'" In re 
Estate of Burgeson, 125 111. 2d 477, 486, 532 N.E.2d 825, 126 111. Dec. 954 (1988). The Probate Act 
provides that "[a] representative [or guardian] is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services." 755 
ILCS 5/27-1 (West 1992). The Act also provides that personal guardians may be compensated from the 
estate of a ward, i.e.: 
"Duties of personal guardian. *** The guardian [***12] shall assist the ward in the development of 
maximum self-reliance and independence. The guardian of the person may petition the court for an order 
directing the guardian of the estate to pay an amount periodically for the provision of the services specified 
by the court order." 755 ILCS 5/1 la-17 (West 1992) 
In addition, a guardian may be compensated from the estate of the ward for services which "further the 
emotional well-being of the ward," and sections 27—1 and 1 la—17 have been interpreted "to permit the 
probate court to consider services performed exclusively for the emotional benefit of the disabled adult in 
setting compensation for [*597] the adult's personal guardians." In re Estate of Donnelly, 111 111. App. 3d 
1035, 1038-39, 445 N.E.2d 49, 67 111. Dec. 757 (1983). 
While the statutory provisions and case law cited above support Winkelman's argument that a guardian 
may be compensated for his or her services from a ward's estate, in the present case, as both parties agree, 
the trust is not a part of Alice's estate. Therefore, under sections 27—1 and 1 la-17, Winkelman is not 
entitled to compensation from the trust's funds for services she has provided because those funds are not a 
part [*** 13] of Alice's estate. 
Winkelman argues, however, that although the trust's funds are not a part of Alice's estate, she should 
be compensated from those funds because while it was John's intent to create a discretionary supplemental 
needs trust, in actuality the trust has been functioning as a discretionary primary support trust and should 
be construed as such. Winkelman argues that because the trustee has been providing payments for Alice's 
primary support, and because Alice has not been able to secure any form of public aid, John's intent that 
the trust pay supplemental support cannot be fulfilled. Moreover, Winkelman argues, John intended that 
the trust should provide for Alice's comfort, and this requires the trustee to pay for guardian services. 
Winkelman further argues that under a discretionary primary support trust, her services constitute primary 
support and the trustee does not retain the discretion to withhold [**289] payment to her under its 
discretionary power or under the trust's spendthrift provision because she is not a common creditor. The 
trustee argues that the trust contains a spendthrift provision which protects the principal and income from 
being subject to the claims of [***14] any creditor or legal process, and Winkelman's claims for her 
guardianship services and guardian attorney fees is that of a creditor. Therefore, the trustee argues, the 
plain language of the trust prevents the trustee from being subject to Winkelman's claims. 
"In general, the rules for construction of written instruments *** apply to the interpretation of trusts— 
the question of paramount importance being the settlor's intention, which if unambiguous is gathered from 
the whole instrument creating the trust." Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities v. 
First National Bank of Chicago, 104 111. App. 3d 461, 463, 432 N.E.2d 1086, 60 111. Dec. 187 (1982). The 
court will effectuate the terms of the trust if it is not contrary to public policy. Harris Trust & Savings 
Bank v. Donovan, 145 111. 2d 166, 172, 582 N.E.2d 120, 163 111. Dec. 854 (1991). When construing trusts, 
the court will apply the same rules of construction it applies when it construes wills. Harris Trust, 145 111. 
2d at 172. "The settlor's intent is to be determined solely by reference to the plain language of the trust [* 
598] itself, and extrinsic evidence may be admitted to aid interpretation only if the document is ambiguous 
and the [***15] settlor's intent cannot be ascertained.'" Stein v. Scott, 252 111. App. 3d 611, 615, 625 
N.E.2d 713, 192 111. Dec. 558 (1993). 
A court will permit the reformation of a trust only in extreme cases, and this power is to be "exercised 
with great caution." Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Phillips, 114 111. 2d 85, 
91, 500 N.E.2d 29, 102 111. Dec. 407 (1986) (Phillips II). The court may consider "the surrounding 
circumstances at the time the instrument was executed, to the extent they may aid in determining the 
settlor's intention in using certain language." First National Bank v. Canton Council of Camp fire Girls, 
Inc., 85 111. 2d 507, 514, 426 N.E.2d 1198, 55 111. Dec. 824 (1981). "A court can allow reformation of a 
trust when an unforeseen exigency arises which may place the cestui que trust in 'pinching want,' making it 
necessary for the court to place itself in the position of the settlor and carry out his intention as if he had 
anticipated the changed circumstances." Phillips II, 114 111. 2d at 91. 
In the present case, both parties agree that John intended to create a discretionary supplemental support 
trust with a spendthrift provision. As the trustee states in its brief, case law addressing [***16] the issue of 
whether third parties may obtain reimbursement from a discretionary supplemental support trust with a 
spendthrift provision is scarce. The cases cited by both Winkelman and the trustee involved the issue of 
whether State agencies may be reimbursed for services provided to beneficiaries of discretionary trusts 
with spendthrift provisions, and have been affected bv a statute enacted by the Illinois legislature in 1991. 
See First National Bank, 104 111. App. 3d 461, 60 111. Dec. 187, 432 N.E.2d 1086; Department of Mental 
Health v. Phillips, 133 111. App. 3d 337, 478 N.E.2d 1052, 88 111. Dec. 444 (1985) (Phillips I); Phillips II, 
114 111. 2d 85, 102 111. Dec. 407, 500 N.E.2d 29; and Button v. Elmhurst National Bank, 169 111. App. 3d 
28, 522 N.E.2d 1368, 119 111. Dec. 509 (1988). These cases stand for the proposition that discretionary 
trust income and principal should be considered as part of the beneficiary's estate for purposes of 
reimbursement when a State agency is seeking to be paid for its services provided to the beneficiary even 
when the trust contains a spendthrift provision. See First National Bank, 104 111. App. 3d at 465 (holding 
"that the interests of the beneficiaries in the spendthrift trusts here should be considered as estates within 
[***17] the meaning of that term in section 5-105 of the Code [405 ILCS 5/5-105] and, in this regard, 
we also view the omission of a specific reference to trustees in that section as not implying a legislative 
intent to provide free treatment in State facilities for the beneficiaries of spendthrift or other trusts"). 
[*599] [**290] In the present case, however, Winkelman is the guardian, not a State agency, 
seeking reimbursement for services provided to the beneficiary. Thus, the case law cited above does not 
apply. In addition, even if Winkelman's services were more similar to those of a State agency than to those 
of a creditor, she would be precluded from compelling payment from Alice's trust because in 1991 the 
Illinois legislature enacted a statute which protects discretionary trusts created for disabled beneficiaries 
from claims by State agencies, i.e.: 
"A discretionary trust for the benefit of an individual who has a disability that substantially impairs the 
individual's ability to provide for his or her own care or custody and constitutes a substantial handicap shall 
not be liable to pay or reimburse the State or any public agency for financial aid or services to the 
individual [***18] except to the extent the trust was created by the individual or trust property has been 
distributed directly to or is otherwise under the control of the individual ***. A discretionary trust is one in 
which the trustee has discretionary power to determine distributions to be made under the trust." (Emphasis 
added.) 760 ILCS 5/15.1 (West 1996). 
Based on the facts of the present case, the exception in this statute does not apply and, therefore, 
Winkelman may not recover fees under the statute. 
Winkelman further argues, however, that if her services are not similar to those of a State agency, but 
rather to those of a creditor, she is providing primary support for Alice and, under section 157(b) of the 
Restatement of Trusts, she should be allowed to assert a claim against the trust even though the trust 
contains a spendthrift provision protecting it from creditors' claims. 
Section 157 of the Restatement of Trusts specifies claims which may be enforceable against a 
spendthrift trust and trusts for support, as follows: 
"Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of the beneficiary can be reached in 
satisfaction of an enforceable claim [*** 19] against the beneficiary, 
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the wife for alimony; 
(b) for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or necessary supplies furnished to him; 
(c) for services rendered and materials furnished which preserve or benefit the interest of the 
beneficiary; 
(d) by the United States or a State to satisfy a claim against the beneficiary." (Emphasis added.) 
Restatement of Trusts, § 157(1959). 
Here, we conclude that Winkelman, if acting as a creditor, is [*600] not supplying necessary services 
to Alice. The trustee has distributed funds from the trust for food, clothing, shelter and other miscellaneous 
items (primary support) at Winkelman's request for Alice's necessities. Winkelman, as Alice's guardian, is 
only required to represent Alice's interests; Winkelman is not required to provide the services she is now 
seeking to have the trust reimburse, such as grocery shopping, taking Alice to lunch, or taking Alice on 
vacation. Thus, Winkelman is not entitled to circumvent the trust's spendthrift provision by way of the 
exceptions enumerated in section 157(b) of the Restatement of Trusts. 
We also briefly note that it is irrelevant [***20] whether the trustee has disbursed funds for Alice's 
primary support "in violation" of the settlor's intent, as Winkelman argues, because under either a 
discretionary supplemental support trust with a spendthrift provision or a discretionary primary support 
trust with a spendthrift provision, Winkelman is not entitled to compensation because her services clearly 
do not constitute primary support. Therefore, this court does not have to determine whether it must reform 
the trust, a power which is to be exercised "with great caution." Phillips II, 114 111. 2d at 91. 
Winkelman also contends that the trustee abused its discretion in refusing to pay for her guardianship 
services because they are necessary for Alice's basic support. Winkelman further argues that because the 
trustee has withdrawn monies from the trust for [**291] trust administration fees, it has breached its 
fiduciary duty. 
"Absent proof of fraud, abuse of discretion or bad faith, a trustee's exercise of discretion is not subject 
to interference by the court." Taxy v. Worden, 181 III. App. 3d 97, 107, 536 N.E.2d 901, 129 111. Dec. 851 
(1989). A court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trustee's absent actions by the trustee which 
[***21] are outside the bounds of reasonable judgment. Taxy, 181 111. App. 3d at 107. However, "such 
discretion is not an arbitrary one and one which would permit the trustee to provide no support whatever 
for [the beneficiary]." First National Bank, 104 111. App. 3d at 465. 
Here, we hold that the trustee has not abused its discretion in performance of its duties enumerated 
under the trust instrument in refusing to pay Winkelman guardian and attorney fees. The trust specifies that 
the trustee shall disburse funds at its discretion for the comfort and support of Alice, supplemental to what 
Alice is entitled to receive from government aid. The trustee has made disbursements for Alice's room and 
board, clothing, medical needs and other miscellaneous needs because Alice has been unable to secure any 
other form of income. Simply because the trustee did not authorize a [*601] disbursement for 
Winkelman's guardian and attorney fees does not mean that the trustee has abused its discretion. If the 
trustee had not paid for food when Alice was in desperate need for food, for example, the trustee could be 
considered to have abused its discretion. This is not the case, however. In any event, based [***22] on our 
determination that Winkelman's claims for guardian and attorney fees were unenforceable against the trust, 
there could be no abuse of discretion in the trustee's refusal to pay them. 
We also reject Winkelman's argument that the trustee has abused its fiduciary duty by charging the 
trust for trust administration fees. Winkelman, failed 1o produce evidence in the trial court of the trustee's 
fees and, therefore, no record exists of what, if any, charges the trustee has made to the trust res. Moreover, 
assuming arguendo that the trustee breached its fiduciary duty to the beneficiary by charging excessive fees 
to the trust res, Winkelman's remedy would be an action against the trust in behalf of Alice, rather than in 
her own behalf for payment of guardian and attorney fees. 
Lastly, it should be noted that Winkelman is requesting fees for her services beginning on February 23, 
1994, over one month before she was appointed Alice's guardian on March 31, 1994. Additionally, 
Winkelman states in her opening and reply briefs that family members and the trustee "prevailed" upon her 
to become guardian and, therefore, equity and public policy dictate that she be compensated [***23] for 
her services. There is no indication in the record, however, that Winkelman's assumption of guardianship 
duties was anything other than voluntary. Moreover, any implication in Winkelman's brief that the trustee 
misled her regarding compensation for her guardianship services is also unsupported by the record. 
For the reasons stated, we affirm the order of the circuit court dismissing Winkelman's petition for 
fees. 
Affirmed. 
McNAMARA and CERDA, JJ., concur. 
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[*177] 
[**155] The opinion of the court was delivered by 
LARSON, J.: This case presents for our review the first impression question in Kansas [***3] of 
whether a will which made no reference to a preexisting inter vivos trust had the legal effect of revoking 
the trust. 
Although our decision is based on the construction of the applicable legal documents whose provisions 
we will fully set forth, we will also recite facts surrounding their execution. 
On November 29, 1990, Ellen M. Sanders executed a restatement and amendment of the Ellen M. 
Sanders Trust Agreement dated July 23, 1990. Ellen was the grantor, trustee, and lifetime beneficiary of 
the trust. 
The trust agreements dated July 23, 1990, and November 29, 1990, were both amendable and 
revocable in Part I, Paragraph 2 of both documents-
"TRUST REVOCABLE BY ELLEN M. SANDERS. This Agreement may be amended from time to 
time, and may be revoked partially or fully by ELLEN M. SANDERS during her lifetime by a writing 
delivered to the Trustee, which shall specify the term of such amendment or revocation. No amendment 
hereto shall increase the duties and responsibilities of the Trustee without their consent." 
The amended trust designated Ellen's brother, Frank Palmer, as successor trustee upon Ellen's death or 
her inability to act, and provided the following statement [***4] relating to the successor's service during 
Ellen's lifetime: 
"If at any time during Grantor's lifetime she is under a legal disability, or resigns in writing, or, if in the 
opinion of Frank Palmer, Grantor's brother, Grantor is unable to properly manage her affairs by reason of 
illness or mental or physical disability, or is determined unable to act as Trustee by reason of incapacity as 
determined by a commission of two (2) persons duly licensed to practice medicine and surgery by the State 
Board of Healing Arts, Grantor's brother, Frank Palmer, shall carry out the provisions contained herein as 
successor trustee." 
[*178] Frank Palmer was a signatory party to the trust in his capacity as successor trustee. 
The dispositive provisions of the amended trust stated the principal and income should be used for 
Ellen's benefit during her lifetime. It then provided that after Ellen's death, the trust property should be held 
in trust for a period of 10 years with the income payable to her son, Mac Sanders, and her grandson, Bill 
Sanders, in equal shares. Upon termination of the trust, 480 acres of designated real property in Harper 
County, Kansas, was to be distributed to Mac [***5] Sanders, 480 acres of different designated real 
property in Harper County, Kansas, was to [** 156] be distributed to Bill Sanders, and an undivided one-
ninth interest in certain real property was to be distributed equally to Mac Sanders, Bill Sanders, and 
Patricia Bergman, with all the residue of the trust to be divided equally among Patricia Bergman, Mac 
Sanders, and Bill Sanders. The November 29, 1990, amendment of the trust had the effect of removing 
Patricia Bergman's son, Kenneth, as a beneficiary and of reducing Patricia's share to a one-third interest in 
a single parcel of land and the residuary. 
The trust was fully funded by the execution and recording of deeds of conveyance of the real property 
to Ellen as trustee of "the Ellen M. Sanders Trust Agreement, dated July 23, 1990." Schedule A attached to 
the trust agreement also stated the trust corpus was to include: "All personal property of every kind 
wherever located including specifically but not limited to all household goods, personal effects, jewelry, 
clothing, furniture, and textures and all items in the home at 104 W. 13th, Harper, Harper County, Kansas." 
Contemporaneous with execution of the amended trust, Ellen executed a [***6] pour-over will and a 
durable power of attorney. The pour-over will, dated and executed November 29, 1990, left her entire 
estate to the trust, but provided that in the event the trust no longer existed or could not take, Ellen's estate 
was to be divided between Mac Sanders and Bill Sanders, share and share alike. The will specifically 
stated: "I am not unmindful of my daughter, Patricia Bergman, but am not making any provision for her." 
The broad durable power of attorney named Frank Palmer and Mac Sanders attorneys-in-fact. 
[*179] On February 12, 1992, Ellen executed a second amendment to the trust, essentially only 
reducing the time the trust continued after her death to 5 years rather than 10, but specifically republishing, 
ratifying, and reaffirming her existing trust agreement as modified by this second amendment. Frank 
Palmer again signed this amendment as successor trustee. 
On June 24, 1992, Ellen executed her third amendment to the trust. This amendment added Mac 
Sanders and Bill Sanders as successor co-trustees in the event that Frank Palmer was unable to act as 
successor trustee. Again, the trust agreement as it existed was republished, ratified, and reaffirmed in [*** 
7] all respects except as modified by the previous restatement and amendment, the second amendment, 
and this third amendment. Ellen signed as settlor and trustee, but neither Frank, nor Mac, nor Bill executed 
the document as successor trustee. 
All of the documents that Ellen had executed up to this time had been prepared by attorney Phillip W. 
Unruh, who represented Bill and Mac at trial. 
Several months prior to July 13, 1993, Ellen told Patricia that she wished to change her will, but that 
she did not wish to consult with attorney Unruh. Patricia recommended attorney Theodore J. Nichols, 
whom she did not know, but who had performed services for her son and grandchildren. 
Nichols met with Ellen once before July 8, 1993, regarding preparation of her will. Attorney Nichols 
prepared a will as requested by Ellen. The will was executed on July 8, 1993, and divided all of Ellen's 
property among her surviving children, Patricia and Mac, and her grandson, Bill, in equal shares, 
specifically providing the following: 
"ITEM III 
"It is my greatest desire that my family agree and get along with one another in disposition and 
distribution of my estate. Because I believe that they will be able [***8] to do so, I direct that, after the 
payment of debts, claims, taxes and expenses of administration, all of my remaining property, real, 
personal, and mixed, and wherever located, be divided equally, in kind, among my surviving children Patty 
Bergman and Mac Sanders, and my grandson, Bill Sanders, as the three of them may agree. 
[* 180] "In the event that they are unable to agree, then I direct that the Court appoint three 
independent appraisers to distribute all of my property equally, in kind, to each Patty Bergman, Mac 
Sanders, and Bill Sanders as a majority of said appraisers may agree. If the appraisers determine that my 
property cannot be distributed equally in kind, then I [**157] direct that all of my property be sold at 
private sale or public auction, as my Co-Executors, hereinafter named, deem to be in the best interests of 
my estate and that the proceeds from the sale be distributed equally, share and share alike, to Patty 
Bergman, Mac Sanders, and Bill Sanders." 
None of the beneficiaries were present when the will was executed. After signing the new will, Ellen 
discovered a few minor typographical errors, and on July 13, 1993, Ellen met again with Nichols and 
executed a [***9] new will correcting these errors. The will specifically contained the dispositive 
provision previously set forth and provided: 
"I, Ellen Sanders, sometimes known as Ellen M. Sanders, hereby make, publish and declare this to be 
my Last Will and Testament. By this publication I intend to revoke any prior will or codicil." 
The will did not make any reference of any nature whatsoever to the Ellen M. Sanders Trust dated July 
23, 1990. 
Ellen died on September 15, 1994. Patricia offered the July 13, 1993, will for probate. Mac and Bill 
challenged this will on the grounds that Ellen lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will or was 
unduly influenced. They also asserted that because the July 13, 1993, will made no reference to the trust, it 
could not revoke the trust. They further alleged that if the will was construed to terminate the trust, Ellen 
had not complied with the revocation provisions by notifying Frank Palmer, who they claimed had 
succeeded her and was acting as successor trustee. 
The case was tried over several days in June 1995. The parties submitted detailed suggested findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, and the trial court issued its opinion in November 1995. [***10] The court 
concluded that Ellen possessed the testamentary capacity to execute the July 13, 1993, will and that she had 
not been unduly influenced. The court noted Ellen had never been advised that Frank was acting as 
successor trustee and Frank had demonstrated confusion as to whether he had been acting as trustee or 
under the power of attorney. The court thus found that Frank had not succeeded [*181] Ellen as successor 
trustee during her lifetime. Additionally, the court held the successorship provision of the trust was 
ambiguous and unenforceable. 
The court then determined that the will of July 13, 1993, revoked the inter vivos trust. Finding that the 
adoption of the arguments of Bill and Mac would give effect to form over substance, the court ruled: 
"Based on the above and foregoing, the Court concludes that Kansas law, justice, equity and the 
evidence adduced at trial require it to give effect to Ellen Sanders' last stated intention regarding the 
disposition and distribution of her estate upon her death. Accordingly, this Court concludes that it was 
Ellen Sanders' specific intention when she executed the July 13, 1993, will to alter, amend, modify and/or 
revoke any previous [***l 1] testamentary dispositions (be they by will or trust document); that the Last 
Will and Testament of Ellen Sanders dated July 13, 1993, was her last expressed intent of who the 
beneficiaries of her estate should be; that the Last Will and Testament of Ellen M. Sanders dated July 13, 
1993, should be and it is hereby admitted to probate in the District Court of Harper County, Kansas, and 
that all property purported to be owned or held by the Ellen M. Sanders Trust shall be subject to disposition 
and distribution through the Estate of Ellen M. Sanders rather than through the purported Trust." 
Mac appeals the trial court's decision as to whether Frank became the successor trustee, and both Bill 
and Mac appeal the decision that the July 23, 1990, trust as amended was revoked by the July 13, 1993, 
will. The appeal has been transferred to our court pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c). 
Although two issues are raised on appeal, because of the result we reach, we need only consider 
whether Ellen M. Sanders' will of July 13, 1993, revoked the Ellen M. Sanders Trust Agreement dated July 
23, 1990, as subsequently amended. 
Under our standard of review, "the legal effect of a written instrument is [***12] a question of law for 
the court to decide. On appeal, a written instrument or contract may [**158] be construed and its legal 
effect determined by the appellate court regardless of the construction made by the trial court." Galindo v. 
City of Coffeyville, 256 Kan. 455, 885 P.2d 1246, Syl. P 2, (1994). Whether an instrument is ambiguous is 
a matter of law to be decided by the court. Mobile Acres, Inc. v. Kurata, 211 Kan. 833, 839, 508 P.2d 889 
(1973). 
[*182] Because we are dealing with the provisions (or lack thereof) of both a will and a trust, the 
statement in In re Living Trust ofHuxtable, 243 Kan. 531, 534, 757 P.2d 1262 (1988), dealing with both, is 
instructive: "While most of the published cases involve the construction of provisions in wills, the same 
rules that apply to their construction apply to trusts and most other written documents. In re Estate of 
Hauck, 170 Kan. 116, 119-20, 223 P.2d 707 (1950)." 
Justice Holmes in Huxtable went on to declare that "it is the general rule that if the language of a 
written instrument is clear and can be carried out as written there is no room for rules of construction." 243 
Kan. at 534 (citing In re Estate ofWernet, [***13] 226 Kan. 97, 596 P.2d 137 [1979]). Also cited with 
approval was In re Estate of Graves, 203 Kan. 762, 457 P.2d 71 (1969), in which syllabus P 4 stated: 
"In considering a will a court cannot begin by inferring a testator's intention and then construe the will 
to give effect to such intention however probable it may be, nor can it rewrite the will, in whole or in part, 
to conform to such presumed intention. It is the duty of a court to construe not to construct a will." 
We commence our discussion of the arguments and authorities raised by the parties with the clear 
understanding that the Ellen M. Sanders Trust Agreement of July 23, 1990, could be revoked partially or 
fully "by ELLEN M. SANDERS during her lifetime by a writing delivered to the Trustee, which shall 
specify the term of such amendment or revocation." Further, and equally important, we recognize that 
notwithstanding the arguments of Patricia Bergman and the findings of the trial court, the Last Will and 
Testament of Ellen M. Sanders dated July 13, 1993, makes absolutely no reference to the valid and existing 
revocable trust she had previously instituted and fully and lawfully funded. 
The above revocation provision [***14] is clear, definite, and unambiguous. It gives rise to the 
equally clear authority that where a trust document contains specific provisions to be complied with, they 
are required to be followed. 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts § 97, p. 134 states: "If the settlor reserves a power to 
revoke the trust only in a particular manner or under particular circumstances, he can revoke the trust only 
in that manner or under those circumstances." 
[*183] 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts § 98, p. 135 goes on to state: "As a rule, a reserved power to revoke 
during the settlor's lifetime cannot be exercised by his will." Likewise, 89 C.J.S., Trusts § 91, p. 920 says: 
"Where a mode of revocation other than by will is specified, in the trust instrument, the trustor has no 
power to revoke the trust by will." 
In a similar straightforward manner, Professor Austin Scott, in his treatise on trusts, states: "Where the 
settlor reserves a power to revoke the trust in a particular manner, he can revoke it only in that manner." 4 
Scott on Trusts § 330.8 (4th ed. 1989). Professor Scott further states it is a question of interpretation of the 
instrument whether a provision reserving a power of revocation empowers the settlor [***15] to revoke it 
by will as well as by a transaction inter vivos. 4 Scott on Trusts § 330.8. However, he then cites 33 cases 
from Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington that held a trustee 
could not revoke a trust by a will and two cases from New York that held a trust could be revoked by a 
will. 4 Scott on Trusts § 330.8, p. 264 n.10. 
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 1001 (2 ed. rev. 1983), resolves the issue in this manner: "The settlor 
may make provision for the method by which a power of revocation or termination is to be exercised and 
such a provision must be followed." 
[**159] When faced with a lack of Kansas law directly on point, we have often turned to the 
guidance of the Restatement of Trusts, which in this instance provides in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 
330(1) (1957): "The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and to the extent that by the terms of the trust 
he reserved such a power." Comment (j) to § 330 states specifically: 
"j. Where method of revocation specified. If the settlor reserves a power to revoke the trust only [*** 
16] in a particular manner or under particular circumstances, he can revoke the trust only in that manner or 
under those circumstances. 
...."If the settlor reserves a power to revoke the trust by a transaction inter vivos, as, for example, by a 
notice to the trustee, he cannot revoke the trust by his will. [* 184] 
...."... Ordinarily the power is not exercised by a general residuary clause disposing of all of the residue 
of the property of the settlor or all the property over which he has a power of appointment. 
"If the settlor reserves a power to revoke the trust only by a notice in writing delivered to the trustee, 
he can revoke it only by delivering such a notice to the trustee." 
For an additional compilation of the numerous cases in this area, see Annot, Exercise by Will of 
Trustor's Reserved Power to Revoke or Modify Inter Vivos Trust, 81 A.L.R.3d 959, which contains general 
statements consistent with those set forth above and cites cases which quote with approval Comment (j) to 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330(1). The annotation states: 
"Such attempts to modify or revoke (if they can be regarded as such) have been uniformly unsuccessful. A 
settlor's [***17] general testamentary disposition of his property is ineffective to exercise a general or 
unrestricted power to revoke or modify an inter vivos trust. 
...."Attempts to modify or revoke by will, considered as wills, have all failed." 81 A.L.R.3d at 961. 
Although Mac and Bill primarily rely on the authorities above cited, they also contend that Ellen's 
intention at the execution of the trust was to have a specific method which must be utilized to revoke the 
trust, citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330 Comment (a). They claim that because this intention 
was clearly expressed, it must govern, and no later, different intention may be inferred. 
Mac and Bill further argue the trial court reformed and rewrote Ellen's will, which it is not permitted to 
do under Kansas law. They rely on rules of construction that since the will was silent as to the trust, there is 
no language from which any intention to revoke the trust can be determined. They cite many of the cases to 
which we have previously referred for the rule that before a trust can be revoked, it must be done clearly 
and unequivocally by an express reference to the trust. They specifically point out that the trust [***18] 
here involved was not a Totten trust, where a different rule might apply. 
[*185] Bill, in his brief and at oral argument, suggested the rule which we should adopt in Kansas is 
that found in In re Estate of Lowry, 93 111. App. 3d 1077, 418 N.E.2d 10, 49 111. Dec. 366 (1981), which 
involved a self-declaration of trust with a reserved power to revoke during Katherine Lowry's (settlor's) 
lifetime by an instrument delivered to the trustee. While still trustee, the settlor executed a will expressly 
revoking the trust. That instrument was an effective instrument of revocation as well as a will. 
The significant paragraph of Mrs. Lowry's will, which differs greatly from that of Ellen M. Sanders' 
will, read as follows: 
'"I, Katherine Bulkley Lowry,... hereby revoke any and all other wills, codicils and trusts that I may 
have heretofore made, Executed or created. More particularly I wish by this instrument, my last will and 
testament, to revoke, set aside and nullify specifically a certain trust created by me on January 24, 1972 and 
known as the Katherine Bulkley Lowry Declaration of Trust No. 44995 as amended by amendments no. 
one through four inclusive.'" 93 111. App. 3d at [***19] 1081. 
Bill suggests that the Lowry rule, which allows the revocation of a trust when specifically so stated in a 
will, would be logical for Kansas, but would not aid Ellen in this case because she made no reference to her 
trust in her will, did not satisfy the necessary requirements for revocation, and showed no intention by her 
will of revoking the trust. 
In this case, a strong public policy argument is made that settled and predictable common-law rules 
governing the revocation of valid trusts should not be displaced by completely different statutory rules 
relating to the revocation of wills. It is further contended that accidental and unintended revocations of 
trusts might be accomplished if the decision of the trial court is upheld. This argument requires that we 
appreciate the difference between a defeasible vested interest under a revocable trust and an ambulatory 
gift in a will. It is suggested that unnecessary litigation will ensue and uncertainty will reign if revocations 
of trusts may result without even a mention of the trusts to be so affected. 
Patricia does not meet the compelling authority from the legal encyclopedia, treatises, and Restatement 
head on, but rather [***20] points out that in Kansas we rely on the intent of the settlor and testator, [* 
186] citing In re Estate ofPickrell, 248 Kan. 247, 806 P.2d 1007 (1991). She contends Ellen's intent was 
clearly established by the testimony the trial court heard in this matter. Her principal argument is that 
because we recognized in Pickrell that inter vivos trusts are an integral part of many estate plans, this 
allows the rules regarding inter vivos trusts and wills to be applied interchangeably, notwithstanding the 
basic difference between the documents and statutory requirements for each. 
Patricia notes that K.S.A. 59-602 (Ensley) and K.S.A. 59-603 (Ensley) were amended in 1992 to allow 
election by a surviving spouse against a will and any and all other dispositions subject to a surviving 
spouse's right of election, such as a revocable trust. See Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 252 Kan. 192, 843 P.2d 
240 (1992). Wills and inter vivos trusts are also alleged to be similar because they both are restricted from 
passing property to a foreign country and because rules regarding contractual wills and trusts are the same. 
Patricia contends that due to these similarities, we would be justified [***21] in blurring any difference 
between an inter vivos trust and a will and in upholding a finding that Ellen's later will had the effect of 
revoking the earlier trust even though the will made no reference to the trust's provisions or existence. 
Patricia points out our case law history in Kansas in which wills and revocable trusts are treated alike, 
citing Taliaferro, 252 Kan. 192, 843 P.2d 240; Newman v. George, 243 Kan. 183, 755 P.2d 18 (1988), and 
Ackers v. First National Bank ofTopeka, 192 Kan. 319, 387 P.2d 840 (1963). Patricia asserts that this 
history justifies a broad and expansive reading ofPickrell, 248 Kan. 247, 806 P.2d 1007, which would 
allow our courts to disregard the specific wording of the documents involved and, after taking testimony 
from all interested and involved parties, to determine the "intent" of the estate plan. 
Patricia also cites Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 339 and Comment (a) (1957), which states that if 
the settlor is the sole beneficiary of the trust, the settlor can compel termination, even if the trust was 
specifically labeled irrevocable. Such is not the case here. Ellen was not the sole beneficiary of the trust 
involved [***22] herein. Mac and Bill were successor income beneficiaries after Ellen's death, and Mac, 
Bill, and Patricia were the remainder beneficiaries [* 187] as well. The trial court's finding that the trust 
"was solely for [Ellen's] benefit and she was the settlor, beneficiary and trustee thereof and that "the trust 
was not created for the Respondents' benefit and they had no beneficial interest in the Trust until Ellen 
Sanders' death," insofar as it attempts to assert that Ellen was the sole beneficiary, is erroneous. 
Patricia's argument to us is principally based upon her construction ofPickrell, 248 Kan. 247, 806 
P.2d 1007, as well as two cases from other jurisdictions: Moran v. Cornell, 49 R.I. 308, 142 A. 605 (1928), 
and Sanderson v. Aubrey, All S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). 
[**161] In Pickrell, 248 Kan. 247, 806 P.2d 1007, Syl. P 4, we held: 
"Under the facts of this case, where a conflict exists between an earlier executed will and a later 
amended inter vivos trust as to how the death taxes and the administration expenses are to be paid, the last 
instrument in time controls." 
Strictly stated, the holding in Pickrell is limited to whether a later inter [***23] vivos trust can make a 
different provision insofar as it pertains to death taxes generated by the assets of the trust than what an 
earlier will might have stated as to the liability for death taxes and administration expenses. The Pickrell 
opinion makes no reference to conflicting provisions as to dispositive or beneficial interests and relates 
solely to an administrative question concerning apportionment of taxes. To be consistent with Pickrell, 
Ellen should have amended the dispositive provisions of her existing trust, as she had the right to do, or 
revoked the trust in its entirely. 
Applying Pickrell to our present set of facts would be in direct conflict with the weight of authority 
throughout the country. Additionally, although there was a conflict between the provisions in the trust and 
the will in the Pickrell case, here the will does not conflict with the trust. Rather, Ellen's disposition of the 
assets held in her trust differs from her disposition of 1he assets forming her probate estate, which she had 
every right to do. 
In the case before us, Ellen expressed no intent regarding the trust, and while the trial court's 
determination of her intent might in [***24] fact be correct, it could just as easily be incorrect. A much 
better rule established by the majority of the jurisdictions around the country is that the revocation of a 
trust requires an express statement [* 188] and cannot be accomplished through implication, especially fay 
allowing oral testimony from outside the four corners of the document to determine intent. 
The trial court's reliance on Moran, 49 R.I. 308, 142 A. 605, is misplaced. This case was decided 
before the Restatement of Trusts and cannot represent a rejection of the Restatement's rule. Secondly, a 
power of appointment was involved in Moran, which is different from the power of revocation. Finally, the 
authority of Moran is clearly undermined by a later holding, more directly on point, of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court in Union Trust Co. v. Watson, 16 R.I. 223, 228, 68 A.2d 916 (1949), which held: "Where 
the settlor reserves a power to revoke the trust in a particular manner, he can revoke it only in that manner." 
We further find that the trial court's and Patricia's reliance on Sanders on, All S.W.2d 286, is 
misplaced. There, a will specifically referred to an inter vivos trust and stated that [***25] the "same is 
now formally revoked." 472 S.W.2d at: 287. The Texas court gave legal effect to the wording as 
specifically revoking the trust, in part because of a statute in Texas making every trust revocable by the 
trustor unless expressly made irrevocable. Sanderson did cite Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330, 
Comment (i) as it relates to the situation "where no method of revocation [is] specified," but this Comment 
would not be applicable in our case, as the Ellen M. Sanders Trust Agreement, dated July 23, 1990, 
specifically required that the revocation be made by Ellen during her lifetime by a writing delivered to the 
trustee specifying the terms of the amendment. Sanderson supports Bill's argument for the adoption of the 
Lowry rule referred to previously, but it does not justify the trial court's decision. 
Patricia's argument that the similar legal rules in Kansas regarding wills and inter vivos trusts in the 
cases of spousal elective shares and gifts to foreign governments indicate that wills and inter vivos trusts 
are the same, is not persuasive. She also argues that both are testamentary in nature. However, such is not 
the case. A trust can and does come [***26] to immediate effect upon being established and funded, while 
a will never takes effect until the death of a testator. In fact, the legal rules regarding trusts and wills differ 
in many [*189] ways, particularly regarding requirements for their creation and revocation. We cannot 
erase the distinction between the documents or convert one into the other for purposes of a legal analysis 
favorable to a party who would benefit from a determination based on parol evidence. 
[**162] Patricia's argument that wills and inter vivos trusts are essentially the same would have us 
rewrite K.S.A. 59-611 to add the emphasized language: "No will or will substitute in writing shall be 
revoked or altered otherwise than by some other will in writing; or by some other writing of the testator." 
This we should not and will not do. It is not our place to rewrite the statute. If the legislature chooses to do 
so, that is its right. However, to do so here would be improper and would reject the almost unanimous 
weight of authority regarding revocation of trusts. 
We recognize Mac's argument that if Frank Palmer was actually acting as the successor trustee when 
the will was executed, this would provide additional [***27] grounds for finding the trust revocation was 
ineffective. We need not reach or discuss that issue because we believe that even if Frank had not 
succeeded Ellen as trustee, her actions in executing the July 13, 1993 will failed to revoke her existing 
revocable trust. 
While we could at this point discuss and analyze the numerous opinions from other jurisdictions which 
we have previously referred to as being cited in Annot., 81 A.L.R.3d 959 and in 4 Scott on Trusts, § 330.8, 
p. 364 n.10, it would only unduly lengthen this opinion to do so. The cases are of two general types: those 
dealing with wills which merely make some disposition of the settlor's estate in a manner inconsistent with 
the existing inter vivos trust and those involving wills in which a specific modification or revocation is 
clearly attempted. This latter class of cases is factually different from our facts and not deserving of any 
discussion except a statement that we decline to give credence to, or disaffirm Bill's argument that we 
should adopt as part of our decision, the Lowiy rule from Illinois. The Lowry will contained specific 
statements revoking the trust, while the Sanders will contains no similar provisions. [***28] We do not 
issue advisory opinions, Sheila A. v. Finney, 253 Kan. 793, 796, 861 P.2d 120 (1993), and should not make 
comments [* 190] which could only be considered dicta and unnecessary to a decision on the matter in 
controversy. Rodriguez v. Cascade Laundry Co., 185 Kan. 766, 770, 347 P.2d 455 (1959). 
The rule of the cases similar to ours is clearly summarized in Annot., 81 A.L.R.Bd at 961, where it is 
stated: "A general testamentary disposition is an ineffective exercise of a reserved power to revoke by 
written instrument even if the executed will is delivered to the trustee before the settlor's death." 
Many of the cases cite with approval Comment (j) to Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330, which 
requires the revocation to be in the manner specified and disapproves of attempts to do so by testamentary 
dispositions. This rule can be clearly applied to the fact situation we face in the present case. 
We adopt the rule of the overwhelming authority in the United States and hold that the settlor of an 
inter vivos revocable trust who has reserved the power to amend or revoke the trust during the settlor's 
lifetime by a writing delivered to the trustee which specifies the [***29] terms of such amendment or 
revocation, does not amend or revoke the trust by the execution of a will void of any statement or provision 
relating to the existing trust. 
Reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a finding that the will of Ellen M. 
Sanders dated July 13, 1993, has no legal effect on the assets covered by the Ellen M. Sanders Trust 
Agreement of July 23, 1990, as subsequently amended. 
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OPINION: ' •' 
[*1035] The court below disposed of two parcels of real property involved in the estate of Edward 
W. Sharp, deceased. On appeal is the judgment of the court, challenged by one of the daughters of the 
deceased, Mrs. Florence Powell. Statutory references are to U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
[*1036] Mrs. Ethel Thompson, another daughter of the deceased, filed a petition with the court 
claiming purchase from her deceased father, and adduced evidence which, in the court's mind, sustained 
her petition; and the court ordered conveyance. Mrs. Louise Blanch, another daughter of deceased, prior to 
her death had filed with the court her petition claiming conveyance from her father of the second parcel of 
realty here under consideration. The estate of Mrs. Blanch is currently in probate. Mrs. Florence Powell, 
(the occupant of the Blanch parcel since 1962, making substantial alterations and [**2] repairs) claiming 
as the successor in interest to Mrs. Blanch, also filed a petition with the court requesting conveyance to her 
of the seven-tenths acre comprising the Blanch parcel. The court denied the petitions of Mrs. Blanch and 
Mrs. Powell, thus remitting the seven-tenths acre to the estate as an asset. 
Mrs. Powell, hereafter also appellant, seeks reversal of the lower court's judgment disposing of both 
parcels; and assigns three points of error. These will be treated in the order given them by appellant. 
Appellant contends that the trial court improperly admitted evidence barred by 78-24-2(3), the "dead 
man's" statute; and claims that without this inadmissible testimony there is insufficient evidence to sustain 
the court's findings. The testimony objected to concerned the transaction wherein Mrs. Ethel Thompson 
purchased her parcel from her father. For two reasons we cannot agree with appellant's first assignment of 
error. 
First, witness Florence Powell was present and witnessed the contract by which the deceased sold the 
pasture to Ethel Thompson. Mrs. Powell also admitted that Ethel Thompson had assumed the mortgage, 
made payments thereon, and had paid the property [**3] taxes. Mrs. Powell further conceded Ethel 
Thompson's rights, under the contract, to purchase the land; and seemed only to want assurance that the 
remaining payments be made. 
As a witness to the transaction concerning Ethel Thompson's land, Mrs. Powell's testimony is 
admissible to establish the execution of the contract, and the circumstances then extant, nl 
nl Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 (1963). 
Secondly, although some of the details to which Ethel Thompson testified may have been inadmissible 
under 78-24-2(3), there was substantial evidence to sustain the determination of the trial court. Through 
documentary evidence and expert testimony the contracts of sale were established, the payments to the 
decedent were proved, as well as the payments to the mortgagee, and the payment of property taxes. In 
addition, Mrs. Thompson's possession of the property from the date of sale to the present time was 
established. With reference to the effect of testimony inadmissible because of the "dead man's" [**4] 
statute see Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972). 
Appellant's second assignment of error contends that the court below erred in treating the petitions of 
appellant, and Mrs. Thompson, as claims against the estate, stating that the court should have required them 
to file separate actions against the estate. With that point we are in partial agreement. 
The trial court determined that the claim of Mrs. Blanch (through whom Mrs. Powell claims) was filed 
more than one year after the time for presenting claims had passed, as fixed by the notice of creditors. The 
petition of Louise S. Blanch (which the court denominates as a "claim") asserted that the property was sold 
to her by Edward W. Sharp, as evidenced by a written document executed February 17, 1945. It further 
asserted that she had occupied and exercised complete dominion over the premises from and after February 
17, 1945; and that the court should order the administrator to execute and deliver to her a suitable 
conveyance. 
[*1037] This was a petition for specific performance of a contract to convey real estate, and fell 
squarely within the provisions of 75-11-26. The statutory provisions found in 75-9-4, [**5] concerning 
creditor's claims and the time limitations thereof do not apply to a petition for specific performance. 
In Bancroft's Probate Practice n2 it is said: 
.... that equitable claims for relief beyond the money judgment, such as for enforcement of liens or 
trusts or for enforcement of rights in specific property are not "claims" within the usual statutes. 
This problem has been dealt with by other courts, and we make reference to two. In the matter of 
Ashbauth v. Davis, n3 the court, dealing with a statute similar to our own, said: 
As early as 1886 this court held that the term, "claim" does not include causes of action purely 
equitable, and in which purely equitable relief is sought. 
n2 Second Edition, Chapter 16, Section 772. 
n3 71 Idaho 150, 227 P.2d 954, 957, 32 A.L.R.2d 361 (1951). 
See also In re Bailey's Estate, 42 Cal.App.2d 509, 109 P.2d 356 (1941). 
The term "claim" found in 75-9-4 does not include a claim for specific performance, but refers to debts 
or demands [**6] against the decedent which might have been enforced in his lifetime, by personal actions 
for the recovery of money; and upon which only a money judgment could have been rendered. Here, both 
Mrs. Thompson and Mrs. Powell are not claiming as creditors, but seeking specific performance of 
contracts to convey property which they claim as their own, thus they cannot be called creditors of the 
estate. 
The assertions of appellant that the trial court should have refused to entertain the petitions is not well 
made. This for the reason there is a complete statutory procedure, for the determination of a claim for 
specific performance. n4 Under Section 75-11-28 the court was authorized to order the administrator to 
execute a conveyance. 
Section 29 of that statute provides that, upon hearing, if the petitioner's right to specific performance 
appears doubtful, the court must dismiss the petition, without prejudice to the rights of petitioner, who may 
at any time within six months thereafter proceed by action to enforce specific performance of the contract. 
n4 75-11-26 through 75-11 -31. 
[**7] 
Louise Blanch filed her petition., prior to her death, and this was before the court. Appellant filed a 
response to the administratrix's petition for determination of the claim, wherein appellant claimed she was 
an owner of the land by gift; and at the hearing she asserted that she was a. devisee under Louise Blanch's 
holographic will. 
The instrument under which Louise Blanch made her claim is as follows: 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This is to certify that on February 17, 1945 I have sold to Louise Blanch for the .urn r,' S1 •;•) (one 
dollar) all my right and title to the lot on which she now lives containing about one n^v more .>]
 L-^ 
discribed [sic] as follows: 
Leaving a right of way along the East side for a ditch and a road about twenty feet wide. I also reserve 
the right to change pipe across road so that it runs straight with said ditch and roadway. It is further 
understood that all buildings moved on said ground belong to Ralph Blanch and his wife and that they have 
been leasing said ground for that purpose 
Signed Edward Sharp 
Edward Sharp 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 24 da} r of November 19 15. 
Lucy T. Elliss 
Notary 
(SEAL) 
This instrument [**8] conferred an equitable interest in the property on Mrs. Blanch. Her petition asserted 
her possession of the property. The testimony of Ethel Thompson [*1038] was that her father had 
conveyed, or agreed to convey, the subject parcel, with the home on it, to Louise Blanch. The record does 
not disclose defeat of this instrument, and the grantor could not, unilaterally, by his own fiat, do so. 
The pleading filed by appellant, in response to the order of the administrator setting the hearing for the 
determination of appellant's petition, states that appellant is the successor in interest to Louise Blanch - that 
appellant inherited the subject property from her sister. Under 75-11-30, either the administrator of the 
estate of Louise Blanch, or one who has succeeded to the rights of Louise Blanch, under the Blanch 
contract to convey, may participate in a proceeding for specific performance. 
The circumstances here are not unlike those found in Wilson v. Fackrel. n5 In that case the proof 
showed a completed inter vivos gift of realty; evidenced by a writing. The donee sought a decree directing 
the administrator to execute a deed to the property. On appeal, the action was remanded [**9] to take 
further evidence to determine if a gift were made and accepted and if so, the donee was entitled to a 
conveyance. 
n5 >1 Idaho > h \ 34 i'.AJ 40M ( PM4) 
A daughter of Louise Blanch, and the administratrix of her mother's estate, testified that she knew 
nothing about the claim her mother filed concerning the property. As representative of her mother's estate, 
she attempted (apparently for the estate) to disclaim any interest in the subject parcel. This action of the 
administratrix requires comment here. It is contrary to the duty of an administrator not to take measures to 
marshall the assets of an estate. This court in In re Burt's Estate n6 so held in conformity with 75-11-3; and 
an administrator's duty is succinctly set forth in Bancroft's Probate Practice, Second Edition. 
§ 349. - Duty of Representative. - One of the first duties of an executor or administrator is that of 
collecting the assets of the estate. Not only is it within his power to collect and reduce to possession such 
assets, but [**10] he is affirmatively required in most of the states to take into his possession all the estate, 
both real and personal, and to maintain and preserve it in as good condition as is reasonably possible 
during administration 
n6 58 Utah 353, !0s P 11.08(1921). 
For an unwarranted failure to acquit this duty an administrator is subject to removal, and liability for 
loss. The court found the Blanch claim to be abandoned (apparently on the disclaimer of the 
administratrix), the appellant's claim to the property not to have been proved; that the property belonged to 
the estate of Sharp; and both petitions were disallowed. This was error. 
At such a juncture the proper action of the court was to dismiss the claim, without prejudice, thus 
allowing the petitioner six months within which to file an action for specific performance; which time 
would commence to run from the effective date of the order to be made by the trial court, to that effect. 
The judgment as it refers to the Blanch petition and that [* * 11 ] of appellant is reversed and remanded 
with instructions to proceed in consonance with this opinion. Costs are awarded to appellant. 
ELLETT, CROCKETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, C.J., concurs in the result. 
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OPINIONBY: 
WOLFE 
OPINION: 
[**211] [*375] WOLFE, Justice. 
The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not an administrator or executor of an estate in 
probate may claim as deductions from the gross estate for inheritance tax purposes amounts paid by said 
administrator to creditors [***2] of deceased who presented no claims against the estate in the probate 
proceedings. The lower court ruled that such deductions could not be allowed. 
Waldo Jones died intestate on June 26, 1930. His mother and only heir was appointed Administratrix 
of his estate on September 6, 1930. The estate was appraised for inheritance tax purposes at $ 38,000. 
Notice to creditors to present their claims was duly published beginning October 2, 1930, [*376] but no 
claims were presented on or before February 15, 1931, as required in the notice. Nor were any claims filed 
subsequently. 
In her petition for distribution and discharge, however, Administratrix alleged that she had paid from 
the funds of the estate three obligations owing from decedent at the time of his death, to wit: $ 22,200 to 
Mrs. Eugenia Jones (Administratrix), $ 1,000 to the Bank of Grand Junction, and S 25,412.18 to Mrs. 
Myrtle [**212] Adams (an aunt of deceased), These payments aggregate $ 48,612.18 and, if allowed, will 
completely liquidate the estate and eliminate any inheritance tax levy. No question has been raised as to the 
good faith of Administratrix in paying these amounts nor has the validity of any of the obligations [***3] 
as against the deceased been challenged. The point made by the Tax Commission is that no proper claims 
against the estate were ever filed; that consequently the debts are barred under Sec. 102-9-4, R. S. U. 1933, 
and that, even if said claims had been presented, they were not "approved and allowed *** within one 
year" so are not deductible under Sec. 80-12-8, R. S. U. 1933. It should be noted at the outset that in all 
aspects material to this case, the statutes in effect at the time of decedent's death (1930) are identical with 
those hereafter cited from R. S. U. 1933. 
Sees. 102-94 and 2, R. S. U. 1933 (Sees. 7645 and 7646, C. L. Utah 1917) provide that every 
executor or administrator immediately after appointment must publish notice to creditors to file their claims 
within four months after the first publication against an estate which exceeds $ 10,000 in value or within 
two months against one of S 10,000 or under. Sec, 102-9-4, R. S. U. 1933 (Sec. 7648, C. L. Utah I y 1 7 
provides: 
All claims *** must be presented win . ' - , - - • -i^-iUv-.is 
barred forever * * *." (Italics added.) 
This court held in the case of In re Agee's Estate [***4] , 69 Utah 130, 252 P. 891, 895, 50 A.L.R., 
641, decided under Sec. [*377] 7648, Comp. L. Utah 1917, identical with Sec. 102-9-4, R. S. U. 1933: 
"There can be no doubt that claims for debts contracted by decedent in his lifetime must be presented 
to the administrator or executor, as provided in the sections referred to *** or the claim will be forever 
barred." 
In Clayton v. Dinwoodey, 33 Utah 251, 93 P. 723, 14 Ann. Cas. 926, we used this language: 
"Mere knowledge on the part of the executor or administrator of the existence of a debt *** is not 
sufficient to dispense with the necessity of presentation. *** the defense that the claim is barred by the 
statute of limitations cannot be waived by the executor or administrator." 
The cases of Harris v. Turner, 96 Utah 342, 85 P.2d 824, and In re Phillips'Estate, 86 Utah 358, 44 
P.2d 699, by implication support this view. There is no conflict in the Utah cases and our ruling that, after 
proper notice, claims must be filed against an estate within the time limited by statute or said claims are 
forever barred is settled and clear. 
If, therefore, these claims against the estate were forever barred, Administratrix [***5] was without 
discretion or power to allow and pay them. Any money which she did pay out on said claims which had not 
been presented and allowed as provided by statute, she paid as a volunteer and such amounts are 
considered as drawn from her personal funds because they cannot be charged against the estate. In re 
Thompson's Estate, 110 Wash. 635, 188 P. 784. See Vol. 3 Bancroft's Probate Practice, Sec. 846, p. 1480. 
Indebtedness of an estate barred by statute cannot be deducted in fixing the amount due as an inheritance 
tax. In re Walker's Estate, 184 Minn. 164, 238 N.W. 58, 76 A.L.R. 1450, and Annotation at page 1456 of 
76A.L.R. 
[*378] Administratrix cites In re Lambrecht's Estate, 112 Wash. 645, 192 P. 1018, to show that debts 
need not always be allowed in probate proceedings to be deductible for inheritance tax. But the Lambrecht 
case is not in point, because in this case formal probate proceedings were instituted and administratrix 
became an officer of the court to manage and preserve the estate, to pay its debts and taxes, and to 
distribute the residue, all under the supervision and approval of the court and according to law. In paying 
claims which had not been [***6] presented and allowed, administratrix acted beyond her power and 
cannot charge said amounts against the estate. 
People v. Tatge, 267 111. 634, 108 N.E. 748; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Strauss, 1 Cir., 77 
F.2d 401; and In re Suderov's Estate, 249 A.D. 763, 292 N.Y.S. 468; Id., 274 N.Y. 525, 10 N. E. 2d 531, 
have been cited for the proposition that all bona fide debts of an estate may be deducted before computing 
inheritance taxes. But none is a holding under a statute identical with or similar to ours, hence they are not 
in point. 
Administratrix contends that our inheritance tax is levied on the right or privilege of an heir to succeed 
to the property of the dead, and that, therefore, only such property as actually passes to the heirs may be 
taxed. She further contends that the amount here in question was actually paid to creditors and, therefore, it 
did not [**213] pass to the heir, hence, no tax is due. But in advancing such a theory, administratrix 
misconceives the law of succession of property. 
Sec. 101-4-2, R. S. U. 1933 (Sec. 6405, C. L. Utah 1917): 
"The property, both real and personal, of one who dies without disposing of it by will passes [***7] 
to the heirs of the intestate, subject to the control of the court, and to the possession of any administrator 
appointed by the court for the purposes of administration." (Italics added.) 
See Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586. Our statute is entirely 
clear that title [*379] to property of an intestate passes to his heirs upon his death subject to divestment 
for debts and expenses. All that the administrator gets is possession. In this instant case, therefore, upon his 
death, all of decedent's estate passed to his heirs (his mother) subject to the control of the court and to the 
possession of Administratrix. Because claims against said estate were never presented as provided by 
statute, administratrix was powerless to pay the debts from the estate, and title to the property was never 
divested from the heir. Obviously then, there was a transfer of the estate of decedent to his heir which was 
never divested. This transfer is taxable. 
The arguments of Administratrix regarding penalties and forfeitures are not in point. We are here 
dealing with an inheritance tax on an estate that has not been paid to creditors. This tax is measured [***8] 
by the corpus of the estate plus interest. No element of penalty enters. 
Administratrix raises for the first time in her appeal the Statute of Limitations and laches as defenses 
against the tax. The Statute of Limitations and laches are affirmative defenses which must be pleaded. 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm., 64 Utah 176, 228 P. 753; Whittaker v. 
Greenwood, 17 Utah 33, 53 P. 736; Tate v. Rose, 35 Utah 229, 99 P. 1003. It appears that these defenses 
were never raised in the district court nor even referred to in the assignments of error. They cannot now be 
raised on appeal. Ashton v. Glaze, 9 Cir., 95 F.2d 427; In re Estate of Mayer, 210 Mich. 188, 177 N.W. 
488, 10 A.L.R. 773; Henshaw v. State Bank, 239 111. 515, 88 N.E. 214, 130 Am. St. Rep. 241; 3 Am. Jur. 
Sec. 298, p. 66 See Utah Delaware Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 187, 289 P. 94; Chief 
Consolidated Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 78 Utah 447, 4 P.2d 1083. 
Finally, the point is raised that a stipulation was entered into by and between the Attorney General for 
the State and the attorney for the estate, to the effect that, [***9] if Administratrix's [*380] Petition for 
Final Distribution were granted by the Court, no inheritance tax would be due, and that as a consequence 
Administratrix was lulled into allowing the statutory period to run and into paying the debts thereafter, 
believing that no tax would be assessed. To this contention there are several answers. First, Administratrix 
recognizes that the stipulation does not bind the Tax Commission. Second, by its terms the stipulation 
limited itself to the event of approval of the order by the court which approval was not and has not yet, 
been given. Third, the stipulation is dated more than a year after death of decedent so it could not have 
lulled administratrix into allowing the statutory time for filing claims to slip away. 
"Where the statute clearly and unambiguously fixes a tax liability that is controlling on all parties 
subject to tax regardless of rules or regulations of administrative departments." State Tax Commission v. 
Associated Oil & Gas Co., 98 Utah 474, 100 P.2d 966, 969. See, also, cases there cited. 
Having decided that the creditors' failure to file claims in the probate proceedings rendered 
Administratrix powerless to pay said [***10] claims, we deem it unnecessary to discuss respondent's point 
that under Sec. 80-12-8, R. S. U. 1933, said claims are not deductible because they were not presented 
within a year of the death of deceased. 
The ruling of the District Court was correct and is affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
McDONOUGH and PRATT, JJ., concur. 
Moffat, Chief Justice. 
I concur in the result. 
LARSON, Justice. 
I dissent. 
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ELLETT 
OPIN1 *• 
[*798] This is an appeal from an adverse ruling of the trial court in granting a summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants and denying one to the plaintiffs. There is no disputed issue of fact, and since there 
is merely an issue of law, we need not accord any favored position to the trial court. 
On December 10, 1956, one Samuel E. Makoff, Sr., now deceased, created an inter vivos trust by and 
between himself and his two sons as trustees for the benefit of "the then living issue of each of the 
following named sons of the Settlor,...." to wit: Richard P. Makoff and Samuel E. Makoff, Jr. The 
plaintiffs are the present trustees of the trust. The defendants Richard David Makoff, John Harvey Makoff, 
and Robert Evan Makoff are the natural children of Richard P. Makoff [**2] by his first wife, and John 
Gibbs Makoff is the natural son by a prior marriage of Sidney G. Makoff, the present wife of Richard P. 
Makoff. The problem arises because Richard has legally adopted John Gibbs Makoff. 
rhe parties wish to know whether an adopted child is included within the term "issue" as used in the 
Indenture of Trust, the pertinent provisions of which are: 
3.1 Upon the death of the Settlor, the Trustees shall continue to hold the Trust Estate subject to the 
following trust uses and purposes: 
(a) The entire net income of the Trust Estate shall be divided each year into equal shares as follows: 
One share for the then living issue of each of the following named sons of the Settlor, which shares the 
Trustees shall distribute to such issue upon the principle of representation: 
Richard P. Makoff 
Samuel E. Makoff, Jr. 
(b) Upon the death of the survivor of the above-named sons of the Settlor, the Trustees shall divide the 
Trust Estate into equal shares as follows: One share for the then living issue of each deceased above-named 
son of the Settlor, which shares the Trustees shall distribute in accordance with section 3.1(c). 
(c) Each share set aside for the issue [**3] of a deceased son shall be distributed to such issue upon 
the principle of representation .... 
Specifically, we are required to determine if John Gibbs Makoff, the adopted child of Richard P. 
Makoff, is entitled to a share in the trust as being the issue of his adopting father. 
At the time the trust instrument was made, Richard was living with his first wife and their natural 
children. 
The general rules of construction of written instruments apply to the construction of trust instruments, 
and those rules require a determination of the intention of the settlor where the creation of the trust is a 
unilateral matter, nl However, in case the trust is based on a written instrument, the intention of the settlor 
must be ascertained from the language thereof, and the court may not go outside of the language in an 
effort to give effect to what it thinks the intent was. If the language is unambiguous, there is no need for 
wondering what the true intent may have been, and parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms set out. 
n2 However, in ascertaining the intention of the settlor we may consider the entire instrument aided by the 
surrounding circumstances existing at the time of [**4] creation of the trust. n3 
nl 54 AmJur., Trusts, § 17. 
n2 Ibid. 
n3 Dumaine v. Dumaine, 301 Mass. 214, 16 N.E.2d 625 (1938), 118 A.L.R. 834. 
At the time of the creation of the trust neither of the sons of Samuel E. [*799] Makoff, Sr., had been 
divorced, and there was nothing to bring to the attention of the settlor that there might be adopted children 
brought into either of the families. The use of the word "issue" as being the class which he wished to 
benefit should be given its then natural meaning. n4 
n4 54 AmJur., Trusts, § 18. 
The definition given in 57 AmJur., Wills, § 1378 is as follows: 
The term "issue," according to the almost universal consensus of opinion, includes descendants of 
every degree and is to be given that meaning in the absence of explanatory context. It may, however, 
receive from the context [**5] in which it is used, read in the light of such extrinsic circumstances as are 
proper to be considered, the restricted meanings of "children," "grandchildren," "grandchildren whose 
parents are deceased," and "heirs of the body." 
Re Farmers' Loan & Trust Company n5 is similar to the instant matter. There the meaning of the work 
"issue" was involved. The court said: 
The rule is that, unless some other meaning is given to it by the context, the word "issue" is not 
confined to children, but includes descendants in any degree. Another meaning will not readily be given if 
the result would be to divert the gift from the direct line of descent.... 
n5 213 N.Y. 168, 107 N.E. 340 (1914), A.L.R. 910, 912. 
Some light is thrown on the meaning intended to be given the word "issue" when the settlor provided 
in section 3.1(c) that the share of the deceased son should be distributed to such issue upon the principle of 
representation. "Representation" means per stripes and not per capita, and "per stripes" [**6] means 
taking or inheriting a share of an estate which the immediate ancestor would have taken had he lived. n6 
n6 2 Blackstone Commentaries 217, 517. 
In In re Smith's Estate n7 this court held that adopted children could not inherit from the relatives of 
the adoptive parents. 118 
n7 7 Utah 2d 405, 326 P.2d 400 (1958). 
n8 Justice Crockett filed a strong dissent in the case. 
One thing is clear, and that is this: In the year 1956 when the trust was created, the law was well 
settled that an adoptive child could not inherit from the parents of its adoptive parents. That was the law as 
Samuel E. Makoff, Sr., undoubtedly understood it, and that is the law that must govern the interpretation of 
the trust before us now. 
The law of inheritance was amended by Chapter 189, Laws of Utah 1971, to provide that in various 
sections "children shall [**7] include adopted children." These amendments have no bearing on the matter 
before us, for we must ascertain what Samuel E. Makoff, Sr., meant by the word "issue" when he used it in 
the trust deed on December 10, 1956. We agree with the trial court that he did not intend to include 
adopted children as beneficiaries of his largess. 
The trial court is affirmed, and costs are awarded to the respondents. 
CALLISTER, C I , and HENRIOD and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
DISSENTBY: 
CROCKETT 
DISSENT: 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting): 
To discriminate against the adopted child and deprive him of his share of the intended family trust is in 
my opinion a grave injustice. It is contrary to the clearly expressed intent of our statutory law; it is 
inconsistent with the better considered decisional law; and is out of harmony with sound policy 
considerations for the welfare of the family and society generally. 
The clearly expressed intent of our adoption statutes in accordance with the conclusion above stated is 
set forth in Section [*800] 78-30-9, U.C.A. 1953, which provides that upon the order of adoption: 
.... The child shall thenceforth be regarded and treated in all respects as the child of the [**8] person 
adopting. 
And the succeeding Section 10 states that: 
After adoption the two shall sustain the legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights .... 
of that relation. 
For the purpose of carrying out the clear mandate of those statutes, that the adopted child should have 
all legal rights the same as natural children, including those of inheritance and succession, our 1971 
legislature re-enacted Chapter 189, S.L.U. 1971. It is entitled "Interests of Adopted Children, An Act 
Amending Sections 74-1-24, .... [et seq.] .... [enumerates all pertinent sections relating to wills and 
succession] .... Providing for Adopted Children to Have the Same Rights under the Inheritance and 
Succession Laws as Natural Children ...." The act then proceeds to re-enact the pertinent sections, adding at 
each of ten separate sections the provision that, "For the purposes of this section, issue shall include 
adopted children," with slight variations appropriate to the text of some sections. 
It requires but little reflection to see the fallacy in the concept of narrowing the adoption down to 
simply a contract between the adoptive parents of the [**9] child. It is just as erroneous as it would be to 
say that a marriage contract is only between the immediate parties. Whether we want to accept it or not, 
the immutable fact is that the adoptive proceeding, like the marriage ceremony, affects not only the 
immediate parties, but the family and all of society. 
Coordinate to the foregoing, I can see no reason why a person should not have an absolute and 
inviolable right to acquire and establish his family in the manner he chooses; and that his child, whether 
acquired by natural birth or by choice and adoption, should become his child for all intents and purposes, 
social, legal and otherwise. Even more important, the child himself should have the right to become a 
member of the family for all purposes, not only in relation to his adoptive parents, but in relation to 
brothers, sisters and so on to all other relatives, and to society in general. If this is not so, it is easy to see 
difficulties that may result as to the reciprocal rights and duties within the family and in relation to the 
public. Contrasted to this, by regarding the adoptive child as a bona fide member of the family for all 
intents and purposes the same as a natural [**10] child, much good would be accomplished and those 
difficulties eliminated, nl 
nl To avoid repetition I refer to my dissent in In re Smith's Estate, 7 Utah 2d 405, 326 P.2d 
400, footnote 7 of main opinion. 
The main opinion itself, generously, but inconsistent with its own conclusion, quotes the definition of 
issue as a generic term. 
The term "issue," .... includes descendants of even/ degree and is to be given that meaning in the 
absence of explanatory context. 
This view, that the term should be given general meaning unless the contrary is shown is supported by 
abundant authority. n2 A plethora of cases could be cited, but in order to avoid burdening the page, a few 
examples are sufficient for my purpose and anyone who desires to further pursue this subject. 
n2 The main opinion quotes 57 Am.Jur., Wills, Sec. 1378 which see for numerous supporting 
cases; and see also Annotation, adopted child as within class in testamentary gift, 82 A.L.R.2d 12. 
[**11] 
In re Heard's Estate, n3 involved construction of a will creating a trust to be paid to the son's lawful 
issue. As in our case, after the death of the testatrix, the son adopted a child. The court held that it would 
be assumed, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, that the testatrix intended [*801] an adopted 
child to be included in the term "lawful issue" in view of the public policy to treat adopted children the 
same as natural children. It commented that there is no more probability that a person would adopt a child 
to adversely affect someone else, than that he would deliberately have a blood child for that purpose. 
n3 49 Cal.2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957). 
In O'Brien v. Walker n4 the court expressly rejected the contention that the term "issue" when used in 
a will or trust instrument, meant only "children of the blood" and held that an adopted daughter took as 
"issue" of the trustor's daughter. 
n4 35 Hawaii 104 (1939), aff d 115 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1940); and to the same effect see 
decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, In re Estate of Cunha, 49 Hawaii 273, 414 
P.2d 925 (1966). 
[**12] 
In Dollar Savings & Trust Company of Youngstown v. Musto n5 the court held that a child adopted by 
the son of the testatrix 16 years after her death (1938) and 17 years after her will was executed (1937) was 
the son's "issue" within the meaning of the will. The court said: 
.... in modern days, after reading all of the cases submitted and after careful research, we find that the 
word "issue" has taken on a much broader meaning and feel that it now, and did at the time the will was 
drawn, include adopted children. 
n5 88 Ohio L.Abst. 62, 181 N.E.2d 734 (Ct.App. 1961). 
In re Holden's Trust n6 the testatrix died in 1926, one year after making her will. She provided for her 
own adopted son for his life. The question was whether a child adopted by her adopted son 11 years after 
her death was "lawful issue" of her adopted son. The Minnesota court, upon an exhaustive review of the 
decisions in this country, held the adopted child was such lawful issue. 
n6 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (Sup.Ct. 1940). In the later case of In re Trusteeship 
Agreement with Nash, 265 Minn. 412, 122 N.W.2d 104 (1963), the court said: ".... we hold that the 
settlor is presumed to intend that adopted children be included within the category of issue of a life 
tenant 'who may hereafter be born,'" unless the contrary is shown. Similar holding in Prince v. 
Nugent, 93 R.I. 149, 172 A.2d 743 (1961), the court stated that gift to lawful issue in a deed of trust 
prima facie includes the grantees' adopted child unless otherwise stated. 
[**13] 
In summary I think it appropriate and directly to the point to reiterate the words of Judge Goodrich in 
Carpenter v. United States: n7 
.... That the current of modern thought on the matter is Wholly in the direction of placing the adopted 
child in the family of his adoption as completely as though the relationship from the beginning had been by 
blood. 
n7 3 Cir., 168 F.2d 369, 372, 3 A.L.R.2d 841, 889. 
Impelled by what has been said herein, I state with the utmost emphasis my conviction that under the 
fair and clear interpretation and application of our statutes, and the better considered decisional law on the 
subject, an adoptive child should be regarded as emancipated to the rights of a natural child in every 
respect; and that therefore this particular adoptive child should have his fair and lawful share of the trust. 
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OPINION: 
[*539] [***686] 
YEGAN, J. 
Larry T. Parson, successor trustee of the Tage A. Parson Revocable Trust No. 1, appeals from an order 
awarding a family allowance to Sigrid Parson (respondent), the disinherited surviving spouse of Tage 
Parson (decedent). He contends the trial court erred because the Probate Code does not authorize a family 
allowance in cases involving revocable trusts. The trial court granted the award because it determined that 
respondent would have been entitled to a family allowance from the decedent's estate [***687] (Prob. 
Code, § 6540) nl, and that the trust property is subject to the claims of creditors of the decedent's estate. (§ 
19001, subd. (a).) This ruling is erroneous as a matter of law. [**2] Accordingly, we reverse. 
nl All statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise stated. 
About six months before his death, the decedent created a revocable living trust naming his son, Larry 
Parson, as the beneficiary and successor trustee. The trust, which embraced all of the decedent's assets, and 
decedent's will both specifically disinherit respondent, decedent's wife of 17 years. Respondent is in her 
early 90's and resides in a nursing home. 
About three months after the death, respondent petitioned the trial court for a family allowance (§ 
6540), and an order setting apart a probate homestead. (§ 6521.) Her petition alleges that she requires 
about $ 1,800 per month for the nursing home, her medical insurance and incidentals. It contains no 
information concerning her separate property or whether she has other sources of financial support. 
Larry Parson opposed the petition on the ground that the Probate Code authorizes a family allowance 
only in connection with the administration of [**3] an estate. (§ 6540.) Because this case involves a trust, 
not an estate, he contends respondent is not entitled to a family allowance. 
The trial court determined that section 6540 mandates the award of a family allowance to a surviving 
spouse during the administration of an estate. While the Probate Code does not expressly authorize a 
family allowance from trust property, the trial court found implicit authorization in sections 19001 and 
11420. Section 19001 provides: "(a) Upon the death of a settlor, the property of the deceased settlor that 
was subject to the power of revocation at the time of the settlor's death is subject to the claims of [*540] 
creditors of the deceased settlor's estate and to the expenses of administration of the estate to the extent that 
the deceased settlor's estate is inadequate to satisfy those claims and expenses. [P] (b) The deceased settlor, 
by appropriate direction in the trust instrument, may direct the priority of sources of payment of debts 
among subtrusts or other gifts established by the trust at the deceased settlor's death. Notwithstanding this 
subdivision, no direction by the settlor shall alter the priority of payment, from whatever [**4] source, of 
the matters set forth in Section 11420 which shall be applied to the trust as it applies to a probate estate." 
Section 11420 provides: "Debts shall be paid in the following order of priority among classes of debts 
...: [P] (1) Expenses of administration. [P] (2) Funeral expenses. [P] (3) Expenses of last illness. [P] (4) 
Family allowance. [P] (5) Wage claims. [P] (6) Obligations secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other 
lien .... [P] (7) General debts ...." 
The trial court reasoned that section 19001, subdivision (b) makes section 11420 applicable to 
revocable trusts. Because section 11420 gives a family allowance priority over most other debts, the trial 
court concluded that the statute authorizes the payment of a family allowance from a revocable trust. 
Section 6540, subdivision (a) provides that a surviving spouse is "entitled to such reasonable family 
allowance out of the estate as is necessary for [the spouse's] maintenance ... during administration of the 
estate ...." (§ 6540, subd. (a).) "Unknown at common law, the family allowance is the exclusive creature of 
statute." ( Estate ofHerrera (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 630, 633 [**5] [12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751].) Its purpose is 
to provide for the support of the persons designated in the statute during the period between the decedent's 
death and the distribution of the estate. ( Estate of Blair (1954) 42 Cal. 2d 728, 730 [269 P.2d 612]; Estate 
ofHerrera, supra, 10 Cal. App. 4th at p. 634; Estate ofHafner (1986) 184 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1397 [229 
Cal. Rptr. 676].) Payment of the allowance is given priority over virtually every other debt. (§ 11420, 
subd. (a), 11421.) Accordingly, the allowance is said to occupy a preferential position and to be "highly 
favored by the law." {Estate of Blair, supra, 42 Cal. 2d at p. 730; Estate of [***688] Herrera, supra, 10 
Cal. App. 4th at p. 634.) 
Despite its favored position, the family allowance has its limits. For example, Blair held that an 
allowance could not be awarded to a widow's estate, even if she would have qualified for an allowance had 
she requested it during her lifetime. (Estate of Blair, supra, 42 Cal. 2d at pp. 731, 733.) Similarly, Hafner 
reversed a family allowance awarded to a putative spouse because,"... the Legislature did not provide for a 
family allowance for [**6] a [*541] putative spouse though it easily could have done so if that had been 
its intent. ... [P] The language of section [6540] is not ambiguous .... [I]t does not authorize the probate 
court to make a family allowance for the benefit of persons other than those specified therein. A putative 
spouse is not one of the persons specified in section [6540] and the court's award of a family allowance to a 
putative spouse is contrary to law." (Estate ofHafner, supra, 184 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1398.) 
We adopt a similar commonsense construction of the plain language of section 6540. The statute 
authorizes the payment of a family allowance "out of the estate ... during administration of the estate ...." (§ 
6540, subd. (a).) In this case, there is no "estate" because the decedent placed all of his assets in a revocable 
trust. Because there is no estate, there is no period of "administration" during which the allowance could be 
paid, nor are there any funds to be paid "out of the estate ...." Accordingly, section 6540 does not authorize 
a family allowance in this case. 
Respondent contends that sections 19001 and 11420 provide the necessary authority. Section [**7] 
11420 grants the payment of a family allowance priority over the payment of most other debts. Section 
19001, subdivision (b) makes section 11420 applicable to a revocable trust. Respondent concludes that 
section 19001 therefore authorizes the award and payment of a family allowance from a revocable trust. 
We disagree. Section 11420 sets priorities for the payment of debts, it does not create them. For 
example, section 11420 requires that administrative expenses be paid first. Under section 19001, then, a 
trust must pay its administrative expenses before any other bills. But nothing in section 11420 requires the 
trust to incur such expenses, nor does it require that a payment be made for administrative expenses even if 
the trust has no such expenses. By the same token, section 11420 does not grant a surviving spouse the 
right to receive a family allowance. It requires only that such an allowance, if otherwise authorized, be paid 
in a specific priority. 
Such a payment might be required from a trust if, for example, a settlor placed some assets in a 
revocable trust and provided for the disposition of other assets by will. In that case, a surviving spouse may 
be entitled to a family [**8] allowance from the estate (e.g., those assets subject to the will). Section 
19001, subdivision (a) makes the assets of a revocable trust "subject to the claims of creditors of the 
deceased settlor's estate ... to the extent that the deceased settlor's estate is inadequate to satisfy those claims 
...." Thus, if the assets of the estate were insufficient to pay the family allowance, section 11420 may 
require the trust to make up the difference. [*542] 
That circumstance does not exist here. Here, the settlor placed all of his assets in the revocable trust, 
leaving none for disposition under his will. Thus, he had no estate from which a family allowance could be 
paid to respondent. The incorporation of section 11420 into section 19001 does not create an estate out of 
thin air, nor does it authorize the payment of a family allowance where no estate exists. 
Respondent also contends that section 19001 subdivision (a) authorizes the payment of a family 
allowance from the trust. She is incorrect. Subdivision (a) makes the assets of a revocable trust available to 
satisfy the claims of creditors of the deceased settlor's estate. As relevant here, a claim is "a demand for 
payment [**9] for any of the following, whether due, not due, or contingent, and whether liquidated or 
unliquidated: [P] (1) Liability of the deceased settlor, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise." (§ 
19000, subd. (a).) 
[***689] This argument fails for the reasons stated above. The deceased had no estate against which 
respondent could make a claim. Moreover, the obligation to pay a family allowance is not a "[liability of 
the deceased settlor ...." (§ 19000, subd. (a)(1).) It is an obligation that arises only after death and after an 
appropriate order is made. {Estate of Blair, supra, 42 Cal. 2d at 733.) 
Section 6540 authorizes the award of a family allowance only in connection with the administration of 
an estate. No estate exists here because the deceased disposed of his assets through a revocable trust. 
Sections 19001 and 11420 do not authorize the payment of a family allowance from a revocable trust 
where, as here, no estate exists. 
The order awarding a family allowance is reversed. Costs to appellant. 
Stone S. J., P. J., and Gilbert, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 18, 1996. 
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OPINION: 
[* 1109] Hugh Schurtz brought suit against BMW of North America and against Clark Buick-Datsun-
GMC-BMW, Inc., BMW of Murray, and John Does I through X (collectively "BMW") alleging (i) breach 
of express and implied warranties under (a) the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 2310(d)(1) 
and 2301(6) (1974), and (b) Utah Uniform Commercial Code, sections 715 and 719, Utah Code Ann. § § 
70A-2-715 and -719 (1990); and (ii) negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation, in violation of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-1 to -23 (1990). The district court entered an 
order granting defendant BMW partial summary judgment, disallowing Schurtz's claim for incidental and 
consequential damages on a breach of warranty claim, and awarding Schurtz [**2] attorney fees in an 
amount less than the amount that Schurtz claimed he was owed. Schurtz appeals. He claims that the district 
court erred in granting BMW's motion for partial summary judgment on the damage issues. He also claims 
that the trial court erred in awarding judgment for less than the full amount of claimed attorney fees. We 
vacate both the summary judgment and the attorney fees award and remand the matter for further 
proceedings. 
In February 1982, Hugh Schurtz purchased a 1982 BMW 320i from BMW of Murray. The car carried 
a written warranty limiting BMW's responsibility to the repair or replacement of defective parts within 
three years or 38,000 miles. The limited warranty specified that the decision to repair or replace was within 
the sole discretion of BMW. Of central concern for the purposes of the appeal were additional warranty 
provisions stating that "BMW of North America, Inc., makes no other express warranty on this product" 
and that "BMW of North America, Inc., hereby excludes incidental and consequential damages ... for any 
breach of any express or implied warranty." nl 
nl The full text of the limited warranty reads as follows: 
BMW of North America, Inc., warrants this vehicle to be free of defects in materials or 
workmanship for a period of 3 years or 38,000 miles, whichever occurs first, commencing with the 
date the vehicle is first licensed or placed in service as a "demonstrator" or "company car." To 
obtain service under this warranty, the vehicle must be brought, upon discovery of the defect, to the 
workshop of any authorized BMW dealer. This dealer will, without charge for parts or labor either 
repair or replace the defective part(s). The decision to repair or replace said part(s) being wholly the 
responsibility of BMW of North America, Inc. Parts for which replacements are made become the 
property of BMW of North America, Inc. 
BMW of North America, Inc., makes no other express warranty on this product except the 
warranty as to the emission control system or the Limited Warranty-Rust Perforation. THE 
DURATION OF ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY 
OF MERCHANTABILITY, IS LIMITED TO THE DURATION OF THE EXPRESS 
WARRANTY HEREIN. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., HEREBY EXCLUDES 
INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING LOSS OF TIME, 
INCONVENIENCE, OR LOSS OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, FOR ANY BREACH OF ANY 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, APPLICABLE TO THIS PRODUCT. Some states do not allow limitations 
on how long an implied warranty lasts, or the exclusion of incidental or consequential damages, so 
the above limitations and exclusions may not apply to you. 
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may also have other rights which vary 
from state to state. Any legal claim or action arising from any express or implied warranty 
contained herein must be brought within 12 months of the date it arises. 
r**3i 
[* 1110] After allegedly encountering numerous problems with the car, Schurtz filed the present 
action. He claimed that immediately after purchase, he experienced difficulties with the car. He further 
asserted that BMW breached the limited warranty because it was either unable or unwilling to repair or 
replace the car. Schurtz claimed (i) breach of written and implied warranties in contravention of the 
Magnuson Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 2301(6) and 2310(d)(1) (1974); (ii) negligent misrepresentation; (iii) 
breach of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § § 13-11-1 to -23 (1990); and (iv) 
breach of express and implied warranties made actionable by code sections 70A-2-715 and -719 (1990). 
Schurtz sought damages including the purchase price of the automobile, incidental and consequential 
damages, attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages. 
BMW filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all Schurtz's warranty claims. 
Pertinent to this appeal is the alternative motion for partial summary judgment in which BMW sought to 
have Schurtz's claims for incidental and consequential damages dismissed, arguing that these claims were 
barred by the express provisions of the limited [**4] warranty. 
In response to this alternative motion, Schurtz argued that the limited warranty's provision excluding 
incidental and consequential damages and limiting the remedy for breach to repair or replacement was 
invalid under section 2-719(2) of the Utah U.C.C. He reasoned that a provision excluding incidental and 
consequential damages is invalid under section 70A-2-719(2) if the warranty to repair or replace "fails of 
its essential purpose" and that the limited BMW warranty failed of its essential purpose because BMW was 
either unable or unwilling to repair his car. 
BMW responded to this argument by contending that under the U.C.C. the limited warranty provision 
excluding incidental and consequential damages remains valid even if the warranty of repair or 
replacement fails of its essential purpose. BMW argued that section 2-719(3) governs incidental and 
consequential damage provisions and specifically allows a provision to exclude incidental and 
consequential damages unless it is "unconscionable." BMW argued that "unconscionability" under subpart 
(2) does not arise merely because a limited warranty to repair or replace fails of its "essential purpose." 
The issue thus joined is [**5] the critical issue of this appeal. Specifically, are subparts (2) and (3) of 
section 2-719 of the Utah U.C.C. to be read dependently, as Schurtz argues, or independently, as BMW 
claims and the trial court found? A dependent reading would mean that any limitation on incidental and 
consequential damages under subpart (3) would be ineffective in the event that the contingency in subpart 
(2), a failure of the essential purpose of the limited warranty, occurred. An independent reading would 
mean that the occurrence of the condition specified in subpart (2) would not mean the automatic invalidity 
of a limitation on incidental and consequential damages. Because the disposition of this issue turns on 
section 70A-2-719 of the Utah U.C.C., we set it forth here: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the [*1111] preceding 
section on liquidation and limitation of damages, 
a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this 
chapter and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this chapter, as by limiting the 
buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement [**6] of 
non-conforming goods or parts; and 
b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in 
which case it is the sole remedy. 
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive remedy or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, 
remedy may be had as provided in this act. 
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is 
unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer 
goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not. 
The motion for partial summary judgment was heard on July 22, 1988, and taken under advisement by 
the court. The matter came for trial on August 1, 1988. On the first day of trial, a jury was impaneled, 
counsel made their opening statements, and Schurtz was called as the first witness. On the second day of 
trial, before any further evidence was taken, the court ruled on the summary judgment motion filed 
previously by BMW. The court denied BMW's motion to dismiss all Schurtz's warranty claims, but it 
granted BMW's motion with respect to Schurtz's claim for incidental and consequential [**7] damages. 
The court agreed with BMW and concluded that subparts 70A-2-719(2) and (3) operate independently. 
When a warranty limits the remedies available to the buyer to repair or replacement and also provides that 
the buyer may not recover incidental and consequential damages, if the repair or replacement provision 
fails of its essential purpose, the incidental and consequential damages limitation in the warranty remains 
valid. 
Following this decision, an agreement was reached between the parties under which BMW, although 
not conceding the issues of breach of warranty and breach of contract, would refund the car's purchase 
price of $ 14,500 to Schurtz upon return of the car, minus a credit to BMW for actual use by Schurtz in the 
amount of 16 cents per mile for 22,516 miles, for a total credit of $ 3,602.56. It was further agreed that 
Schurtz would be deemed the prevailing party for the purpose of obtaining attorney fees as provided for by 
the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). Under that provision, the prevailing party is entitled to 
such fees as the court determines were "reasonably incurred" in prosecuting the action. 
Following entry of the parties' agreement, the court [**8] held a hearing to determine the reasonable 
attorney fees due Schurtz. Schurtz requested fees of $ 44,069.15, the amount which he claimed he had 
incurred in prosecuting the claim. BMW contended that he was not entitled to any attorney fees or, in the 
alternative, entitled only to an award sufficient to compensate him to the point where he filed his complaint 
and received an offer for settlement based on rescission on the theory that the lawsuit was unnecessary and 
the fees were unreasonable. The court awarded Schurtz only $ 10,000 on the ground that the matter "could 
have been and probably should have been settled very early in the proceedings, for an amount roughly 
equal to the ultimate outcome." The court, in awarding a discounted sum of fees to Schurtz, operated on the 
assumption that Schurtz should have known that he was not entitled to incidental and consequential 
damages and therefore spent more money prosecuting the action than was justified. Schurtz appeals from 
the grant of summary judgment and from the award of fees. 
We note at the outset that a challenge to a summary judgment presents for review only conclusions of 
law because, by definition, cases decided on summary judgment [**9] do not resolve factual disputes. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Landes v. Capital [*1112] City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). We 
therefore accord no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions given to support the grant of summary 
judgment, but review them for correctness. See, e.g., Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1990); 
Landes, 795 P.2d at 1129. 
The fundamental question before us is whether the trial court correctly held that the failure of essential 
purpose of a repair or replace provision in a limited warranty does not affect the validity of a companion 
provision in the warranty precluding incidental and consequential damages or, in other words, that subparts 
(2) and (3) should operate independently. To determine the answer, we must determine the proper 
interpretation of subparts 2-719(2) and (3) of the Utah U.C.C. In so doing, we review the language of the 
statute, the legislative history, and the relevant policy considerations. 
We first look to the statute's plain language. Only if we find some ambiguity need we look further. 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989); Williams v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 763 
P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1988); [**10] P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 
(Utah 1988). Subparts 2-719(2) and (3) must be put in context. Chapter 2 of the Utah U.C.C. deals with 
sales, and part 7 deals with sales remedies, spelling those remedies out in some detail. For example, section 
2-713 deals with a buyer's damages for nondelivery or repudiation, section 2-714, a buyer's damages for 
breach in respect of accepted goods, and section 2-715 describes the availability of incidental and 
consequential damages. The section with which we are concerned, section 2-719, follows those explaining 
the various remedies. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-719 (1990). 
Section 2-719 states the contractual limitations or modifications that may be made in the remedies 
provided for in the earlier sections of part 7. Subpart (1) of section 2-719 states that, consistent with 
subparts (2) and (3) of that section, the parties may limit the remedies provided in chapter two of the 
agreement between the buyer and seller to, for example, "repair and replacement of non-conforming goods 
or parts." Subpart 2-719(2) then provides that a limitation of remedies may become ineffective: "Where 
circumstances cause [**11] an exclusive remedy or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, [then] 
remedy may be had as provided in this act." As we recognized in Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832, 835 
(Utah 1981), where a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, the buyer may pursue all remedies 
provided in that part of the U.C.C, including the recovery of incidental and consequential damages under 
section 2-715. 
Subpart 2-719(3) deals separately with provisions expressly limiting damages otherwise available 
under section 2-715. That section provides, "Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the 
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable." 
From the statute's language, it appears that subparts (2) and (3) are to operate independently. A scheme 
is established under which express agreements disclaiming incidental and consequential damages are to be 
governed by subpart (3), and the validity of these exclusions is tested by "unconscionability," while 
agreements disclaiming all the other contractual remedies provided in chapter two are governed by 
subparts (1) and (2) and their validity is tested by "failure of essential purpose as well as the general 
unconscionability [**12] requirements of the Code." 
This independent reading of the two provisions also conforms to the general rule that we should 
construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms, where possible. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.l 1 (Utah 1988). If we were to read subparts (2) and (3) as dependent, we 
would effectively read out the unconscionability test of subpart (3) for determining the validity of a 
provision limiting incidental and consequential damages and substitute "failure of essential purpose" from 
subpart (2) as the operative text. Such a reading seems to fly in the face of the plain language of the statute. 
The statute's terms lead us to conclude that subparts (2) and (3) should be read [*1113] 
independently. We recognize that courts across the country are split on the question, suggesting that a 
number of courts find the statute's language less than clear. See, e.g., KKO Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 517 F. 
Supp. 892 (N.D. 111. 1981); Clark v. International Harvester, 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 1978); 
Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 111. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E 2d 1 (111. Ct. App. 1970); Kelynack v. Yamaha 
Motor Corp. USA, 152 Mich. App. 105, 394 N.W.2d 17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); [**13] Goddard v. 
General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 396 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio 1979); Johnson v. John Deere Co., 306 
N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 1981) (finding that the provisions should be read dependently). But see Chatlos Sys. v. 
National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 
919 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (reading the provisions independently). Our position is in accord with the Third 
Circuit's statement in Chatlos Systems: 
It appears to us that the better reasoned approach is to treat the consequential damages disclaimer as an 
independent provision, valid unless unconscionable [subpart (3)].... The limited remedy of repair [subpart 
(2)] and a consequential damages exclusion are two discrete ways of attempting to limit recovery for 
breach of warranty.... The code, moreover, treats each by a different standard. The former survives unless 
it fails of its essential purpose, while the latter is valid unless it is unconscionable. We therefore see no 
reason to hold, as a general [**14] proposition, that the failure of the limited remedy provided in the 
contract, without more, invalidates a wholly distinct term in the agreement excluding consequential 
damages. The two are not mutually exclusive. 
Chatlos Systems, 635 F.2d at 1086 (bracketed material added). 
Our independent reading of the two subparts is consistent with the only thing that could be described 
as legislative history on the issue, the comments of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code. The 
comment to section 70A-2-719 does not expressly state whether the remedies provided for by section 70A-
2-719(2) should include incidental and consequential damages when a limited warranty specifically 
excludes them. See U.C.C. § 2-719 comment (1990). However, the general terms of the comment, when 
viewed in light of the other provisions of part 7, are furthered by an independent reading of subsection 
70A-2-719(2) and subsection 70A-2-719(3). The comment explains that 2-719 permits contractual 
limitations on remedies to be overthrown in certain circumstances, and consequently, parties who conclude 
a contract for sale, even one with limitations of remedies, "must accept the legal consequence [**15] that 
there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract." 
Such a "fair quantum of remedy for breach" is available when subparts (2) and (3) are given an 
independent reading. 
Our independent reading of subparts (2) and (3) is also supported by sound policy considerations. And 
with some careful tuning, our independent reading of the two subparts can accommodate the values that 
appear to have driven a number of courts to read these two provisions as dependent. 
As noted above, there is a split among the courts across the country, with some courts reading (2) and 
(3) independently and others reading them dependency. These positions may appear irreconcilable. 
However, when the facts of the cases are taken into account, the policy considerations that seem to underlie 
the decisions holding the two subparts dependent appear reconcilable with the considerations underlying 
those holding them independent, and the split of authority on the question of a dependent or independent 
construction seems largely a result of the context in which the question was presented to the courts. 
In cases where the buyer is a consumer, there is a disparity [**16] in bargaining power, and the 
contractual limitations on remedies, including incidental and consequential damages, are contained in a 
preprinted document rather than one that has been negotiated between the parties, the courts have held 
uniformly that if the limited warranty [*1114] fails of its essential purpose, the consumer should be 
permitted to seek incidental and consequential damages. The courts usually reach this result by reading the 
two subparts dependency. See, e.g., Clark v. International Harvester, 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 
1978). On the other hand, in cases where the parties are operating in a commercial setting, there is no 
disparity in bargaining power, and the contract and its limitations on remedies are negotiated, most courts 
have concluded that if a limited warranty fails of its essential purpose, any contractual limitation on 
incidental and consequential damages is not automatically void. The subparts are read independently and 
the surviving limitation on incidentals and consequentials remains valid absent a showing of 
unconscionability. n2 E.g., V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1971); 
American Elec. Power Co., 418 F. Supp. at 457-59. [**17] 
n2 There are exceptions to this. Several courts have automatically invalidated incidental and 
consequential damages provisions upon failure of essential purpose even in commercial settings. 
See, e.g., KKO Inc., 517 F. Supp. at 898; Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. 
Supp. 39, 43-44 (N.D. 111. 1970). 
In our view, both the consumer and the nonconsumer situation can be dealt with in a manner that 
reconciles the apparent split of authority in the cases by giving an independent reading to subparts (2) and 
(3). When trial courts are addressing the subpart (3) issue of unconscionability in any specific case, they 
should take an approach that frankly recognizes the differences that inhere in consumer, as opposed to 
commercial, settings and affect the determination of unconscionability. This distinction is recognized in 
other areas of the U.C.C. See, e.g., J. White & R. Summers, U.C.C. § § 4-2 to 4-9 (difference in 
unconscionability determination in consumer and commercial [**18] setting); 12-1 to 12-5 (difference in 
warranties to consumers and merchants); 14-8 to 14-9 (consumer/merchant distinction in rights of holders 
in due course) (2d ed. 1980). We think the results in the cases we have canvassed amount to a recognition 
of this distinction in section 2-719 cases. Under such an approach, the trial court confronted with an issue 
of unconscionability takes into account any disparities in bargaining power between the parties, the 
negotiation process, if any, and the type of contract entered into by the parties, specifically addressing 
whether the contract was one of adhesion. As noted above, in practice after these factors are examined and 
weighed, a trial court will generally find that provisions limiting incidental and consequential damages are 
unconscionable in consumer settings and conscionable in commercial settings. We acknowledge that the 
outcome in any particular case may diverge from this pattern because of the facts; but that is only a 
recognition of the difficulty of neatly categorizing transactions as commercial or consumer. 
An analysis that takes a case-by-case approach to the question of unconscionability accommodates the 
results in virtually [**19] all the cases dealing with the relationship between subparts (2) and (3). It also 
provides the courts with a flexible tool for determining the validity of limitations on incidental and 
consequential damages that serves well the different policies appropriate to consumer and commercial 
settings. For example, where such a limitation is freely negotiated between sophisticated parties, which will 
most likely occur in a commercial setting, it seems unlikely that a court will find a provision limiting 
incidental and consequential damages unconscionable and free the buyer from that provision simply 
because some other limited warranty provision has failed of its essential purpose. On the other hand, where 
a limitation of incidentals and consequentials is nonnegotiable and preprinted on a standard form limited 
warranty that is sealed in a package with consumer goods or stuffed in a glovebox, where it will never be 
seen until after the goods are sold, as may often occur in consumer transactions, then it seems more likely 
that a court will find that the freedom to contract for limitations on remedies described in subparts 2-719(1) 
and (3) has not really been meaningfully exercised by both parties [**20] and the limitation will be held 
unconscionable. See Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock [*1115] Co., 706 P.2d 
1028 (Utah 1985); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983); Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling on the motion for partial 
summary judgment that, as a matter of law, Schurtz was not entitled to incidental and consequential 
damages. Although the trial court correctly held that subparts (2) and (3) of section 2-719 are to be read 
independently, it erred by not then determining whether the facts of this case warrant a finding that the 
limitation of incidental and consequential damages is unconscionable under subpan 2-719(3). n3 And if it 
had so found, it should have made findings of fact to support the result. 
n3 Justice Howe, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, maintains that "the issue in this case 
was presented and decided by this court in 1981 in Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832 (Utah 1981)." 
We disagree. 
In Devore, a car had been sold under a warranty stating that "recovery hereunder by the [buyer] 
shall be limited to amounts paid by the [buyer]." We held that upon the failure of the seller to 
comply with the terms of the limited warranty by returning the monies paid, the buyer was entitled 
to recover both the amount paid and incidental and consequential damages. We reasoned that under 
subpart (2) of section 70A-2-719, when the limited remedy provided in the warranty failed of its 
essential purpose, the buyer was entitled to any remedy "provided in this act," including incidentals 
and consequentials. We never mentioned subpart (3) of 2-719 in Devore, presumably because the 
contract in question did not contain an express provision limiting recovery of incidental and 
consequential damages. 
Justice Howe comes to the conclusion that Devore governs the instant case by assuming that it 
is immaterial whether a contract providing a limited remedy pursuant to subpart (2) also contains an 
express provision excluding incidental and consequential damages, as authorized by subpart (3). It 
is, however, precisely the presence of such an express provision that raises the conflict between 
subparts (2) and (3) which we address. Demonstrative of the fact that it is the presence of an 
express limitation on incidentals and consequentials that raises this issue is the fact that every case 
we have found directly addressing the question of whether subparts (2) and (3) should be read 
dependently or independently involved agreements containing both a limited warranty and an 
express limitation on incidental and consequential damages. 
Devore and our decision in the instant case are completely reconcilable. Under Devore, if the 
seller provides a limited warranty under subpart (2) and that warranty fails of its essential purpose, 
all damages provided in the act are available, including incidentals and consequentials. However, if 
the contract containing the limited warranty also contains a limitation of incidental and 
consequential damages, then upon proof of the failure of the limited warranty of its essential 
purpose, the buyer may be entitled to other remedies provided in the act, but not incidental and 
consequential damages, unless the court first finds that that limitation would be unconscionable. 
Not only is the result we reach today compatible with Devore, but also it gives meaning to the 
two separate standards contained in subparts (2) and (3) and provides a workable rule for both 
commercial and consumer transactions. When the parties to a sale expressly agree not only to a 
limited warranty, but also to a limitation on incidental and consequential damages, they are entitled 
to have both provisions given effect. And that is the effect of the independent reading we give 
subparts (2) and (3) today. 
[**21] 
We vacate the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings on the warranty question in 
accordance with this opinion. 
Schurtz also claims that it was error for the court to award a discounted sum of attorney fees because it 
was based on the legal assumption that Schurtz could not recover incidental and consequential damages 
and should have known that fact. Because that assumption was incorrect, the trial court must readdress the 
attorney fees question after deciding the warranty issues. 
CONCURBY: 
HOWE (In Part); STEWART (In Part) 
DISSENTBY: 
HOWE (In Part); STEWART (In Part) 
DISSENT: 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice (concurring and dissenting) 
The issue in this case was presented and decided by this court in 1981 in Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 
832 (Utah 1981). The majority opinion in this case attempts to distinguish it "because the contract in 
Devore did not expressly exclude recovery of incidental and consequential damages." It is true that in the 
opinion of this court in Devore, it does not appear whether the written limited warranty given the buyer [* 
1116] expressly excluded incidental and consequential damages. However, the Utah U.C.C. does not 
require that they be "expressly" [**22] excluded. All that is required is that the limited warranty be agreed 
upon as exclusive. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-719(l)(b) provides: 
(b) Resort to a [limited] remedy as provided is optional unless the [limited] remedy is expressly agreed to 
be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy. 
When a limited remedy is agreed upon, incidental and consequential damages are necessarily 
excluded. In Devore, the limited warranty given the buyer stated, "NOTICE TO BUYER: RECOVERY 
HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL BE LIMITED TO AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR 
HEREUNDER." That language certainly cannot be construed to mean anything other than that the buyer's 
sole remedy was to recover the amounts he or she had paid. The words "shall be limited to amounts paid" 
mean no other amounts. We so regarded it and wrote the opinion on that premise. Otherwise, the case 
could have been disposed of summarily in favor of the buyer. The majority, however, finds Devore not 
controlling because the limited warranty was not followed by superfluous language also excluding 
incidental and consequential damages. This additional requirement makes no sense in my opinion. Section 
70A-2-719(l)(b) provides that when [**23] a remedy is agreed upon to be exclusive, "it is the sole 
remedy." The buyer agreed to an exclusive remedy, and we correctly regarded it as his sole remedy even 
though all other remedies may not have been expressly excluded. Devore controls the instant case, and the 
summary judgment against the buyer must be reversed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-719(l)(a) provides in part: 
(a) The agreement may ... limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this chapter, as by 
limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement 
of nonconforming goods or parts.... 
That subsection allows a seller to give only a limited warranty consisting of (1) return of goods and 
repayment of the price, as was the case in Devore, or (2) repair and replacement of nonconforming goods 
or parts as in the instant case. In both cases, the limited warranty is intended to be exclusive. In Devore, the 
automobile dealer failed to repay the purchase price of the automobile when the buyer offered to return the 
damaged automobile. In the instant case, the automobile dealer has allegedly failed to replace the 
nonconforming automobile. Because of the [**24] failure of the automobile dealer in Devore to honor the 
limited warranty of repayment of the purchase price to the buyer, we held that subsection (2) of section 
70A-2-719 came into operation. That subsection provides: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or 
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this act." In Devore, we 
held: 
The purpose of section 70A-2-719(2) as reflected in the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial 
Code is to make available to an aggrieved party all remedies provided in our statutory scheme where the 
limited remedy provided for in the contract fails of its essential purpose. These additional remedies include 
the incidental and consequential damages as provided in section 70A-2-715. 
Devore, 632 P.2d at 832 (emphasis added). Essentially, we held in Devore that the automobile dealer 
could not use the very provision of a warranty which it failed to honor as a reason for limiting the trial 
court's award of incidental and consequential damages. We relied in part on Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 111. 
App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970) (a case cited [**25] but rejected by the majority opinion in the instant 
case), where the manufacturer and a dealer of a tractor had limited their liability for repair or replacement. 
We quoted with approval the following statement from that court's opinion: 
The manufacturer and the dealer have agreed in their warranty to repair or replace defective parts while 
also limiting their liability to that extent. Had they reasonably complied with their agreement [*1117] 
contained in the warranty they would be in a position to claim the benefits of their stated limited liability 
and to restrict plaintiff to his stated remedy. The limitations of remedy and of liability are not separable 
from the obligations of the warranty. Repudiation of the obligations of the warranty destroy its benefits.... 
It should be obvious that they cannot at once repudiate their obligation under their warranty and assert its 
provisions beneficial to them. 
125 111. App. 2d at 402, 261 N.E.2d at 9. 
It is therefore clear to me that in Devore we held that when an exclusive or limited remedy fails of its 
essential purpose, "remedy may be had as provided in this act," which includes incidental and 
consequential [**26] damages as provided for in section 70A-2-715. That right should not be limited or 
curtailed by subsection (3) of 70A-2-719, which provides that consequential damages may be limited or 
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. That subsection does not address the 
problem when the exclusive or limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose. Subsection (3) should be 
interpreted to mean that where there is an exclusive or limited remedy that does not fail of its essential 
purpose, consequential and incidental damages may not also be recovered unless denying recovery would 
be unconscionable, such as is suggested in subsection (3), where the buyer has sustained personal injuries 
as a result of the breach of warranty. By so interpreting subsection (3), we do not "read it out" of the statute 
as feared by the majority opinion. 
In summary, Devore and the instant case cannot be distinguished despite the majority's attempt. It 
therefore follows that the buyer in the instant case is entitled to reversal of the summary judgment against 
him and to a remand of this case to the trial court for a factual determination as to whether the limited 
warranty failed of its [**27] essential purpose. If the buyer prevails on that issue, he then, under Devore, is 
entitled to incidental and consequential damages. Devore settled that question, and I submit that case 
should remain the law since it is predicated on the perfectly sound premise that a seller who fails to honor 
his own limited warranty is in no position to resist the award of incidental and consequential damages 
afforded to buyers under section 70A-2-715. When a limited warranty fails of its essential purpose (which 
is usually because the seller will not honor it), what remedy does the buyer have if he fails to prove (as 
required by the majority) that the limitation on recover/ of incidental and consequential damages is 
unconscionable? Neither the majority opinion nor Justice Stewart's opinion provides an answer. This denial 
would seem to fly in the face of the official comment to section 2-719, which reads: 
It is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available. If the 
parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must accept the legal consequence that 
there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the [**28] obligations or duties outlined in the 
contract. 
U.C.C. § 2-719 comment (1990) (emphasis added). 
The bench and bar will be confused by the majority opinion and Devore standing side by side, each 
reaching a different result on similar facts. We should not have a different rule for a case where incidental 
and consequential damages are necessarily excluded by the existence of a limited warranty which is made 
the buyer's sole and exclusive remedy, such as Devore, and the instant case where incidental and 
consequential damages are expressly excluded. 
STEWART, Justice (concurring and dissenting) 
I agree with the majority opinion that Utah's U.C.C. § 70A-2-719(2) does not mandate that 
consequential damages be allowed every time a limited warranty fails of its essential purpose. However, 
there may be circumstances in which the failure of a limited warranty will also result in the failure of a 
clause limiting consequential damages. The question is primarily one of contract interpretation, in my 
view, rather than one of statutory construction, as both [*1118] the majority and Justice Howe in his 
opinion seem to suggest. 
Section 70A-2-719(l) authorizes a limited or exclusive [**29] remedy. Section 70A-2-719(2) 
provides that if "circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy 
may be had as provided in this act." The phrase "as provided in this act" does not invalidate an otherwise 
valid contractual provision. The true question is whether, based on an interpretation of the contract, the 
failure of an exclusive or limited remedy also causes the failure of a consequential damages limitation. The 
answer to this question depends on the contract rather 1han the U.C.C. In other words, if the contract is 
interpreted in such a way that the consequential damages limitation must fail with the limited remedy, then 
incidental and consequential damages may be recovered as provided in the U.C.C. On the other hand, if the 
failure of the limited remedy does not cause the failure of the consequential damages limitation, then that 
limitation must be evaluated under the unconscionability standard of § 70A-2-719(3). 
Sustaining an otherwise valid consequential damages limitation, even though a limited remedy has 
failed of its essential purpose, is entirely consistent with the terms and framework of the U.C.C. Under the 
U.C.C., a seller may [**30] limit consequential damages without otherwise limiting a buyer's remedies. 
See, e.g., Adams Laboratories, Inc. v. Jacobs Eng'g Co., 486 F. Supp. 383, 388 (N.D. 111. 1980). There is no 
reason to hold that a seller and a buyer may not enter into a contract which provides for the limitation of 
consequential damages, so long as it is not unconscionable, in the event that a limited remedy fails of its 
essential purpose. The U.C.C. certainly does not mandate such a conclusion. Although generally the failure 
of the essential purpose of a limited remedy will also invalidate a consequential damages limitation, there 
are cases when it will not. 
Our holding in Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832 (Utah 1981), does not conflict with this analysis. In 
Devore, there was a limited remedy but not an express consequential damages limitation. As Justice Howe 
notes, the limited remedy necessarily excluded consequential damages. However, when the limited remedy 
failed of its essential purpose, there was no longer any contractual limitation of consequential damages. 
Thus, as Devore correctly held, when a limited remedy fails, all remedies provided in the [**31] statutory 
scheme, including consequential damages, can appropriately be recovered. 632 P.2d at 835. 
Case law from other jurisdictions, including that cited in the majority opinion, if not expressly 
following this reasoning, at least does so implicitly. Those cases allowing consequential damages in spite 
of an express limitation have done so either because the seller repudiated the warranty and therefore could 
not rely on the warranty's limitation of consequential damages or because the two limitations were so 
interrelated that the failure of one necessarily caused the failure of the other. See, e.g., Jones & McKnight 
Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 43 (N.D. 111. 1970) (court "would be in an untenable position if 
it allowed the defendant to shelter itself behind one segment of the warranty when it has allegedly 
repudiated and ignored its very limited obligations under another segment of the same warranty"); Clark v. 
International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 343, 581 P.2d 784, 801 (1978) (both limitations were "integral 
parts of the provision, reciprocal to one another, and together they represented the agreed [**32] 
allocation of risk between the parties"); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 111. App. 2d 388, 402, 261 N.E.2d 1, 7 
(1970) ("Limitations of remedy and of liability are not separable from the obligations of the warranty. 
Repudiation of the obligations of the warranty destroy its benefits."); Kelynack v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 
USA, 152 Mich. App. 105, 115, 394 N.W.2d 17, 21 (1986) ("repair and replace remedy and the exclusion 
of consequential damages are integral and interdependent parts of the warranty"; seller cannot "repudiate 
its limited obligation under the warranty while shielding itself behind another provision of the very 
warranty it has repudiated"); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 88 S.D. 612, 620, 226 N.W.2d [*1119] 157, 
161 (1975) (seller cannot "repudiate its obligation under the warranty" and at the same time attempt "to 
shield itself behind the beneficial limitation clause" of the same warranty). 
On the other hand, many courts are willing to enforce a completely separate and otherwise valid 
consequential damages limitation provision. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 
635 F.2d 1081, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980) [**33] ("limited remedy of repair and a consequential damages 
exclusion are two discrete ways of attempting to limit recovery"; the consequential damages limitation is 
"valid unless it is unconscionable"); AES Technology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941 
(7th Cir. 1978) (court rejected "the contention that failure of the essential purpose of the limited remedy 
automatically means that a damage award will include consequential damages"; "purpose of the courts in 
contractual disputes is not to rewrite contracts by ignoring parties' intent; rather it is to interpret the existing 
contract as fairly as possible when all events did not occur as planned"); V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. 
Co., 447 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1971) (court "not persuaded that Section 2-719(2)... requires the negation 
of the specific limitations of the contract"); American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elect Corp., 418 F. 
Supp. 435, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("totally separate provision" limiting consequential damages does not fail 
with limited remedy; limited remedy which "fails of its essential purpose ... may be ignored, and other 
clauses in [**34] the contract which limit remedies for breach may be left to stand or fall independently of 
the stricken clause. Section 2-719 was intended to encourage and facilitate consensual allocations of 
risks"); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503, 516, 267 S.E.2d 919, 926 (1980) (failure of limited 
remedy does not invalidate a "contractual limitation on the recovery of consequential damages"). 
Although, as a practical matter, the various courts deciding these cases might not agree on how to 
interpret a particular set of facts, the principle derived from the cases is well-reasoned. In sum, if a 
consequential damages limitation is not so integrally related to a limited remedy that the failure of the 
essential purpose of that remedy, or its repudiation by the seller, necessarily invalidates the damages 
limitation, the consequential damages limitation should be upheld if not unconscionable. 
Finally, although unconscionability is more likely to be found in consumer contracts than in 
commercial contracts, the language of the majority opinion should not be read as creating a presumption of 
unconscionability in consumer contracts. The majority states: "[A] [**35] trial court will generally find 
that provisions limiting incidental and consequential damages are unconscionable in consumer settings and 
conscionable in commercial settings." This statement should only be read as descriptive of the usual 
outcome of these issues and should not be considered as indicative of what the trial court must do. 
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OPINION: 
[*183] The issues in this appeal are (1) whether an express trust was created, (2) if so, whether the 
trial court correctly decreed termination of the trust on the ground that its purposes had been fulfilled, and 
(3) whether attorney's fees incurred by the trustee can be paid from the trust corpus. 
I. CREATION OF TRUST 
The principles governing the creation of a trust are well settled. An inter vivos trust is created when a 
settlor, with intent to create a trust, transfers property to a trustee in trust for, or declares that he or she (the 
settlor) holds specific property in trust for, a named beneficiary. Restatement of Trusts 2d, § § 2, 17. The 
settlor need not sign a formal trust instrument or employ any particular form of words. Capps v. Capps, 
110 Utah 468, 175 P.2d 470 (1946); Acott v. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d [**2] 720 (1959); Bogert, 
Trusts & Trustees, § 45 (2d ed. 1965); Restatement ofTrusts 2d, § 24. But the settlor must have [*184] 
an intent to create a presently enforceable trust, Pagano v. Walker, Utah, 539 P.2d 452, 455 (1975), the 
trust property must be clearly specified and set aside, Renshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 87 Utah 359, 
363, 35 P.2d 298 (1934), and the essential terms of the trust must be clear enough for the court to enforce 
the equitable duties that are the sine qua non of a trust relationship. Restatement of Trusts 2d, § § 2, 4; 
Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d at 454; Duchesne County v. State Tax Commission, 104 Utah 365, 371, 140 
P.2d 335, 338 (1943). 
This requirement of clarity is met if the beneficiaries are identified and the nature of their beneficial 
interests and the duties of the trustee are specified orally, Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah at 474-75, or in writing 
(as is more common), or are clearly ascertainable from the circumstances, Restatement of Trusts 2d, § § 
112, 129, or dictated by the law of trusts. Loco Credit Union v. Reed, 85 N.M. 729, 516 P.2d 1112 (1973). 
To be enforceable against objections, a trust in [**3] real property must be created by a writing signed by 
the settlor or his agent. U.C.A., 1953, § 25-5-1. But trusts other than those involving real property can be 
created without the formality of a writing, Restatement of Trusts 2d, § 39, so long as they are proven by 
clear and convincing evidence. Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah at 474-75. 
The district court found as a fact that "the parties attempted to set up a trust [pursuant to the 
requirement in their divorce decree] but none was created." The findings state: "There is no document in 
evidence creating a trust," the terms of any trust were too "ambiguous," "the time and duration of any trust 
which might have been created is uncertain and .... a reasonable time for duration of the trust has elapsed," 
and "the parties have not defined the terms and conditions of any trust and the court has no basis upon 
which to find what the terms of any trust might be which the parties intended to create." These findings, 
which are a mixture of findings of fact and a conclusion of law on the ultimate question of the creation of 
the trust, are challenged by appellant. We must therefore review the evidence to see if it clearly 
preponderates [**4] against the findings of the trial court. Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (1981); 
Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (1981). The evidence is essentially uncontested. 
Appellant and respondent were husband and wife. In his complaint for divorce, appellant suggested a 
property settlement, including the creation of a trust of specified property "for the education of the children 
of the parties." Respondent's answer agreed to this proposal, which was then embodied in a Property 
Settlement Agreement and Stipulation signed by the parties on October 16, 1973. That document contains 
the following paragraph, which is essentially identical to the proposals the parties had specified in their 
pleadings: 
That both Plaintiff and Defendant agree that income derived from the interest held by the parties in the real 
estate syndicate known as the Big Bear Property in San Bernardino County, California, should be 
established as a family trust known as the Sundquist Family Trust Fund with the Plaintiff and Defendant as 
Trustees with the restriction and requirement that said funds be accumulated for the education of the minor 
children of the parties and at such time as the children have received [**5] or terminated their advanced 
education, any sums remaining in said trust funds should be equally divided between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant and during the administration of the trust if additional monies are necessary for the education of 
the children, the parties should be ordered to equally contribute to the trust fund. 
A week later, the district court entered a decree of divorce, which included and expressly approved the 
foregoing provision and the other terms of the property settlement and ordered the parties to fulfill their 
agreements under it. 
The parties proceeded as ordered. By January 24, 1975, $1,164.59 had been deposited [*185] in a 
savings account in the Continental Bank and Trust Company of Salt Lake City in the name of the 
"Sundquist Family Trust." This bank account, for which an IRS number had been assigned, apparently 
required the signatures of both parties. No formal written trust agreement was in evidence, and presumably 
none was signed, but on January 25, 1975, the parties signed a one-page document titled "Addendum to 
Trust Agreement," which recited that "The grantors .... do hereby modify and clarify the trust agreement on 
the SUNDQUIST FAMILY [**6] TRUST." The modifications pertained to the definition of "education" 
and the type of expenses that would be paid by the trust. During the remainder of 1975, the trust account 
showed deposits of interest income and a $ 1,154.62 income installment from the Big Bear Property, and 
withdrawals of $ 495 for the educational expenses of one of the parties' children. Similar deposits and 
withdrawals were shown for the years 1976 through 1979. 
In 1976, because of conflict between the parties over which educational expenses were to be paid from 
the trust, appellant petitioned the district court having jurisdiction of the original divorce proceeding for an 
order that respondent sign blank withdrawal slips for appellant's use, or, in the alternative, that respondent 
be removed as a co-trustee. This controversy was settled on May 21, 1976, by a stipulated order which (1) 
directed respondent to remove herself as a joint signatory of the bank account, (2) established further 
definitions concerning the type and amount and documentation of educational expenses that would be paid 
by the trust, and (3) directed appellant to give respondent quarterly reports on disbursements made by the 
trust. This [**7] order refers repeatedly to "the trust," "this trust," or "the Sundquist Family Trust Fund." 
Despite this clarification, conflict over the amount or type of disbursements appellant made for the 
children's education continued. 
On October 11, 1979, respondent filed in the original divorce proceeding under the heading of "order 
to show cause" a request for the termination of the trust and the distribution of its proceeds in equal shares 
to the parties. In support, she recited the ages and current occupations of the three children of the marriage 
and alleged that "there is no need for a continuation of the children's education." Appellant objected, and a 
hearing was held on February 8, 1980, at which respondent suggested for the first time, and the district 
court held, that the trust had not been created in the first place. 
As to the $ 5,914.28 balance of the trust account on deposit in the bank on February 8, 1980, the 
district court's conclusion that no trust was created was erroneous in law and contrary to the clear 
preponderance of the evidence. Here two parties signed an enforceable agreement to create a trust for the 
education of their children, of which they were to be trustees [**8] and to which they were to deposit the 
income derived from specified property. The agreement designated the purpose and beneficiaries of the 
trust: to provide education for the parties' children with a remainder interest in the parties themselves. On 
the sufficiency of these terms, the facts in this case are practically identical to those in Loco Credit Union 
v. Reed, 85 N.M. 729, 516 P.2d 1112 (1973), which sustained the validity of an educational trust created in 
a bank account by a property settlement agreement for the benefit of the children of the divorcing settlers. 
We agree with the New Mexico Supreme Court's declaration on this subject, id. at 1116: 
The rights and duties of the trustee not detailed in the trust instrument are sufficiently detailed in the law of 
trusts .... The use to be made of the trust property is clearly stated in the written instrument evidencing the 
creation of the trust. Minute details, as to the precise items for which funds in an educational trust must be 
used, are not necessary for the trust's validity. 
To the same effect is Sherwin v. Smith, 282 Mass. 306, 185 N.E. 17 (1933), which held that a devise of 
sums to family [**9] members "to be used only for educational purposes" created a valid trust even though 
the [* 186] will gave no additional guidance on how the educational trust was to be administered. 
When the parties signed their Property Settlement Agreement in 1973, they fulfilled all the 
requirements for the creation of a trust (summarized earlier) except the existence of the trust property. Even 
the property requirement would have been fulfilled if the parties had transferred or declared a trust of the 
interest they owned in the Big Bear Property. But the agreement evidences no intent to do this. Instead, 
the parties agreed "that income derived from the interest held by the parties in the .... Big Bear Property .... 
should be established as a family trust...." By this reference to "income derived" and this use of "should" in 
the sense of duty, the parties made clear that they were not creating a present trust but only imposing an 
obligation to create a trust thereafter, and that the subject matter of the trust was not to be the property then 
owned but the income installments to be received in the future. The installments of income were future 
property in 1973 and thus could not [**10] have been the subject matter of a present creation of trust. 
Brainardv. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937); Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 113 (2d ed. 1965), 
and authorities cited therein. Viewing the matter just after the October, 1973, agreement, the parties had an 
enforceable agreement to create a trust, but no trust had been created. Consequently, as to the Big Bear 
Property and as to future income installments, we agree with the district court's conclusion that no trust was 
created. 
However, as the parties received each installment of income from the Big Bear Property, the trust 
automatically came into existence as to that installment. This is a consequence of the fact that the parties 
had made an enforceable agreement to create a trust in those installments of income, and the fact that 
equity would therefore treat the trust as having been perfected when the income was received. As Bogert 
explains: "When the subject-matter came into existence and into the hands of the intended settlor, it would 
at once be deemed to be held in trust, without any act of appropriation by the intending settlor, ...." Bogert, 
Trusts & Trustees, § 113 (2d ed. 1965), and [**11] authorities cited therein. The parties' deposit of these 
income installments in the properly labeled trust account in the bank is further confirmation of their 
performance of their agreement to create a trust and of the existence and validity of the trust as to those 
deposits. 
If our conclusion about the creation of this trust admitted of any doubt, it would surely be resolved by 
the parties' signature on a formal "Addendum to Trust Agreement," by their performance of the trust by 
deposits and disbursements for educational purposes over a period of five years, and by the fact that the 
existence of the trust was, in effect, confirmed by periodic orders of the court that had approved the 
original agreement and supervised the performance of what the court's orders repeatedly referred to as "the 
trust" or "the Sundquist Family Trust." 
For the reasons set out above, a valid trust was created and exists as to the $ 5,914.28 balance of the 
bank account, but not as to the parties' interest in the Big Bear Property or in the future installments 
therefrom. Under Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § 30-3-5, the district court in a divorce proceeding has 
"continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent [**12] changes or new orders with respect to .... the 
distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary." That power does not authorize the court 
to alter property rights already vested in other parties, such as in the children who are the beneficiaries of 
the trust in the income already received and deposited in the trust account. Cf. Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 
(1981). But section 30-3-5 does authorize the divorce court to reallocate property rights between the parties 
to the divorce, such as by modifying the earlier decree as to the parties' interest in the Big Bear Property, 
including installment payments [* 187] not yet received, nl This matter can be pursued on remand. 
nl The record contains testimony that nine or ten future annual payments were then expected, 
in the total amount of approximately S 18,000 to $ 20,000. 
II. TERMINATION OF TRUST 
In Clayton v. Behle, Utah, 565 P.2d 1132 (1977), this Court approved and applied the general rule that 
even though its prescribed duration [**13] has not passed, the beneficiaries can require a court of equity to 
decree the termination of a trust where: (1) all beneficiaries consent, (2) no beneficiary is under an 
incapacity, and (3) the continuance of the trust is not necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust. 
This rule is supported by a multitude of authorities, including, in addition to those cited in Clayton v. 
Behle, supra; Ambrose v. First National Bank of Nevada, Nev., 87 Nev. 114, 482 P.2d 828 (1971); Bogert, 
Trusts & Trustees, § 1007 (2d ed. 1962); 4 Scott on Trusts § 337 (3d ed. 1967), and authorities cited 
therein. n2 
n2 A corollary rule, also referred to in Clayton v. Behle, supra, that all beneficiaries can 
terminate a trust even though its continuance is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust 
when the settler(s) consent to its termination, Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308, 75 P.2d 132 
(1938); Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 1005 (2d ed. 1962); 4 Scott on Trusts, § 338 (3d ed. 1967), is 
inapplicable to this case because appellant, one of the settlers, resisted termination. 
[**14] 
In its findings of fact, the district court stated that "one of the children of the parties desires that any 
trust should be terminated and the other two have no objection to such termination." There were no 
findings of fact on whether the continuance of the trust was necessary to carry out a material purpose of the 
trust, except as implied by the district court's conclusions of law: "the purpose of any possible trust has 
been accomplished; the children, beneficiaries, have no objection to its termination and the trust should be 
terminated." 
At the conclusion of evidence in support of respondent's request for termination, appellant moved to 
dismiss. That motion should have been granted because respondent's request for termination failed of 
proof in two essential respects. 
(1) Respondent failed to prove consent by all of the beneficiaries. Appellant, who owned a beneficial 
interest in remainder, resisted the termination. Moreover, although one of the parties' children consented 
that the trust be terminated, the other two beneficiary-children did not affirmatively consent to the 
termination. As Bogert states, "It is well settled that the court will not end the trust as a whole [**15] on 
the request of a part only of the beneficiaries." Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 1007 (2d ed. 1962). It is not 
sufficient for purposes of this rule that beneficiaries "have no objection to its termination" or take no 
position on the matter. All beneficiaries must consent. Clayton v. Behle, supra; A.B. v. Wilmington Trust 
Co., 41 Del.Ch. 191, 191 A.2d 98 (1963); Hills v. Travelers Bank & Trust Co., 125 Conn. 640, 7 A.2d 652 
(1939); Clossetv. Burtchaell, 112 Or. 585, 230 P. 554 (1924). 
(2) Respondent also failed to prove that there was no unfulfilled purpose of the trust which could be 
carried out by its continuance. Indeed, the contrary is clear from the evidence. The purpose of the trust 
created by the parties was to provide education for their children, with the remaining trust property to be 
divided equally between the parties "at such time as the children have received or terminated their 
advanced education ...." At the time of the attempted termination, the three children beneficiaries were ages 
19 1/2, 22 1/2, and 24 1/2. All had attended some college, but none had yet graduated from college, and 
none had yet attained the age when a majority of young [**16] people who aspire to "advanced" or college 
educations have satisfied those aspirations. Two of the three beneficiaries gave evidence expressing strong 
aspirations for further higher education; one was then enrolled part time in a university, and the other was 
in the army, but expressed his desire to continue his college [*188] education part time on active duty and 
later as a civilian. In view of these facts, we cannot see how it can be said that the educational purposes of 
this trust have been fulfilled or that the appropriate and reasonable duration for performance of this trust 
for "advanced education" has passed. Consequently, the trust could not be terminated. Clayton v. Behle, 
supra; Lafferty v. Sheets, 175 Kan. 741, 267 P.2d 962 (1954); Closset v. Burtchaell, supra. 
For each of these two reasons, we hold that this trust could not be terminated on the evidence before 
the district court in this proceeding. 
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
At the hearing, appellant sought an order directing the payment of his attorney's fees from the corpus 
of the trust. Appellant's attorney represented that he had expended 15 hours in preparing to resist the 
proposed terrnination, plus [**17] his time in the hearing in the district court. These fees were denied, and 
appellant challenges this on appeal. 
A trustee has the fiduciary duty and the concomitant power to defend the trust from the depletion of its 
assets by decrees of termination or invalidity. U.C.A., 1953, § 75-7-402(1) and (3)(x) and (y); In re 
Hart's Estate, 51 Cal.2d 819, 337 P.2d 73 (1959); Van Gorden v. hunt, 234 Iowa 832, 13 N.W.2d 341 
(1944). A trustee who has done so successfully is entitled to have the corpus of the trust pay the reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in that defense. U.C.A., 1953, § 22-3-14(3)(a), § 75-7-402(3)(t); In re Hart's 
Estate, supra; Van Gorden v. hunt, supra; Nelson v. Mercantile Trust Co., Mo., 335 S.W.2d 167, 175 
(1960). As we said in Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 60, 404 P.2d 253 (1965), "a trustee is entitled to 
reimbursement for all expenses properly incurred in discharging the responsibilities of his trust." On 
remand, the court should therefore review the fees for legal services rendered to the trust in this matter and 
order the payment of reasonable fees from the trust corpus. 
Insofar as it holds that no trust was created in the parties' interest [**18] in the Big Bear Property, 
including their interest in installments not paid as of February 8, 1980, the decree of the district court is 
affirmed. In all other respects, the decree of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs awarded. 
WE CONCUR: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, I, Daniel Stewart, Justice, Don V. Tibbs, District Judge. 
CONCURBY: 
HOWE (In Part) 
DISSENTBY: 
HOWE (In Part) 
DISSENT: 
Howe, Justice: (Concurring and Dissenting) 
I concur that a trust was created as payments were received and that the court can modify the divorce 
decree to provide that no more payments should come into the trust. 
I dissent from the balance of the holding of the majority opinion. I believe it to be error to require that 
the trust continue as to the funds on hand just because all the beneficiaries did not consent to its 
termination, or because its purpose was not fulfilled. Under § 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, the district court has 
broad powers to change the funding of education for minor children from one source to another, or to 
discontinue funding completely. (Incidentally, both parents here offered to personally pay any expenses 
[**19] if their children desired further education). "Hie formal rules of trust law should not be applied to 
perpetuate the trust in view of the power of the court under § 30-3-5 to terminate it. 
I also dissent from the statement in the majority opinion that the balance on hand, S 5,914.28, has 
"vested" in the children. This amount belongs to the parents upon termination of the trust under the terms 
of their stipulation and the divorce decree entered in 1973. 
Don V Tibbs, District Judge, concurring. Richard C. Howe, Justice, concurring and dissenting by 
seperate opinion. 
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OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
In this case, the beneficiaries of a trust filed a bill of complaint against the trustee alleging that the trustee 
breached the trust agreement by executing a purchase option, agreeing to a deed of trust on the trust 
property securing funds lent to the lessee/purchaser for development of the property, and subsequently 
conveying the trust property. Because we conclude that the trustee had the authority to grant the purchase 
option and exercised that authority in a prudent manner, and that the deed of trust on the trust property 
provided a benefit to the trust, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
I. FACTS 
In March 1965, J. L. Hartman and Pauline H. Hartman created a trust for the benefit of their 
grandchildren, Lynn-Hall Ward, Robert Lee Walker, Jr., Margaret M. Martin, and Anne Walker Durrett 
(collectively "the Beneficiaries"). Virginia National [***2] Bank, NationsBank of Virginia, N.A.'s 
predecessor, was named as trustee (the Trustee). The trust property was a 29.26-acre tract of land located in 
Albemarle County. 
In May 1969, the Trustee leased the trust property to Wendell W. Wood. The lease contained an option 
to purchase the property for $ 750,000 at the expiration of the 25-year lease term. In December 1972, 
Wood assigned his interest in the lease to Rio Associates Limited Partnership (Rio). 
In conjunction with the assignment, the Trustee, Wood, and Rio executed an agreement (1972 agreement) 
in which the Trustee agreed to subordinate its fee interest in the trust property to first lien deeds of trust 
securing loans to Rio for development of the property. In return, Rio and Wood agreed to provide collateral 
security to insure [*432] performance of their obligations. The 1972 agreement further provided that when 
the first development loan was obtained, the lease would be amended by changing the option to purchase 
clause to a contract to purchase with the deed of conveyance naming Rio or its successors as the grantee. 
Between 1976 and 1994, Rio developed the trust property into Albemarle Square Shopping Center. 
Development of [***3] the property was financed by three loans totaling over S 5 million from The Life 
Insurance Company of Virginia (Life of Virginia). When the first loan for $ 4.1 million was obtained in 
June 1976, Rio exercised the purchase option in accordance with the 1972 agreement and agreed to close 
on the purchase of the trust property and pay the purchase price in December 1994 (contract of sale). Also 
in accordance with the 1972 agreement, the Trustee executed a subordination agreement, [**619] 
subordinating its fee interest to a deed of trust securing Life of Virginia's loan to Rio. Subsequent 
development loans were similarly secured. 
In 1987, the Beneficiaries told the Trust manager, David P. Masich, that they felt the $ 750,000 
purchase price stated in the lease was too low. Masich subsequently informed the Beneficiaries in October 
1988 that the sale of the property at the end of the lease was "a done deal." 
In the spring of 1994, the Beneficiaries retained E. Randall Rawlston, an attorney, to represent them. 
Rawlston told the Beneficiaries that they could file a suit to enjoin the sale of the property. One of the legal 
theories under consideration as a basis for such litigation was that the Trustee [***4] had breached its 
fiduciary duty when it entered into the purchase option. After conferring with another attorney, Rawlston 
told the Beneficiaries that additional work necessary to analyze whether the trust agreement authorized the 
Trustee to enter into a purchase option required a retainer of $ 2,000. The Beneficiaries decided not to 
pursue the matter because they did not want to incur the cost associated with the additional work. 
Ralston also advised the Beneficiaries that they could defer capital gains taxes of S 250,000 if the sale 
of the trust property was structured as a like-kind exchange. Because the Trustee's cooperation was 
necessary to accomplish this type of exchange, the Beneficiaries decided not to institute legal proceedings 
to enjoin the sale of the trust property and to proceed with the sale as a like-kind exchange. They did intend 
to pursue litigation, however, after the transaction was complete. 
[*433] The closing on the sale of the trust property was originally scheduled for December 1994 but 
was delayed to accommodate the like-kind exchange. In conjunction with the closing, Life of Virginia 
agreed to loan Rio an additional $ 6.9 million, part of which was to be used [***5] to pay off the prior 
loans. As with the previous loans, the Trustee subordinated its fee interest, and on December 24, 1994 the 
Trustee and Rio executed a deed of trust on the property to Life of Virginia to secure the loan (1994 Deed 
of Trust). On January 5, 1995, the Trustee executed a deed conveying the property to Rio (1995 deed or 
deed of conveyance). 
II. PROCEEDINGS 
In November 1995, the Beneficiaries filed a bill of complaint against the Trustee, Rio, and Life of 
Virginia, alleging that the Trustee breached its fiduciary duty and the terms of the trust agreement by 
granting a purchase option in the 1969 lease. The Beneficiaries asked the court to void the January 1995 
conveyance of the trust property from the Trustee to Rio, to void the December 1994 Deed of Trust granted 
by the Trustee and Rio to Life of Virginia, and to remove NationsBank as Trustee of the trust. 
The Trustee, Rio, and Life of Virginia responded, denying, inter alia, any breach of fiduciary duty and 
asserting that the 1969 lease and option to purchase, the 1976 contract of sale, the 1994 Deed of Trust, and 
the 1995 deed of conveyance were valid. They also raised the affirmative defenses of consent, ratification, 
[***6] and affirmation of the 1995 deed by the Beneficiaries and asserted that the Beneficiaries were 
estopped from challenging the 1995 deed of conveyance. The Trustee sought attorney's fees. Rio and Life 
of Virginia filed a cross-bill for sanctions and attorney's fees under Code § 8.01-271.1. 
A demurrer and motions for summary judgment were filed. Prior to trial, the trial court denied the 
demurrer, but granted the Beneficiaries partial summary judgment, holding that the grant of the purchase 
option in the 1969 lease was a breach of the trust agreement because it was not expressly authorized by the 
agreement and could not be inferred from or implied by the language of the agreement. The trial court also 
concluded that the breach was not excused under the exception set out in § 190, comment k, of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, because the trust property could have been advantageously sold to Wood 
in 1969 without the purchase option. The trial court held that none of the other issues could be decided on 
summary judgment and denied the remaining motions. 
[*434] [**620] Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order holding that the 
1994 Deed of Trust and the 1995 deed of [***7] conveyance were valid, that the Beneficiaries had 
ratified, acquiesced, and consented to the 1995 deed and could not challenge the deed as a breach of trust, 
and that the Beneficiaries were estopped from challenging the 1995 deed. The trial court declined to 
remove NationsBank as the Trustee, awarded the Trustee attorney's fees, and denied Rio and Life of 
Virginia's cross-bill for sanctions and attorney's fees under Code § 8.01-271.1. 
The Beneficiaries appealed, raising nine assignments of error. The Trustee, Rio, and Life of Virginia 
assigned cross-errors. Life of Virginia filed a separate appeal challenging the denial of attorney's fees 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1. We granted the parties' appeals on all assignments of error and cross-error 
and consolidated the two appeals for our consideration. A number of the assignments of error and cross-
error are dispositive of other issues. 
III. OPTION TO PURCHASE 
The trial court held that the trust agreement was not ambiguous, that it did not expressly authorize the 
Trustee to grant an option to purchase the trust property, and that the power to grant an option to purchase 
would not be implied because an option to purchase "involves [***8] much more discretion in the 
determination of a purchase price as in this case before the sale actually occurs under the option." The 
Trustee, Rio, and Life of Virginia assert that the trial court erred in holding that the power to grant an 
option to purchase should not be implied from the terms of the trust agreement. Alternatively, they argue 
that that trial court erred in holding that the trust agreement was unambiguous and denying the use of parol 
evidence to ascertain the intent of the grantor. 
In refusing to find that the language of the trust agreement was sufficient to include an option to 
purchase, the trial court relied on § 190, comment k, of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. Comment k, 
which the trial court described as stating "the common law rule," provides that "where by the terms of the 
trust a power of sale is conferred upon the trustee, it is ordinarily not proper for the trustee to give an 
option to purchase property." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 190 cmt. k (1959). The trial court's 
reliance on this comment was misplaced in this case. 
Section 190 of the Restatement is entitled "Power of Sale" and the discussion in comment k addresses a 
trustee's [***9] power to grant [*435] an option to purchase based solely upon the expressly granted 
power to sell the trust property. See also 3 William F. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 190.8, at 117-18 (4th ed. 
1988). In this case, however, the trust provision expressly granting the Trustee the power to sell the trust 
property is not the only provision of the trust agreement which is relevant in determining whether the 
Trustee has the power to grant a purchase option. 
In determining the scope of a trustee's powers, we seek to effectuate the intent of the grantor as 
expressed in the terms of the trust. Frazer v. Millington, 252 Va. 195, 199, 475 S.E.2d 811,814 (1996). 
This process requires consideration of the document as a whole. Id.; Dascher v. Dascher, 209 Va. 167, 169, 
163 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1968). Although not explicitly identified in the trust agreement, authority to take 
certain actions may be implied if the intention to create such power is evident, the power may be 
appropriate or necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust power, and the power is not forbidden by the 
trust agreement. Frazer, 252 Va. at 199, 475 S.E.2d at 814; Dascher, 209 Va. at 169, 163 S.E.2d at [***10] 
147; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 186 cmt. d. 
As recognized by the trial court, the trust agreement vested very broad powers in the Trustee, nl Of 
particular relevance here is not only the power granted in Article VI of the trust agreement to sell and lease, 
but also [**621] the authority granted in subsection (m) of that Article to 
nl Article VI of the trust agreement granted the Trustee the power to "dispose" of the trust 
property by "sale, exchange, or otherwise as and when it shall deem advisable;" to dispose of the 
property "upon such terms and conditions as it, in its absolute discretion, may deem advisable, at 
either public or private sale, either for cash or deferred payments or other consideration, as it may 
determine;" and to "lease any or all of the real estate ... upon such terms and conditions as said 
Trustee, in its sole judgment and discretion, may deem advisable." 
do all other acts and things not inconsistent with [the trust agreement which the Trustee] may deem 
necessary or desirable [*** 11] for the proper management [of the trust] in the same manner and to the 
same extent as an individual might or could do with respect to his own property. 
(emphasis added). Any reasonable interpretation of this language would include the ability of the Trustee 
to grant an option to purchase. Therefore, we must determine whether an option to [*436] purchase is 
appropriate or necessary to carry out the purpose of the trust. 
All parties agree that the purpose of this trust was to provide for the education of the grantors' 
grandchildren. The trust agreement states that it is the grantors' "primary concern in the creation of this 
trust to provide each beneficiary with an adequate and sufficient education." To effectuate this purpose, the 
trust agreement gave the Trustee broad discretion to manage the trust property in a way which would insure 
that sufficient assets would be available throughout the period needed to complete the grandchildren's 
education. n2 The Trustee's use of an option to purchase is in no way inconsistent with this purpose. 
Considering all the provisions of the trust agreement, we conclude that the language of the agreement is 
sufficient to imply that the Trustee [*** 12] was given the power to grant an option to purchase and that 
there is no basis to exclude use of the purchase option as a mechanism for achieving the purposes of the 
trust. 
n2 At the time the trust was created, one of the beneficiaries had not yet been born and the 
other three were between three and eight years of age. 
This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry. The authority to undertake a specific action and the 
proper exercise of that authority are distinct considerations. The decision to grant a purchase option is at 
the discretion of the Trustee and, even though a trustee's discretion is generally broadly construed, "his 
actions must be an exercise of good faith and reasonable judgment to promote the trust's purpose." 
NationsBank of Virginia, N.A. v. Grandy, 248 Va. 557, 561, 450 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1994). The trustee must 
"exercise the same degree of discretion in the management of the trust that a prudent man of discretion and 
intelligence would exercise in his own like affairs." Parsons [***13] v. Wysor, 180 Va. 84, 89, 21 S.E.2d 
753,755(1942). 
The trial court considered whether the Trustee's action in this case was prudent. Its analysis was made in 
the context of determining whether the Trustee's action qualified for the exception to the Restatement rule 
set out in § 190 comment k. The exception requires a finding that "the grant of the option was prudent." 
Regardless of the purpose for the prudence review, the analysis and the standard to be applied remain 
constant and, therefore, the trial court's conclusion in this regard is relevant to the inquiry before us. 
[*437] The trial court concluded that the Trustee's action in granting the purchase option was prudent. 
Based on the evidence before it on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that there is no 
evidence that the lease with the option to Mr. Wood may not have been prudent in light of the financial 
analysis advanced by the [Trustee]. The lease of the property with the option to purchase appears to have 
rendered greater financial benefit to the beneficiaries than an outright sale of the property to Wood would 
have rendered. 
The Beneficiaries disagree with this conclusion and argue [***14] that the actions of the Trustee in this 
regard were not prudent because the option contained no escalation in the purchase price over the course of 
the 25-year term, no evidence of how the sales price was reached in 1969, and no provision for evaluating 
the market value of the property at the time of sale at the end of the lease. While the Beneficiaries may be 
correct about the state of the record regarding these items, on appellate review, the factual findings 
regarding the Trustee's actions made by the trial court in this case can be set aside only if [**622] there is 
no evidence in the record to support them. Code § 8.01-680. 
The financial analysis referred to by the trial court was that of the Trustee's expert witness, who compared 
the value of the trust following the 1995 deed of conveyance with what the value of the trust would have 
been if the trust property had been sold outright in 1969. Using a $ 200,000 purchase price, the highest 
price Wood indicated he would have paid for the land in 1969, and taking into account the actual 
disbursements to the Beneficiaries and a reasonable return on the trust assets, the expert testified that the 
value of the trust in January 1995, if [***15] sold in 1969, would have been $ 85,000. In contrast, as 
calculated by the expert, the actual value of the trust following the 1995 deed of conveyance was $ 
905,830.46. This evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the lease with the option to purchase 
"rendered greater financial benefit to the Beneficiaries" than had the trust property been sold outright. 
Furthermore, the record reveals that in 1969 the trust property was swampy wetland, producing no income, 
and that only part of the property was zoned for business purposes. The 1969 assessed value of the 
property was $ 281,133 which included an adjustment to reflect the pre-1977 Albemarle County policy of 
assessing real estate [*438] at 15% of the fair market value. Even though Wood testified he wanted to 
purchase the property in 1969, the most he was willing to pay for it was $ 200,000. Finally, he testified that 
he would not have leased the property without an option to purchase it. These circumstances support the 
trial court's determination that the Trustee's actions in setting a sales price of $ 750,000 with an income 
stream in excess of $ 400,000 over the 25-year term of the lease were prudent. 
In summary, we conclude [***16] that under the terms of the trust agreement, the Trustee had the implied 
power to grant an option to purchase, that an option to purchase was not inconsistent with effectuating the 
purpose of the trust, and that the manner in which the Trustee exercised its authority to grant the purchase 
option was prudent. Because the Trustee did not breach the trust agreement in granting the option to 
purchase, the Beneficiaries' challenge to the 1995 deed based on the 1969 purchase option as amended in 
1976 must fail. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the trial court's decision that the 1995 
deed of conveyance was valid. 
IV. 1994 DEED OF TRUST 
In light of our holding that the exercise of the purchase option by the Trustee was valid and not a breach of 
the trust agreement, we need not address the Beneficiaries' assignments of error I, III, and that portion of II 
relating to the validity of the 1995 deed of conveyance based on the 1976 contract of sale; assignment of 
error IV relating to consent, ratification and affirmation of the 1995 deed of conveyance; assignment of 
error V relating to equitable estoppel; and the Trustee's remaining assignments of cross-error. [***n] We 
do, however, address the Beneficiaries' claim that the trial court erred in holding that the 1994 Deed of 
Trust on the trust property was valid. 
The Beneficiaries assert that the 1994 Deed of Trust executed by the Trustee in favor of Life of 
Virginia was invalid because the trust agreement only allowed the Trustee to place a deed of trust on the 
trust property for the benefit of the trust. The Beneficiaries contend that the loan secured by the 1994 Deed 
of Trust was for improvements to the property and those improvements did not and were not intended to 
benefit the trust. 
The record shows, however, that the 1994 Deed of Trust was part of the plan worked out to develop 
the property and secure financing for the development. Consequently, whether the 1994 Deed of Trust 
benefited the trust must be evaluated within the context of that plan. 
[*439] In 1969, the trust property was swampy wetland with "scrub trees" and a dilapidated, 
uninhabited house on it. Wood testified he tried to purchase the property outright, but the Trustee refused, 
requiring instead a lease which would provide an income stream over an extended period of time. Wood 
hoped to develop the property himself, even though [***18] the Trustee refused to include a provision in 
the lease that it would agree to subordinate [**623] its fee interest to secure development financing. 
After struggling for a few years with zoning and financing, Wood was approached by the principals of 
Rio with an offer to undertake the development of the trust property as a shopping center. The shopping 
center development was feasible for Rio only if the fee simple interest could be "put up" as part of the 
financing. Negotiations ensued, resulting in the assignment of the lease and option to purchase from Wood 
to Rio and the execution of the 1972 agreement. As a condition for subordinating its fee interest, the 
Trustee required removal of "all risks" from the Trustee's standpoint. Accordingly, the 1972 agreement 
provided a guarantee of the rental income and purchase price by requiring Rio and Wood to acquire a line 
of credit for the rent and a certificate of deposit for the purchase price. Additionally, the Trustee was 
relieved from all risk related to rezoning, sewer, road access, environmental concerns, in short, from all 
risks connected with "anything [Rio] might do with the property." 
The 1994 Deed of Trust was part of the financing [***19] and development plan initiated by the 1972 
agreement. In that agreement, the Trustee agreed to subordinate its fee interest in the future in exchange for 
a "virtually risk-free" position while insuring income to the trust over a period of years. Without that 
agreement, the trust had only Wood's personal obligation to pay over $ 13,000 a month for non-income 
producing property. This change in position benefited the trust. 
Based on the facts we have just recited, we conclude that the 1994 Deed of Trust was executed in 
performance of the 1972 agreement. As such, it was a contributing factor to the overall benefit which the 
1972 agreement brought to the trust. Therefore, the trial court did not err in holding that the 1994 Deed of 
Trust was valid. 
V. REMOVAL OF THE TRUSTEE 
In their assignments of error VI and VII, the Beneficiaries argue that the trial court erred in not 
removing NationsBank as Trustee [*440] because the record "is replete" with evidence that the Trustee 
acted dishonestly, negligently, and engaged in misconduct in its management of the trust and in its dealings 
with the Beneficiaries. As support for this argument, the Beneficiaries contend that the record shows, 
contrary [***20] to the trial court's finding, that the 1969 purchase option damaged the trust and did not 
enhance or benefit the trust. 
The Beneficiaries assert that damage to the trust as a result of the 1969 option was evident because, at 
the time of the sale in 1995, the assessed value of the trust property without the improvements was 
approximately $ 4 million. Therefore, according to the Beneficiaries, granting the purchase option in 1969 
caused the trust to suffer a substantial loss because the sales price was only $ 750,000. The Beneficiaries 
thus conclude that the record cannot support a holding that the purchase option benefited the trust. 
In Part III of this opinion, we discussed the evidence which supported the trial court's pre-trial 
determination that the Trustee acted prudently when it granted the purchase option. That evidence likewise 
provides an adequate basis for the trial court's post-trial determination that the trust was not harmed by the 
purchase option and that the option enhanced the trust. n3 
n3 The evidence upon which the trial court based its pre-trial finding was presented to the court 
by affidavit and exhibits prepared by the Trustee's expert. The same evidence was subsequently 
presented ore tenus during trial through the expert's testimony. 
r***9 J! 
As additional grounds for removal, the Beneficiaries recite here, as they did in the trial court, various 
actions of the Trustee in relation to the execution of the 1969 lease and option to purchase, 1976 contract of 
sale, deeds of trust, the 1995 deed of conveyance, and information relayed to the Beneficiaries regarding 
the status of the purchase option. 
Removal of a trustee is within the discretion of the trial court. The trial court must determine whether 
it is in the best interest of the trust for the trustee to be removed. Clark v. Grasty, 210 Va. 33, 37, 168 
S.E.2d 268, 271 (1969). The trial court reviewed all of the Trustee's actions and their impact on the trust, 
but declined the Beneficiaries' request to remove Nations [**624] Bank as trustee. Based on our review, 
we cannot conclude that this decision was an abuse of discretion. 
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The Beneficiaries assign error to the trial court's determination that the Trustee was entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees to be [*441] charged against the trust. The Beneficiaries challenge both the basis for and the 
amount of the award. 
Citing Willson v. Whitehead, 181 Va. 960, 965, 27 S.E.2d 213, 216 (1943), [***22] the Beneficiaries 
assert that a trustee is entitled to attorney's fees only if the litigation was initiated "without his own fault." 
Here, the Beneficiaries assert, the basis for the litigation was the Trustee's action in granting the purchase 
option, and therefore the Trustee is not entitled to attorney's fees. The Beneficiaries misread Willson. 
As applied by the Beneficiaries, Willson would bar an award of attorney's fees in every case naming the 
trustee as a respondent because virtually every case challenging the administration of a trust is based on 
some action taken by the trustee. The correct application of Willson is that a trustee, who has the duty to 
defend the actions challenged as detrimental to the trust, is entitled to attorney's fees when he has been 
called on to defend himself against a charge of dereliction of duty and there is neither substantial evidence 
that the trustee wasted or mismanaged the trust nor evidence of any conduct warranting the removal of the 
trustee. Id. at 967, 27 S.E.2d at 217. 
In this case, the Trustee was required to defend against claims of dereliction of duty in granting the option 
to purchase the trust property. As [***23] we have held, this action along with the other actions of the 
Trustee under attack in this case did not damage the trust but, in fact, benefited the trust. 
The relevant legal principle we apply here is that where a trustee has a good faith basis for defending a suit 
challenging his actions as trustee, attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of the suit should be 
charged against the trust. Cooper v. Brodie, 253 Va. 38, 44, 480 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1997). In this case, the 
Trustee had a good faith basis for defending this law suit and there was no evidence of mismanagement, 
waste, or any other actions warranting removal of the Trustee. 
The Beneficiaries also assert that not all the fees awarded were related to the defense of the trust, and that 
the amount of the fees was unreasonable. The claims made by the Beneficiaries and the relief sought 
related to documents and events which involved all of the respondents; therefore, the Trustee's attorneys 
were required to consult with and review pleadings and other matters generated by Rio and Life of 
Virginia. The Beneficiaries produced no evidence to support their charge that the consultations were 
unnecessary [***24] or that the amount of the fees was unreasonable. In contrast, the Trustee [*442] 
introduced expert witness testimony to establish the reasonableness of the time spent on the case and the 
amount of the fees. Furthermore, the trial court reduced the Trustee's request for attorney's fees by $ 
34,000. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgment awarding attorney's fees to the Trustee. 
VII. CODE § 8.01-271.1 
Finally, we reject claims made by Life of Virginia and Rio that the trial court erred in refusing to 
impose sanctions against the Beneficiaries and their counsel pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1. The trial court 
concluded that this litigation was not frivolous. A number of issues in this case, even though decided 
against the Beneficiaries, were subject to legitimate debate. The relief requested by the Beneficiaries 
included vacating the 1995 deed of conveyance and the 1994 Deed of Trust. Neither of these remedies 
could have been granted without joining Rio and Life of Virginia as parties. 
In reviewing a trial court's award of sanctions pursuant to § 8.01-271.1, we apply an abuse of 
discretion standard. Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 287, 402 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991). [***25] Based on 
our review in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
imposition of sanctions and attorney's fees. 
[**625] VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Beneficiaries' final assignment of error, that the trial court erred in adopting the respondents' 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, merits little attention. We have reviewed and affirmed all the 
factual findings and legal determinations of the trial court necessary for the disposition of these appeals. 
There is no need to review matters which have no bearing on the issues before us. 
In summary, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Record No. 972622- Affirmed. 
Record No. 972640-Affirmed. 
1 of 3 DOCUMENTS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2 001 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** (2001 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION) *** 
TITLE 22. FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 
CHAPTER 3. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT 
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Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-2 (2001) 
§ 22-3-2. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Income beneficiary" means the person to whom income is 
presently payable or for whom it is accumulated for distribution as 
income. 
(2) "Inventory value" means the cost of property purchased by the 
trustee and the market value of other property at the time it became 
subject to the trust, but in the case of a testamentary trust the 
trustee may use any value finally determined for the purposes of an 
estate or inheritance tax. 
(3) "Remainderman" means the person entitled to principal, 
including income which has been accumulated and added to principal. 
(4) "Trustee" means an original trustee and any successor or added 
trustee. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 22-3-2, enacted by L. 1979, ch. 89, § 2. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-4 (2001) 
§ 22-3-4. Income -- Principal -- Charges 
(1) Income is the return in money or property derived from the use of 
principal, including return received as: 
(a) rent of real or personal property, including sums received for 
cancellation or renewal of a lease; 
(b) interest on money lent, including sums received as 
consideration for the privilege of prepayment of principal except as 
provided in Section 22-3-8 on bond premium and bond discount; 
(c) income earned during administration of a decedent's estate as 
provided in Section 22-3-6; 
(d) corporate distributions as provided in Section 22-3-7; 
(e) accrued increment on bonds or other obligations issued at 
discount as provided in Section 22-3-8; 
(f) receipts from business and farming operations as provided in 
Section 22-3-9; 
(g) receipts from disposition of natural resources as provided in 
Sections 22-3-10 and 22-3-11; 
(h) receipts from other principal subject to depletion as provided 
in Section 22-3-12; 
(i) receipts from disposition of underproductive property as 
provided in Section 22-3-13. 
(2) Principal is the property which has been set aside by the owner 
or the person legally empowered so that it is held in trust eventually 
to be delivered to a remainderman while the return or use of the 
principal is in the meantime taken or received by or held for 
accumulation for an income beneficiary. 
Principal includes: 
(a) consideration received by the trustee on the sale or other 
transfer of principal or on repayment of a loan or as a refund or 
replacement or change in the form of principal; 
(b) proceeds of property taken on eminent domain proceedings; 
(c) proceeds of insurance upon property forming part of the 
principal except proceeds of insurance upon a separate interest of an 
income beneficiary; 
(d) stock dividends, receipts on liquidation of a corporation, and 
other corporate distributions as provided in Section 22-3-7; 
(e) receipts from the disposition of corporate securities as 
provided in Section 22-3-8; 
(f) royalties and other receipts from disposition of natural 
resources as provided in Sections 22-3-10 and 22-3-11; 
(g) receipts from other principal subject to depletion as provided 
in Section 22-3-12; 
(h) any profit resulting from any change in the form of principal 
except as provided in Section 22-3-13 on underproductive property; 
(i) receipts from disposition of underproductive property as 
provided in Section 22-3-13; 
(j) any allowances for depreciation established under Section 22-
3-9 and Subsection 22-3-14(1)(b). 
(3) After determining income and principal in accordance with the 
terms of the trust instrument or of this chapter, the trustee shall 
charge to income or principal expenses and other charges as provided in 
Section 22-3-14. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 22-3-4, enacted by L. 1979, ch. 89, § 2. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-14 (2001) 
§ 22-3-14. Charges against income and principal 
(1) The following charges shall be made against income: 
(a) ordinary expenses incurred in connection with the 
administration, management, or preservation of the trust property, 
including regularly recurring taxes assessed against any portion of the 
principal, water rates, premiums on insurance taken upon the interests 
of the income beneficiary, remainderman, or trustee, interest paid by 
the trustee, and ordinary repairs; 
(b) a reasonable allowance for depreciation or property subject to 
depreciation under generally accepted accounting principles, but no 
allowance shall be made for depreciation of that portion of any real 
property used by a beneficiary as a residence or for depreciation of any 
property held by the trustee on the effective date of this chapter for 
which the trustee is not then making an allowance for depreciation; 
(c) one-half of court costs, attorney's fees, and other fees on 
periodic judicial accounting, unless the court directs otherwise; 
(d) court costs, attorney's fees, and other fees on other 
accountings or judicial proceedings if the matter primarily concerns the 
income interest, unless the court directs otherwise; 
(e) one-half of the trustee's regular compensation, whether based 
on a percentage of principal or income, and all expenses reasonably 
incurred for current management of principal and application of income; 
(f) any tax levied upon receipts defined as income under this 
chapter or the trust instrument and payable by the trustee. 
(2) If charges against income are of unusual amount, the trustee may 
by means of reserves or other reasonable means charge them over a 
reasonable period of time and withhold from distribution sufficient sums 
to regularize distributions. 
(3) The following charges shall be made against principal: 
(a) trustee's compensation not chargeable to income under 
Subsections (1)(d) and (1)(e), special compensation of trustees, 
expenses reasonably incurred in connection with principal, court costs 
and attorney's fees primarily concerning matters of principal, and 
trustee's compensation computed on principal as an acceptance, 
distribution, or termination fee; 
(b) charges not provided for in Subsection (1), including the cost 
of investing and reinvesting principal, the payments on principal of an 
indebtedness (including a mortgage amortized by periodic payments of 
principal), expenses for preparation of property for rental or sale, 
and, unless the court directs otherwise, expenses incurred in 
maintaining or defending any action to construe the trust or proteci: it 
or the property or assure the title of any trust property; 
(c) extraordinary repairs or expenses incurred in making a capital 
improvement to principal, including special assessments, but, a trustee 
may establish an allowance for depreciation out of income to the extent 
permitted by Subsection (1)(b) and by Section 22-3-9; 
(d) any tax levied upon profit, gain, or other receipts allocated 
to principal notwithstanding denomination of the tax as an income tax by 
the taxing authority; 
(e) if an estate or inheritance tax is levied in respect of a 
trust in which both an income beneficiary and a remainderman have an 
interest, any amount apportioned to the trust, including interest and 
penalties, even though the income beneficiary also has rights in the 
principal. 
(4) Regularly recurring charges payable from income shall be 
apportioned to the same extent and in the same manner that income is 
apportioned under Section 22-3-5. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-15 (2001) 
§ 22-3-15. Application of chapter 
Except as specifically provided in the trust instrument or the will 
or in this chapter, this chapter shall apply to any receipt or expense 
received or incurred after the effective date of this chapter by any 
trust or decedent's estate whether established before or after the 
effective date of this chapter and whether the asset involved was 
acquired by the trustee before or after the effective date of this 
chapter. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 22-3-15, enacted by L. 1979, ch. 89, § 2. 
NOTES: 
COMPILER'S NOTES. --Laws 1979, ch. 89, which enacted this chapter, 
became effective January 1, 1980. 
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TITLE 75. UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS, DEFINITIONS, AND PROBATE JURISDICTION OF 
COURT 
PART 2. DEFINITIONS 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201 (2001) 
§ 75-1-201. General definitions 
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent 
chapters that are applicable to specific chapters, parts, or sections, 
and unless the context otherwise requires, in this code: 
(1) "Agent" includes an attorney-in-fact under a durable or 
nondurable power of attorney, an individual authorized to make decisions 
concerning another's health care, and an individual authorized to make 
decisions for another under a natural death act. 
(2) "Application" means a written request to the registrar for an 
order of informal probate or appointment under Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 
3, Informal Probate and Appointment Proceedings. 
(3) "Beneficiary," as it relates to trust beneficiaries, includes 
a person who has any present or future interest, vested or contingent, 
and also includes the owner of an interest by assignment or other 
transfer; as it relates to a charitable trust, includes any person 
entitled to enforce the trust; as it relates to a "beneficiary of a 
beneficiary designation," refers to a beneficiary of an insurance or 
annuity policy, of an account with POD designation, of a security 
registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of a pension, profit-sharing, 
retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate transfer at 
death; and, as it relates to a "beneficiary designated in a governing 
instrument," includes a grantee of a deed, a devisee, a trust 
beneficiary, a beneficiary of a beneficiary designation, a donee, 
appointee, or taker in default of a power of appointment, and a person 
in whose favor a power of attorney or a power held in any individual, 
fiduciary, or representative capacity is exercised. 
(4) "Beneficiary designation" refers to a governing instrument 
naming a beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy, of an account 
with POD designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form 
(TOD), or of a pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit 
plan, or other nonprobate transfer at death. 
(5) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child 
under this code by intestate succession from the parent whose 
relationship is involved and excludes any person who is only a 
stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant. 
(6) "Claims," in respect to estates of decedents and protected 
persons, includes liabilities of the decedent or protected person, 
whether arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and liabilities of 
the estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent or after 
the appointment of a conservator, including funeral expenses and 
expenses of administration. "Claims" does not include estate or 
inheritance taxes, or demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent 
or protected person to specific assets alleged to be included in the 
estate. 
(7) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by a court to 
manage the estate of a protected person. 
(8) "Court" means any of the courts of record in this state having 
jurisdiction in matters relating to the affairs of decedents. 
(9) "Descendant" of an individual means all of his descendants of 
all generations, with the relationship of parent and child at each 
generation being determined by the definition of child and parent 
contained in this title. 
(10) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary 
disposition of real or personal property and, when used as a verb, means 
to dispose of real or personal property by will. 
(11) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to receive a 
devise. For the purposes of Title 75, Chapter 3, Probate of Wills and 
Administration, in the case of a devise to an existing trust or trustee, 
or to a trustee in trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the 
devisee, and the beneficiaries are not devisees. 
(12) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as described 
by Section 75-5-401. 
(13) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of a 
decedent from his personal representative other than as a creditor or 
purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the extent of 
distributed assets or increment thereto remaining in his hands. A 
beneficiary of a testamentary trust to whom the trustee has distributed 
property received from a personal representative is a distributee of the 
personal representative. For purposes of this provision, "testamentary 
trustee" includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred by will, to 
the extent of the devised assets. 
(14) "Estate" includes the property of the decedent, trust, or 
other person whose affairs are subject to this title as originally 
constituted and as it exists from time to time during administration. 
(15) "Exempt property" means that property of a decedent's estate 
which is described in Section 75-2-403. 
(16) "Fiduciary" includes a personal representative, guardian, 
conservator, and trustee. 
(17) "Foreign personal representative" means a personal 
representative of another jurisdiction. 
(18) "Formal proceedings" means proceedings conducted before a 
judge with notice to interested persons. 
(19) "Governing instrument" means a deed, will, trust, insurance 
or annuity policy, account with POD designation, security registered in 
beneficiary form (TOD), pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar 
benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a power of appointment 
or a power of attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or nominative 
instrument of any similar type. 
(20) "Guardian" means a person who has qualified as a guardian of 
a minor or incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary or court 
appointment, but excludes one who is merely a guardian ad litem. 
(21) "Heirs," except as controlled by Section 75-2-711, means 
persons, including the surviving spouse and state, who are entitled 
under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a 
decedent. 
(22) "Incapacitated person" means any person who is impaired by 
reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or 
disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause, 
except minority, to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or 
capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions. 
(23) "Informal proceedings" mean those conducted without notice to 
interested persons by an officer of the court acting as a registrar for 
probate of a will or appointment of a personal representative. 
(24) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, 
spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property 
right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, 
ward, or protected person. It also includes persons having priority for 
appointment as personal representative and other fiduciaries 
representing interested persons. The meaning as it relates to particular 
persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to 
the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding. 
(25) "Issue" of a person means descendant as defined in Subsection 
(9) . 
(26) "Joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and "community 
property with the right of survivorship" includes coowners of property 
held under circumstances that entitle one or more to the whole of the 
property on the death of the other or others, but excludes forms of 
coownership registration in which the underlying ownership of each party 
is in proportion to that party's contribution. 
(27) "Lease" includes an oil, gas, or other mineral lease. 
(28) "Letters" includes letters testamentary, letters of 
guardianship, letters of administration, and letters of conservatorship. 
(29) "Minor" means a person who is under 18 years of age. 
(3 0) "Mortgage" means any conveyance, agreement, or arrangement in 
which property is used as security. 
(31) "Nonresident decedent" means a decedent who was domiciled in 
another jurisdiction at the time of his death. 
(32) "Organization" includes a corporation, limited liability 
company, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, joint venture, 
association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or any 
other legal or commercial entity. 
(33) "Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or who would 
be entitled to take if the child died without a will, as a parent under 
this code by intestate succession from the child whose relationship is 
in question and excludes any person who is only a stepparent, foster 
parent, or grandparent. 
(34) "Payor" means a trustee, insurer, business entity, employer, 
government, governmental agency or subdivision, or any other person 
authorized or obligated by law or a governing instrument to make 
payments. 
(35) "Person" means an individual or an organization. 
(36) (a) "Personal representative" includes executor, 
administrator, successor personal representative, special administrator, 
and persons who perform substantially the same function under the law 
governing their status. 
(b) "General personal representative" excludes special 
administrator. 
(37) "Petition" means a written request to the court for an order 
after notice. 
(38) "Proceeding" includes action at law and suit in equity. 
(3 9) "Property" includes both real and personal property or any 
interest therein and means anything that may be the subject of 
ownership. 
(40) "Protected person" means a person for whom a conservator has 
been appointed. A "minor protected person" means a minor for whom a 
conservator has been appointed because of minority. 
(41) "Protective proceeding" means a proceeding described in 
Section 75-5-401. 
(42) "Registrar" refers to the official of the court designated to 
perform the functions of registrar as provided in Section 75-1-307. 
(43) "Security" includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest, or 
participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in payments 
out of production under such a title or lease, collateral trust 
certificate, transferable share, voting trust certificate, and, in 
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, or any 
certificate of interest or participation, any temporary or interim 
certificate, receipt, or certificate of deposit for, or any warrant or 
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
(44) "Settlement," in reference to a decedent's estate, includes 
the full process of administration, distribution, and closing. 
(45) "Special administrator" means a personal representative as 
described in Sections 75-3-614 through 75-3-618. 
(46) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or insular 
possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
(47) "Successor personal representative" means a personal 
representative, other than a special administrator, who is appointed to 
succeed a previously appointed personal representative. 
(48) "Successors" means persons, other than creditors, who are 
entitled to property of a decedent under the decedent's will or this 
title. 
(49) "Supervised administration" refers to the proceedings 
described in Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 5, Supervised Administration. 
(50) "Survive," except for purposes of Part 3 of Article VI, 
Uniform TOD Security Registration Act, means that an individual has 
neither predeceased an event, including the death of another individual, 
nor is considered to have predeceased an event under Section 75-2-104 or 
75-2-702. The term includes its derivatives, such as "survives," 
"survived," "survivor," and "surviving." 
(51) "Testacy proceeding" means a proceeding to establish a will 
or determine intestacy. 
(52) "Testator" includes an individual of either sex. 
(53) "Trust" includes any express trust, private or charitable, 
with additions thereto, wherever and however created. The term also 
includes a trust created or determined by judgment or decree under which 
the trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust. The 
term excludes other constructive trusts, and it excludes resulting 
trusts, conservatorships, personal representatives, trust accounts as 
defined in Title 75, Chapter 6, Nonprobate Transfers, custodial 
arrangements pursuant to any Uniform Transfers To Minors Act, business 
trusts providing for certificates to be issued to beneficiaries, common 
trust funds, voting trusts, preneed funeral plans under Title 58, 
Chapter 58, Preneed Funeral Arrangement Act, security arrangements, 
liquidation trusts, and trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts, 
dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee 
benefits of any kind, and any arrangement under which a person is 
nominee or escrowee for another. 
(54) "Trustee" includes an original, additional, or successor 
trustee, whether or not appointed or confirmed by the court. 
(55) "Ward" means a person for whom a guardian has been appointed. 
A "minor ward" is a minor for whom a guardian has been appointed solely 
because of minority. 
(56) "Will" includes codicil and any testamentary instrument which 
merely appoints an executor, revokes or revises another will, nominates 
a guardian, or expressly excludes or limits the right of an individual 
or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate 
succession. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-1-201, enacted by L. 1998, ch. 39, § 9; 1999, ch. 
142, § 1. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-403 (2001) 
§ 75-2-403. Exempt property 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the decedent's surviving 
spouse is entitled from the estate to a value, not exceeding $10,000 in 
excess of any security interests therein, in household furniture, 
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. If there is 
no surviving spouse, the decedent's children are entitled jointly to the 
same value. If encumbered chattels are selected and the value in excess 
of security interests, plus that of other exempt property, is less than 
$10,000, or if there is not $10,000 worth of exempt property in the 
estate, the spouse or children are entitled to other assets of the 
estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up the $10,000 value. 
Rights to exempt property and assets needed to make up a deficiency of 
exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate, but 
the right to any assets to make up a deficiency of exempt property 
abates as necessary to permit earlier payment of homestead allowance and 
family allowance. Unless otherwise provided by the will or governing 
instrument, the exempt property allowance is chargeable against any 
benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse, if any, or if there is 
no surviving spouse, to the decedent's children, by the will of the 
decedent, by intestate succession, by way of elective share, and by way 
of nonprobate transfers as defined in Sections 75-2-205 and 75-2-206. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-403, enacted by L. 1998, ch. 39, § 41. 
1 of 1 DOCUMENT 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2 001 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** (2001 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION) *** 
TITLE 75. UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
CHAPTER 2. INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS 
PART 4. EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION • 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-405 (2001) 
§ 75-2-405. Source, determination, and documentation 
(1) If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically 
devised may not be used to satisfy rights to homestead allowance or 
exempt property. Subject to this restriction, the surviving spouse, 
guardians of minor children, or children who are adults may select 
property of the estate as homestead allowance and exempt property. The 
personal representative may make those selections if the surviving 
spouse, the children, or the guardians of the minor children are unable 
or fail to do so within a reasonable time or there is no guardian of a 
minor child. The personal representative may execute an instrument or 
deed of distribution to establish the ownership of property taken as 
homestead allowance or exempt property. The personal representative may 
determine the family allowance in a lump sum not exceeding $18,000 or 
periodic installments not exceeding $1,500 per month for one year, and 
may disburse funds of the estate in payment of the family allowance and 
any part of the homestead allowance payable in cash. The personal 
representative or an interested person aggrieved by any selection, 
determination, payment, proposed payment, or failure to act under this 
section may petition the court for appropriate relief, which may include 
a family allowance other than that which the personal representative 
determined or could have determined. 
(2) If the right to an elective share is exercised on behalf of a 
surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person, the personal 
representative may add any unexpended portions payable under the 
homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance to the trust 
established under Subsection 75-2-212(2). 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-405, enacted by L. 1998, ch. 39, § 43. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-507 (2001) 
§ 75-2-507. Revocation by writing or by act 
(1) A will or any part thereof is revoked: 
(a) by executing a subsequent will that revokes the previous will 
or part expressly or by inconsistency; or 
(b) by performing a revocatory act on the will, if the testator 
performed the act with the intent and for the purpose of revoking the 
will or part or if another individual performed the act in the 
testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction. For 
purposes of this subsection, "revocatory act on the will" includes 
burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will or any 
part of it. A burning, tearing, or canceling is a "revocatory act on the 
will," whether or not the burn, tear, or cancellation touched any of the 
words on the will. 
(2) If a subsequent will does not expressly revoke a previous will, 
the execution of the subsequent will wholly revokes the previous will by 
inconsistency if the testator intended the subsequent will to replace 
rather than supplement the previous will. 
(3) The testator is presumed to have intended a subsequent will to 
replace rather than supplement a previous will if the subsequent will 
makes a complete disposition of the testator's estate. If this 
presumption arises and is not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, 
the previous will is revoked; only the subsequent will is operative on 
the testator's death. 
(4) The testator is presumed to have intended a subsequent will to 
supplement rather than replace a previous will if the subsequent will 
does not make a complete disposition of the testator's estate. If this 
presumption arises and is not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, 
the subsequent will revokes the previous will only to the extent the 
subsequent will is inconsistent with the previous will; each will is 
fully operative on the testator's death to the extent they are not 
inconsistent. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-507, enacted by L. 1998, ch. 39, § 50. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-609 (2001) 
§ 75-2-609. Ademption by satisfaction 
(1) Property a testator gave in his lifetime to a person is treated 
as a satisfaction of a devise in whole or in part, only if: 
(a) the will provides for deduction of the gift; 
(b) the testator declared in a contemporaneous writing that the 
gift is in satisfaction of the devise or that its value is to be 
deducted from the value of the devise; or 
(c) the devisee acknowledged in writing that the gift is in 
satisfaction of the devise or that its value is to be deducted from the 
value of the devise. 
(2) For purposes of partial satisfaction, property given during 
lifetime is valued as of the time the devisee came into possession or 
enjoyment of the property or at the testator's death, whichever occurs 
first. 
(3) If the devisee fails to survive the testator, the gift is treated 
as a full or partial satisfaction of the devise, as appropriate, in 
applying Sections 75-2-603 and 75-2-604, unless the testator's 
contemporaneous writing provides otherwise. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-609, enacted by L. 1998, ch. 39, § 67. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 (2001) 
§ 75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the 
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision 
of it, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated 
or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not 
barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the 
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the 
decedent, unless presented within the earlier of the following dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for 
creditors who are given actual notice, and where notice is published, 
within the time provided in Subsection 75-3-801(1) for all claims barred 
by publication. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the 
decedent's domicile are also barred in this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after 
the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its 
subdivisions, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, 
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal 
basis are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and 
the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative 
within three months after performance by the personal representative is 
due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it 
arises, or the time specified in Subsection (1) (a) . 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien 
upon property of the estate; 
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding 
to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative 
for which he is protected by liability insurance; or 
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and 
reimbursement for expenses advanced by the personal representative or by 
the attorney or accountant for the personal representative of the 
estate. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-3-803, enacted by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4; 1992, ch. 
179, § 7. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-814 (2001) 
§ 75-3-814. Encumbered assets 
If any assets of the estate are encumbered by mortgage, pledge, lien, 
or other security interest, the personal representative may pay the 
encumbrance or any part thereof, renew or extend any obligation secured 
by the encumbrance, or convey or transfer the assets to the creditor in 
satisfaction of his lien, in whole or in part, whether or not the holder 
of the encumbrance has presented a claim, if it appears to be for the 
best interest of the estate. Payment of an encumbrance does not increase 
the share of the distributee entitled to the encumbered assets unless 
the distributee is entitled to exoneration. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-3-814, enacted by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4; L. 1977, 
ch. 194, § 39. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402 (2001) 
§ 75-7-402. Powers of trustees conferred by this part 
(1) From time of creation of the trust until final distribution of 
the assets of the trust, a trustee has the power to perform, without 
court authorization, every act which a prudent man would perform for the 
purposes of the trust, including the powers specified in Subsection (3). 
(2) In the exercise of his powers, including the powers granted by 
this part, a trustee has a duty to act with due regard to his obligation 
as a fiduciary, according to the standard set forth in Section 75-7-302. 
(3) A trustee has the power, subject to Subsections (1) and (2) to: 
(a) collect, hold, and retain trust assets received from a trustor 
until, in the judgment of the trustee, disposition of the assets should 
be made. The assets may be retained even though they include an asset in 
which the trustee is personally interested; 
(b) receive additions to the assets of the trust; 
(c) continue or participate in the operation of any business or 
other enterprise and effect incorporation, dissolution, or other change 
in the form of the organization of the business or enterprise; 
(d) acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the 
trustee, in any trust capacity, holds an undivided interest; 
(e) invest and reinvest trust assets in bonds, notes, stocks of 
corporations regardless of class, real estate or any interest in real 
estate, interests in trusts or in any other property, or individual 
interests in property wherever it is located; 
(f) invest and reinvest trust assets in securities of an open-end 
or closed-end type management investment company or investment trust 
which is registered under the Investment Company Act of 194 0, as 
amended, including securities of any investment company or investment 
trust that is affiliated with or a subsidiary of the trustee, or to 
which the trustee or its affiliate or subsidiary provides a service such 
as that of an investment advisor, custodian, transfer agent, registrar, 
sponsor, distributor, manager, or otherwise, for which it receives 
reasonable remuneration for such service; 
(g) deposit or invest trust funds in a bank, including a bank 
operated by the trustee; 
(h) (i) acquire or dispose of an asset, for cash or on credit, at 
public or private sale; 
(ii) manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the 
character of, or abandon a trust asset or any interest therein; and 
(iii) encumber, mortgage, or pledge a trust asset for a term 
within or extending beyond the term of the trust, in connection with the 
exercise of any power vested in the trustee; 
(i) make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in 
buildings or other structures, or demolish any improvements, raze 
existing or erect new party walls or buildings; 
(j) (i) subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use; 
(ii) make or obtain the vacation of plats and adjust 
boundaries; 
(iii) adjust differences in valuation on exchange or partition 
by giving or receiving consideration; or 
(iv) dedicate easements to public use without consideration; 
(k) enter, for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee with 
or without an option to purchase or renew for a term within or extending 
beyond the term of the trust; 
(1) enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal 
of minerals or other natural resources or enter into a pooling or 
unitization agreement; 
(m) grant an option involving disposition of a trust asset, or 
take an option for the acquisition of any asset; 
(n) vote a security, in person or by general or limited proxy; 
(o) pay calls, assessments, and any other sums chargeable or 
accruing against or on account of securities; 
(p) sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights, 
consent, directly or through a committee or other agent, to the 
reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a 
corporation or other business enterprise; 
(q) hold property in the name of a nominee or in other form 
without disclosure of the trust so that title to the property may pass 
by delivery, but the trustee is liable for any act of the nominee in 
connection with the property so held; 
(r) insure the assets of the trust against damage or loss and the 
trustee against liability with respect to third persons; 
(s) (i) borrow money to be repaid from trust assets or otherwise; 
(ii) advance money to be repaid from trust assets or otherwise; 
or 
(iii) advance money for the protection of the trust, and for 
all expenses, losses, and liabilities sustained in the administration of 
the trust or because of the holding or ownership of any trust assets, 
for which advances with any interest the trustee has a lien on the trust 
assets as against the beneficiary; 
(t) (i) pay or contest any claim; 
(ii) settle a claim by or against the trust by compromise, 
arbitration, or otherwise; and 
(iii) release, in whole or in part, any claim belonging to the 
trust to the extent that the claim is uncollectible; 
(u) pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee, and other 
expenses incurred in the collection, care, administration, and 
protection of the trust; 
(v) allocate items of income or expense to either trust income or 
principal, as provided by law, including creation of reserves out of 
income for depreciation, obsolescence, amortization, or for depletion in 
mineral or timber properties; 
(w) notwithstanding the provisions of Section 75-5-102, pay any 
sum distributable to a beneficiary under legal disability, without 
liability to the trustee, by paying the sum to the beneficiary or by 
paying the sum for the use of the beneficiary either to a legal 
representative appointed by the court, or if none, to a relative; 
(x) effect distribution of property and money in divided or 
undivided interests and adjust resulting differences in valuation; 
(y) (i) employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment 
advisers, or agents, even if they are associated with the trustee, to 
advise or assist the trustee in the performance of his administrative 
duties; 
(ii) act without independent investigation upon their 
recommendations; and 
(iii) instead of acting personally, employ one or more agents 
to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary; 
(z) prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings for the 
protection of trust assets and of the trustee in the performance of his 
duties; and 
(aa) execute and deliver all instruments which will accomplish or 
facilitate the exercise of the powers vested in the trustee. 
(4) If a governing instrument or order requires or authorizes 
investment in United States government obligations, a trustee may invest 
in those obligations, either directly or in the form of securities or 
other interests, in any open-end or closed-end management type 
investment company or investment trust registered under the provisions 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. Sections 80a-l through 
80a-64 if: 
(a) the portfolio of the investment company or investment trust is 
limited to United States government obligations, and repurchase 
agreements are fully collateralized by United States government 
obligations; and 
(b) the investment company or investment trust takes delivery of 
the collateral for any repurchase agreement either directly or through 
an authorized custodian. 
(5) The trustee may exercise the powers set forth in this section and 
in the trust either in the name of the trust or in the name of the 
trustee as trustee, specifically including the right to take title to 
encumber or convey assets, including real property, in the name of the 
trust. This subsection applies to a trustee's exercise of trust powers 
both prior to and after the effective date of this subsection. After the 
effective date of this subsection, for recording purposes, the name and 
address of at least one trustee must be included on all recorded 
documents affecting real property to which the trust is a party in 
interest. 
(6) (a) If the fair market value of a trust is less than $25,000, the 
trustee may terminate the trust by the following procedure: 
(i) the trustee shall determine a plan of distribution that 
agrees, as nearly as possible, with the trust's dispositive plan; 
(ii) the trustee shall give notice to all interested persons of 
its intent to distribute the assets in accordance with the plan unless 
an interested person objects within 2 0 days after the date of the 
notice; 
(iii) if no objection is received within 20 days after the date 
of the notice, the trustee shall proceed to distribute the trust assets 
in accordance with the plan; 
(iv) if the trustee receives a written objection to the plan 
within 20 days of the date of the notice, the trustee shall not 
distribute the assets of the trust, but may then petition the court for 
an order authorizing distribution in accordance with the plan. The court 
shall have plenary authority to approve, modify, or reject the trustee's 
petition. 
(b) The existence of a spendthrift or similar provision shall not 
effect the trustee's powers under this subsection unless the trust 
instrument specifically provides that the trustee shall not have the 
power to terminate the trust. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-7-402, enacted by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 8;. 1983, ch. 
63, § 1; 1983, ch. 226, § 24; 1987, ch. 152, § 2; 1988, ch. 26, § 1; 
1991, ch. 133, § 35; 1992, ch. 179, § 16. 
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*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2 001 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** (2001 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION) *** 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. COURTS 
CHAPTER 2. SUPREME COURT 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (2001) 
§ 78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions 
of state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and process 
necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in 
aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals 
prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings 
originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of 
Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State 
Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e) ; 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a 
statute of the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face 
under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or 
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or 
decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory 
order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a 
petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals 
adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3) (b) . 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency 
adjudicative proceedings. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 
161, § 303; 1988, ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1; 1992, ch. 127, § 
11; 1994, ch. 191, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 5; 1995, ch. 299, § 46; 
1996, Ch. 159, § 18; 2001, ch. 302, § 1. 
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Ehe Undersigned, RICHARD D. SNOW, dtfWost Valley, Salt Lake 
County, and State of Utah, hereby establishes THE RICHARD D. SNOW 
FAMILY TRUST for the purposes of owning, operating and 
administering my estate both during my life and after my death and 
avoiding the probate thereof. 
ARTICLE I 
Transfer in Trust 
For good and valuable consideration, the Undersigned, RICHARD 
D. SNOW, hereby transfers, conveys, assigns and delivers to the 
Trustees and any successor Trustees the property listed on Schedule 
"A" or any supplemental schedules annexed hereto and incorporated 
herein by reference, to have and to hold the same, and any cash, 
securities, or other property, real and personal and wherever 
situate, which the Trustees may, pursuant to any of the provisions 
hereof, at any time hereafter hold or acquire, all of such property 
being hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Trust Estate" 
for the uses and purposes and upon the terms and conditions herein 
set forth. 
ARTICLE II 
Disposition Before the Death of the Undersigned 
Before the death of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall hold, 
manage, invest, and re-invest the Trust Estate, and shall collect 
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the income thereof and shall dispose of the net income and 
principal as follows: 
Subject to the provisions contained in Article XIII 
hereinafter, the Trustees shall pay to the Undersigned all to the 
net income of this Trust, in monthly or other convenient 
installments, but at least annually. The Trustees, shall also pay 
to the Undersigned as much of the principal of the Trust as the 
Undersigned may request. Trustees may, in their discretion, pay or 
apply for the benefit of the Undersigned, in addition to the income 
payments herein provided for, such amounts as the Trustees may from 
time to time deem necessary or advisable for the use and benefit of 
the Undersigned. 
ARTICLE III 
Disposition on Death of the Undersigned 
Upon the death of the Undersigned, the property of THE RICHARD 
D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, and including also any other portions added 
thereto from the estate of the Undersigned or other sources, 
together with the undistributed income, shall be held in trust and 
shall be administered and disposed of as follows: 
A. An amount determined solely by the Trustees shall be set 
aside from the balance of the funds held in trust, and shall be 
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used for the support, and education of the Undersigned's 
beneficiaries who have not reached age twenty-one (21) prior to the 
death of the Undersigned. In determining the amount to be set 
aside under the provisions of this paragraph, and the amounts to be 
paid therefrom, the Trustees shall take into account the needs, 
ages, assets, and other available sources of income and support, 
including any manner of state or federal financial assistance, to 
the Undersigned's children. The Trustees, in their sole and 
unqualified discretion, shall determine the amount to be 
distributed, the child or children to whom distributions are to be 
made, and the time and manner of distributions made under this 
paragraph, and shall distribute according to the various needs of 
the children, even if such distributions are unequal. A child 
shall receive no further distributions pursuant to this paragraph 
after she has attained the age designated above. Immediately upon 
the death of the Undersigned, the balance, if any, of the amounts 
set aside under this paragraph shall be distributed according to 
Article III., paragraph B., below. 
B. After setting aside sufficient amounts to carry out the 
purposes of Article III., paragraph A., above, the Trustees shall 
next divide the Trust Estate into as many equal parts as may be 
necessary to provide one part, or share, for each of the 
Undersigned's children then living, and one part, or share, for the 
then-living descendants, taken collectively, of each of the 
Undersigned's children who may then be deceased, which such 
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collective share shall be further divided into separate parts or 
shares for such descendants, they taking per stirpes; and as thusly 
divided, each said share or part shall be held as a separate trust 
for the benefit of the person or persons for whom it was set aside 
and shall be held, administered as follows: 
1. The Trustees may use and expend or apply so much or 
all of first, the income, and second, the principal of the trusts 
hereby created for the benefit of a beneficiary hereof, and said 
amounts shall be used as the Trustees determine necessary or 
advisable and in such reasonable manner as the Trustees see fit, to 
provide for the health, reasonable comfort, education, support, and 
maintenance of the beneficiary for whom such trust shall have been 
created. Provided, however, that in determining 
said amounts the Trustees shall first take into account any 
distributions provided for such beneficiary under Article III., 
paragraph A., above, and the needs, assets, and other available 
sources of income and support of a beneficiary thereof. Provided, 
however, the said powers of encroachments upon a b€*neficiary's 
share shall be limited to the respective share held for the 
respective beneficiary. 
2. Upon the death of the undersigned, the Trustees shall 
distribute to that respective beneficiary, the share of the Trust 
Estate for said beneficiary, free and clear of trust if and when 
that beneficiary has reached twenty-one (21) years of age. 
3. In the event a beneficiary is for any reason unable 
or unwilling to take any portion of his or her share of the Trust 
Estate, or in the event of the death of any of the beneficiaries, 
namely the Undersigned's children, pursuant to the above 
paragraphs of this Article III., then such portion shall be 
distributed in whole to his or her living descendants, equally, 
they taking per stirpes; and if there be no such descendants, then 
such funds shall be divided equally between such beneficiary's 
then-living brothers and sisters, and if there be no brother or 
sister then living, then such funds shall be divided equally 
between the descendants of such beneficiary's brothers and sisters, 
said descendants taking per stirpes; and if there be no descendants 
of such beneficiary's brothers or sisters then living, then the 
Trustees shall distribute according to the principle of 
representation, the portion of the property of that beneficiary to 
the other portions of the other living beneficiaries, and if there 
are no other living beneficiaries, then: said heirs at law of the 
Undersigned, shall take the Trust property in the same priority and 
in the same distributive order as listed in the law of intestate 
succession in force in the state of the Undersigned's residence on 
the date of the signing of this Trust Agreement. Notwithstanding 
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anything contained to the contrary in this paragraph, if, under the 
provisions of this subparagraph 3., of paragraph B., Article III., 
any person under age twenty-one (21) shall become entitled to a 
share of the Trust Estate, such share shall not be distributed to 
such beneficiary's benefit, and shall be held, administered, and 
disposed of according to subparagraphs 1., 2., and 3., of paragraph 
B., Article III. 
4. If under the terms of this Article III., and upon the 
death of any beneficiary, any other person for whom a share or 
portion is being held in trust shall become entitled to an 
additional share or portion, such additional share or portion shall 
not necessarily be delivered free of trust, but shall be added to 
the principal of the share or portion held in trust for 
such person and shall go as and with the same. 
C. At the death of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall 
distribute all_of the Undersigned's personal effects, including1 any 
contents of the Undersigned's residence, according to that certain 
Letter of Disposition of Personal Effects referring to Article III, 
Subparagraph B, of this Trust Agreement, dated and-signed by the 
Undersigned and located among the Undersigned's important papers at 
the time of his death: 
D. Whenever, used herein, the terms "issue", "child", 
"children", and "descendants" include adopted issue, adopted child, 
adopted children and adopted descendants, as well as natural issue, 
natural child, natural children, and natural descendants, and 
include descendants of adopted issued, adopted child, adopted 
children, and adopted descendants. Provided, however, adopted 
issue who are also natural issue shall take their share of the 
Trust Estate only in one capacity, such capacity being the one 
which grants to such issue the larger share. Where applicable, the 
masculine includes the feminine, and vice versa, and the neuter 
includes the masculine or feminine, and vice versa. Where 
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applicable, the singular includes the plural and vice versa. 
ARTICLE IV 
Spendthrift Provision 
After any of the trusts cremated herein become irrevocable, 
the interests of each beneficiary in income and principal shall be 
free from the control or interference of any creditor of such 
beneficiary, or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or the parent 
of a child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or 
be subject to assignment unless herein specified otherwise. 
ARTICLE V 
Invalid Provisions 
If any of the provisions of this Trust are held to be invalid, 
none of the other Trust Agreement provisions shall thereby be 
rendered invalid or inoperative as long as they do not frustrate 
the intents of the Undersigned, but tend to accomplish his over-all 
objectives. 
ARTICLE VI 
Perpetuities Savings Clause 
In any event, and anything to the contrary herein contained 
notwithstanding, the trusts created in this agreement shall 
terminate upon the day next preceding the expiration of twenty-one 
(21) years after the death of the Undersigned and his issue now 
living, in the event these trusts shall not have previously 
terminated in accordance with the terms hereof. In the event of 
termination of these trusts provided for in this paragraph, the 
Trustees shall distribute the Trust Estate as it shall then be 
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constituted, together with any net income, to the beneficiaries 
then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate, in the same 
proportions in which they are entitled to such income • 
ARTICLE VII 
Trustees 
A, The following people will act as trustees in the 
following order of succession: 
FIRST; RICHARD D. SNOW is to act solely as the Trustee 
of THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, unless he becomes disabled or 
legally incompetent or placed in a rehabilitation facility, 
hospital, nursing home, or long-term health care facility, then the 
next successor trustee shall act as Trustee. 
SECOND; Upon the death or inability to function of 
RICHARD D. SNOW then RUKS^WOMACK ^ shall- act solely as Trustee of 
THEVRICHARD D. "SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
THIRD; Upon the death or incapacitation of RUBY WOMACK, 
a Trustee shall be chosen by,a majority of the beneficiaries, with 
a parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries; 
provided, however, that the issue of any deceased child shall have 
collectively only one vote. 
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****SPECIAL PROVISIONS**** 
UPON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED, THIS TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE 
DISTRIBUTED AS FOLLOWS: 
LIVE IN THE MOBILEzapSS, GUREDON, AS LONG c/j 
[E REMARRIES OR SHE DIES, AT THAT TTMtt TB&—>^ 
1. RUBY WOMACK MAY 
AS SHE DESIRES OR UNTIL SHE 
MOBILE HOME SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO MARCIA ELLINGSON, PER STIRPES. 
THE SAID MOBILE HOME SHALL NOT BE SOLD, LEASED, OR RENTED BY RUBY 
WOMACK. / „ __. . 
2. THg-MOTCHir.HOME;*OlSOtflGAN, SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO RUBY 
WOMACK. «'•'---' 
•? 3 r '^a^BALANCE^OFu.THE^TRUST 'ESTATE- SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED T0*' 
^Ria^TETii^GsoN^paa^lsrnSfes. 5/uc u/ 
4. PATRICIA SPROUSE SHALL NOT RECEIVE ANYTHING FROM THIS 
TRUST ESTATE AS SHE ALREADY RECEIVED HER SHARE PRIOR TO THE 
UNDERSIGNED'S DEATH, INCLUDING: 
A) 1981 PONTIAC, / J J C fofrJ vMuJlJuuJ
 J /' ?65 /W 
B) 1987 FORD RANGER PICKUP TRUCK, 
C) PAYMENT OF HER AND HER HUSBAND'S DEBTS IN THE 
AMOUNT OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($20,000), AND 
D) SHIRLEY SNOW'S RINGS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS 
WORTH APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($20,000). 
THESE ABOVE SPECIAL PROVISIONS SUPERSEDE ALL OTHERS IN THIS 
TRUST. 
CATASTROPHIC ILLNESS PROVISION 
If at any time the undersigned should become disabled and 
placed in a rehabilitation facility, hospital nursing home, or 
long-term health care facility, then this trust shall become 
irrevocable and the disabled trustor shall be forbidden to act as 
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Trustee and shall forfeit any benefit or share of this trust estate 
except an income benefit and only to the extent that it will not 
jeopardize his Medicaid eligibility or any trust assets. 
B. Whenever more than two Trustees are designated to act 
concurrently, a majority of the Trustees, whether individual or 
corporate, shall have the power to make any provision, undertake 
any action, or execute any documents affecting the Trusts created 
herein, but a dissenting or nonassenting Trustee shall not be 
responsible for any action taken by the majority pursuant to such 
decision. Before or after the death of the Undersigned, if only 
two individual Trustees are in office, they must act unanimously; 
provided, however, the Trustees may form joint savings, checking or 
investment accounts that require only one Trustee's signature to 
effect transactions for such an account. If an individual and a 
corporate Trustee are in office, the determination of the 
individual Trustee shall be binding. 
C. Any Trustee may from time to time delegate to one or more 
of the remaining Trustees any powers, duties, or discretions. 
Every such delegation shall be made by a writing delivered to the 
delegate or delegates, and shall remain effective for the time 
therein specified or until earlier revocation by a writing 
similarly delivered. Every one dealing with the Trustees shall be 
absolutely protected in relying upon the certificate of any Trustee 
as to who are the Trustees for the time being acting, and as to the 
extent of their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise. 
D. No Trustee named above need give bond in any jurisdiction. 
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If a fiduciary's bond may not be dispensed with, the Undersigned 
request that the bond be accepted without surety and in the lowest 
possible amount. In the absence of breach of trustf no Trustee 
shall ever be required to qualify before, be appointed by, or 
account to any court, or obtain the order or approval of any court 
in the exercise of any power or discretion herein given. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Powers of the Trustees 
A. The~s Trustees shall have full power to do everything^in 
administering these trusts that they deem to be for the best 
interests of the beneficiaries (whether or not it be authorized or 
appropriate for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of authority), 
including power: 
1. To acquire by purchase or otherwise, and to retain 
so long as they deem advisable, any kind of realty or personal 
property, or undivided interests therein, including common and 
preferred stocks, bonds, or other unsecured obligations, options, 
warrants, interests in investment trusts and discretionary common 
trust funds, all without diversifications as to kind or 
amount,without being limited to investments authorized by law for 
the investment of trust funds, and power to hold or take title to 
property in the name of a nominee. 
2. To sell for cash or on credit, at private or public 
sale, exchange, hypothecate, sell short, or otherwise dispose of 
any real or personal property. 
3. To make distributions, including distributions to 
themselves as trustees, in kind or in money or partly in each, even 
if shares be composed differently; for such purposes, the valuation 
of the Trustees shall be given effect if reasonably made. 
4. If, in the Trustee's sole discretion, any beneficiary 
(whether a minor or of legal age) is incapable of making proper 
disposition of any sum of income or principal that is payable or 
appointed to said beneficiary under the previous terms of this 
Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to or on behalf of 
the beneficiary by any one or more of the following methods: by 
payments on behalf of the beneficiary to any one with whom the 
10 
beneficiary resides, or by payments in discharge of the 
beneficiary's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on any 
insurance policies, or by paying an allowance to a beneficiary 
directly. The foregoing payments shall be made without regard to 
other resources of the beneficiary, or the duty of any person to 
support the beneficiary and without the intervention of any 
guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the Trustees 
shall insure and see to the application of the funds for the 
benefit of the beneficiary, so that the funds will not be used by 
any other person for a purpose 
other than the direct benefit of the beneficiary, and particularly 
so that said funds will not be diverted from the purpose of support 
and education of said beneficiary. 
5. To determine whether and to what extent receipts 
should be deemed income or principal, whether or to what extent 
expenditures should be charged against principal or income, and 
what other adjustments should be made between principal and income, 
provided such adjustments do not conflict with well-settled rules 
for the determination of principal and income questions. 
6. To delegate powers to agents including accountants, 
investment counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts, 
remunerate them and pay their expenses; to employ custodians of the 
Trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks, and other assistants and pay 
them out of income or principal. 
7. To renew, assign, alter, extend, compromise, release, 
with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration or 
litigation, obligations or claims held by or asserted against the 
Undersigned, the Trustees, or the Trust assets. 
8. To borrow money, from others or from the Trustees for 
the payment of taxes, debts, or expenses, or for any other purpose, 
which in the opinion of the Trustees, will facilitate the 
administration of these trusts, and pledge or mortgage property as 
security for any such loans; and, if money is borrowed from any 
Trustee, individually, to pay interest thereon at the then-
prevailing rate of interest. 
9. To lease, or grant options to lease, for periods to 
begin presently or in the future, without regard to statutory 
restrictions or the probable duration of any trust; to erect or 
alter buildings or otherwise improve and manage property; demolish 
buildings; make ordinary and extra-ordinary repairs; grant 
easements and charges; make party wall contracts; dedicate roads, 
subdivide; adjust boundary lines; partition and convey property or 
give money for equity of partition; to be either a general or 
limited partner. 
10. To enter into transactions with any other trust in 
which the Undersigned or the beneficiaries of this Trust Agreement, 
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or any of them, have beneficial interests, even though any Trustee 
of such other trust is also a Trustee under this Trust Agreement, 
11. To exercise all the foregoing powers alone or in 
conjunction with others, even though any of the Trustees are 
personally interested in the property that is involved, 
notwithstanding any rules of law relating to divided loyalty or 
self-dealing. 
12. The Trustees may engage in the practice of writing 
options on all recognized exchanges to buy, sell, and trade in 
securities of any nature, (including "short" sales) on margin, and 
for such purposes may maintain and operate margin accounts with 
brokers, and may pledge any securities held or purchased by them 
with such brokers as security for loans and advances made to the 
Trustees. 
B. Any Trustee may decline to act or may resign as Trustee 
at any time by delivering a written resignation to the 
beneficiaries of a trust then subsisting. 
C. From the income of the trusts hereby created, or, if that 
be insufficient, from the principal thereof, the Trustees shall pay 
and discharge all expenses incurred in the administration of the 
Trusts. 
D. No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance 
of any prior Trustee. 
ARTICLE IX 
Additions to Trust 
A. The Undersigned or any other person may grant, and the 
Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional real and 
personal property, by assignment, transfer, deed, or other 
conveyance, or by any other means
 f testamentary or inter vivos, for 
inclusion in the Trust herein created. Any such property so 
received by the Trustees shall become a part of the Trust into 
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which it is transferred and shall become subject to the terms of 
this Agreement. 
ARTICLE X 
Delegation of Authority 
During physical or mental incapacitation, the Undersigned 
herein appoints, the next successor Trustee succeed to his place, 
during said period of incapacitation, either as Trustee, Executor, 
or in any other legal capacity, whether appointed, orally or in 
writing, and to supervise all matters in which the Undersigned had 
the right to act if he had not become incapacitated. 
Incapacitation shall be established either by a court of competent 
jurisdiction or by a written statement filed with the Trustees and 
signed in good faith by two (2) physicians unrelated to the 
Undersigned. 
ARTICLE XI 
Parties Dealing with Trustees 
No purchaser, and no issuer of any stock, bond, or other 
instrument evidencing a deposit of money or property, or other 
person dealing with the Trustees hereunder with respect to any 
property hereunder as purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or 
lease, or in any other capacity whatsoever, shall be under any 
obligation whatsoever to see to the disbursing of money paid to the 
Trustees or to the due execution of this Trust in any particular, 
but such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing 
with the Trustees on the same basis as though the Trustees were the 
13 
absolute owners of the said property, without any conditions, 
restrictions, or qualifications whatsoever. 
ARTICLE XII 
Separate Property to Remain Separate Property 
All property conveyed or transferred to the Trustees or now 
held by the Trustees pursuant to this Trust Agreement that was the 
separate property of the Undersigned at the time of such conveyance 
or transfer, shall remain, respectively, the separate property of 
the Undersigned who transferred such property to the Trustees, 
Accordingly, while the Undersigned is alive, the Trustees shall pay 
to the Undersigned only the income or principal from his separate 
property that he contributed to this Trust. 
ARTICLE XIII 
Revocation and Amendment 
A. As long as the Undersigned is alive, he reserves the 
right, without the consent or approval of any other, to amend, 
modify, revoke, or remove from this Trust the property that he has 
contributed, in whole or in part, including the principal and the 
present or past undisbursed income from such principal. On the 
death of the Undersigned, the remainder of the Trust Estate, and 
the trusts created hereinafter, may not be amended, revoked, or 
terminated, other than by disposition of the trust property to the 
beneficiaries according to the terms stated herein. 
B. While the Undersigned is alive, he shall have full 
authority, in his discretion, to sell, convey, or mortgage property 
in his own name, without disclosing his capacity as Trustee of this 
14 
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Trust Agreement; any such sale or conveyance of property in 
accordance with this provision, shall be considered as, and shall 
cause, a partial revocation of the Trust with respect to the 
property so conveyed or sold, and shall be sufficient to remove 
said property from the Trust. 
ARTICLE XIV 
Vested Interest of Beneficiaries 
The interest of the beneficiaries is a present vested interest 
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated 
other than by death. 
ARTICLE XV 
Governing Law 
This Agreement shall be construed and regulated by the laws of 
the state of residence of the Undersigned. 
ARTICLE XVI 
Last Instructions 
During any serious illness, or at the death, of the 
Undersigned, the Undersigned requests that the Trustees call his 
attorney, DtiiB. ROWE, of 535 West -500 South, Gateway Plaza #300, 
Bountiful, Utah 84010, (801) 298-0640, or another attorney 
specializing in Estate Planning, to obtain instructions regarding 
the settlement of his estate. 
ARTICLE XVII 
Settlement of the Undersigned's Estate 
This Trust Agreement has been prepared in duplicate, one copy 
of which has been executed as an original and the other is a 
15 
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photocopy of the unexecuted original, retained in the above 
attorneys office. Either copy may be used as an original without 
the other; if only one copy of this Trust Agreement can be found, 
then it shall be considered as the original, and the missing copy 
will be presumed inadvertently lost- Any clarifications or 
instructions concerning this Trust Agreement may be obtained by 
calling the above named attorney, DEL B, ROWE of Bountiful, Utah, 
who is requested to do everything necessary to implement the 
provisions of this Trust Agreemsmt, who also retains an unexecuted 
copy of the foregoing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned has executed this Trust 
Agreement on the o day of A I £> J m , 1993. 
RICHARD D. SNOW 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
On this o day of / V 0 v* » 1993, personally appeared 
before me RICHARD D. SNOW, who acknowledged to me that: he executed 
the foregoing Trust Agreement. , yo 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 04-27-96 ft. JS_JL^< J y) , C A ^ ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC; 
RESIDING AT DAVIS COUNTY 
r**J<?yS*r""" Notary Ft/rib
 m ; 
I / £ « ^ X :<ARAN i CORNIA ! 
! i f ' l ^ i f R iCavsviBe, Utah £4037 J My Commission Expires 
Apri27,1996 i 
16 
-"--'•c.c; LJi.strict 
AMENDMENT TO THE p £g j g
 {gQQ 
RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST SALT i a - - -. 
, M s M 3 By ^ y ^ r ^ 
The Undersigned, RICHARD D. SNOW, Grantor, hereby amends THE 
RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, established the 8th day of November, 
1993, as follows: 
ARTICLE VII 
Trustees 
A. The following people will act as trustees in the 
following order of succession: 
FIRST: RICHARD D. SNOW is to act solely as the Trustee 
of THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
SECOND: Upon the death or inability to function of 
RICHARD D. SNOW, then RUBY WOMACK shall act solely as Trustee of 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
THIRD: Upon the death or incapacitation of RUBY WOMACK, 
then MARCIA SNOW shall act solely as Trustee of THE RICHARD D. SNOW 
FAMILY TRUST. 
FOURTH: A Trustee chosen by a majority of the 
beneficiaries, with a parent or legal guardian voting for minor 
beneficiaries; provided, however, that the issue of any deceased 
child shall have collectively only one vote. 
••••SPECIAL PROVISIONS**** 
UPON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED, THIS TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE 
DISTRIBUTED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. RUBY WOMACK MAY LIVE IN THE MOBILE HOME, GUREDON, AS LONG 
AS SHE DESIRES OR UNTIL SHE REMARRIES OR SHE DIES. 
2. THE 1995 CHEVROLET CUSTOM VAN (OR WHATEVER VEHICLE THE 
GRANTOR OWNS AT HIS DEATH) SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO RUBY 
WOMACK. 
3. THE REMAINDER OF THE TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE HELD IN TRUST 
TO PROVIDE RUBY WOMACK WITH INCOME. RUBY SHALL HAVE COMPLETE 
DISCRETION IN THE USE OF THE TRUST ESTATE. 
a-
4. PATRICIA SPROUSE SHALL NOT RECEIVE ANYTHING FROM THIS 
TRUST ESTATE AS SHE ALREADY RECEIVED HER SHARE PRIOR TO THE 
UNDERSIGNED'S DEATH, INCLUDING: 
A) 1965 FORD 
B) 1976 FORD THUNDERBIRD 
C) 1981 PONTIAC, 
D) 1987 FORD RANGER PICKUP TRUCK, 
E) PAYMENT OF HER AND HER HUSBAND'S DEBTS IN THE 
AMOUNT OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
(.$20,000), AND 
F) SHIRLEY SNOW'S RINGS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS 
WORTH APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($20,000). 
THESE ABOVE SPECIAL PROVISIONS SUPERSEDE ALL OTHERS IN THIS 
TRUST. 
CATASTROPHIC ILLNESS PROVISION 
THIS PROVISION IS HEREBY REVOKED IN WHOLE AND SHALL NO LONGER 
CONTROL THE DETERMINATION OF THIS TRUST ESTATE. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned has executed this Trust 
Amendment on the f5 day of ?>Pp(gft\hgf 1995. 
^..y? o _J^W 
RICHARD D. SNOW 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
On this IS day of ^rrle^CPf' , 1995, personally 
appeared before me RICHARD D. SNOW, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he executed the foregoing Trus /^<Amendment « 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES; 04-14-97 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
_^^ ,-,-ap..
—
«.-.— Residing at Salt Lake County 
"** Notary Pubfic / ] 
IflCHEUE CLAIRE TACK 1 
8185 a Vine Hill Lr.o } sail Lane wi y, ^^n ^ *.... -, 
My Comrr.isslc;-! .=...' \ 
Aeril 14. u .V ] 
Sta» zl'.. _ . I 
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DEL B. ROWE 
Attorney at Law, #2813 
P. 0. Box 476 
Bountiful, UT 84011-0476 
Telephone (801) 298-0640 
Fax (801) 292-9551 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
RICHARD DONALD SNOW and 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, 
Deceased. 
INVENTORY 
The undersigned, as named but unappointed personal representative of the estate of the above-named 
decedent and Trustee of THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST dated the 8th day of November, 
1993, states and represents that she accepts the position as Trustee of THE RICRARD D SNOW FAMILY 
TRUST and that the mailing address of the trust is c/o Del B Rowe. Attorney at Law, P. O. Box 476, 
Bountiful, UT 84011-0476; (801) 298-0640, and further hereby submits the following. 
1. The schedules attached hereto constitute a full and complete inventory of the property owned by the 
decedent as far as the same has come to the possession or knowledge of the undersigned. 
2. The values set forth in such schedules are the fair market values of the decedent's property as 
determined as of January 28, 1998, the date of the decedent's death, by: 
(a) jx_ the undersigned. 
(b) the undersigned with the assistance of qualified and disinterested appraisers, the name and 
addresses of whom appear in such schedules with the items they appraised 
DATED this 2nd day of June, 1998. 
RUBY W< 
11324 Hidden View Drive. *245 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 553-0924 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of June, 1998. 
State of Utah .• 
My Commission Expires: 
i&sssssss. * NOTARY A^tic 
Octo6er20, t998 •/; Residing at Davis County 
tjuL&-£<' 
DEL B. ROWE 
Attorney for the Estate of Richard Donald Snow a 
The Richard D. Snow Family Trust 
P.O. Box 476 
Bountiful UT 84011-0476 
Telephone (801) 298-0640 
Fax (801)292-9551 
2 
Inventory of Property of 
RICHARD DONALD SNOW aka RICHARD D. SNOW, Deceased 
Dated: June 2, 1998. 
Recapitulation 
Schedule A - Real Estate S -Jh 
Schedule B -- Stocks and Bonds S d2= 
Schedule C - Mortgages, Notes and Cash S 37,661 60 
Schedule D -- Other Miscellaneous Property S 44.000 00 
Schedule E -- Encumbrances (S 11.443 01 ) 
TOTAL N E T VALUE S 70.218 59 
Schedule A — Real Estate 
Item No Description Gross Value 
None S 0 00 
Schedule B -- Stocks and Bonds 
Total S -0-
Item No. Description Gross Value 
None $ 0 00 
Total S -0-
3 
Schedule C — Mortgages. Notes, and Cash 
Item No. Description . Gross Value 
001 Granite Credit Union Checking Account S 37:661.60 
Title Richard D. Snow, as Trustee or Successor Trustees of THE RICHARD D SNOW FAMILY 
TRUST (as per trust and amendment to be held in trust and used to provide Ruby with income in her 
complete discretion - See Amendment to THEjRICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST dated the 
15th day of September, 1995. See Exhibit 1 for breakdown). 
Total S 37,661 60 
Schedule D — Other Miscellaneous Property 
Item No Description Gross Value 
002 Guredon Mobile Home $ 35,000 00 
Title in Richard D. Snow (qualifies for small estate treatment); title placed in Ruby Womack, Trustee 
of THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST dated the 8th day of November, 1993, and held 
therein as a life estate for Ruby Womack (until her death or remarriage). 
003 1995 Chevrolet Custom Van (Blue book) $ 9,000.00 
Title in Richard D. Snow (qualifies for small estate treatment); title placed and distributed outright 
as a specific bequest to Ruby Womack. 
004 Miscellaneous Personal Effects S ? 
See schedules attached (have been distributed as specific bequests to the named persons): value 
unknown. 
Total $ 44,000.00 
Schedule E — Encumbrances 
Item No Description Gross Value 
005 Miscellaneous payables (utilities, etc.) S 697 87 
(Please see expenses schedule). 
006 Funeral and burial expenses $ 1,387.02 
007 Administrative expenses $ 2,323 45 
008 Pay off Van S 7,034 6^ 
Total S 11.443 01 
Exhibit D 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST 
EXHIBIT 1 
J DATE 
1/30/98 
1/30/98 
1/30/98 
1/30/98 
1 1/30/98 
1 1/30/98 
1 1/30/98 
1 1/30/98 
J 2/16/98 
J 2/18/98 
1 2/18/98 
1 2/23/98 
| 3/2/98 
3/5/98 
3/5/98 
3/5/98 
3/5/98 
5/4/98 
5/4/98 
5/4/98 
DESCRIPTION 
Beehive Credit Union 
Miscellaneous deposit 
Cannon Mart 
Park Rent - Crescent Wood 
Gas bill for January 
Mt Olympus water 
Newspaper obituary 
MH Insurance 
i IRS tax preparation 
Final phone bill 
Final gas bill 
Van pay-off 
Miscellaneous deposit 
VA Life Insurance 
IRS 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
(Van) 
Miscellaneous deposit 
Del Rowe retainer 
OFEGLI insurance 
IRS refund 
! DEBIT 
$1,102 02 
$225 00 
$36 00 
$41 10 
$285 00 
$328 00 
$90 00 
$60 27 
$7 50 
$7,034 67 
$531 00 
$202 45 
$1,500 00 
CREDIT 
$27,304 94 
$91.59 
$15 97 
$3,058 04 
$25 00 
$18,659 07 
$116 00 
BALANCE J 
$27,304 94 1 
$27,396 53 | 
$26,294 51 
$26,069 51 
$26,033 51 
$25,992 41 
$25,707 41 
$25.379 41 
$25,289 d\ 
$25,229 14 
$25,221 64 
$18,186 97 
$18,202.94 
$21,260 98 
$20,729 98 
$20,527 53 
$20,552 53 
$19,052 53 
$37,711 60 
$37,827 60 
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DENNIS M. ASTTLL #0140 
MICHAEL S. LOWE #8529 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth. Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
RICHARD D. SNOW, DECEASED, AND ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY ) 
TRUST, ) 
) Probate No. 993900093 EF 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment having come before the Court on the 31st 
day of July, 2000, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., Dennis M. Astill appearing for Petitioner, Marcia Snow, 
and Robyn Rowe Walton appearing for Respondent, Ruby Womack, and the Court having received 
the affidavits of the parties and considered the deposition testimony, answers to discovery presented 
to the Court, considered the briefs filed by the parties and considered the arguments of counsel, 
hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Richard D. Snow duly executed that Last Will and Testament of Richard D. Snow, 
dated November 8,1993, the Richard D. Snow Family Trust, dated November 8,1993, and the First 
Amendment to Trust, dated September 15,1995, (herein collectively the "Trust"). 
p-3 AP 
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2. There is no issue of material fact regarding the construction of the Richard D. Snow 
Trust The Court considered no parole evidence in construing the terms of the Trust 
3. Ruby Womack- as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard D, Snow and the 
Trustee of the Trust, distributed to herself, as beneficiary of the Trust, a 1995 Chevrolet Custom Van, 
(the "Van")> in accordance with Paragraph 2., of the Special Provisions of the Trust. 
4. Prior to or in connection with the distribution of the Van, Ruby Womack, as Trustee 
of the Trust utilized the sum of 57,034.67 from Trust principal for the purpose of payment and 
exoneration of indebtedness which was secured by the Van. 
5* The terms of the Trust do not provide for exoneration or payment of debts secured 
by assets of the Trust and Ruby Womack should not have used 57,034.67 in Trust principal to satisfy 
the debt secured by the Van-
6. Petitioner obj ected to the payment of the debt secured by the Van and Ruby Womack 
has refused to repay to the Trust the principal and interest for such debt. 
7. The Trust is the owner of a 1994 Guredon Mobile Home, VIN 
#6BD01D01947680A/8 (the "Mobile Home"). 
8. After the death of Richard D. Snow, Ruby Womack transferred the Mobile Home into 
her name, 
9. Ruby Womack should transfer the Mobile Home into the name of the Trust to avoid 
any confusion or creditor claims of Mrs. Womack. 
10. The terms of the Trust do not provide that Ruby Womack has any interest in the 
Mobile Home except during her lifetime and subject to the conditions of the Trust 
OCT-05-2000 09=48 STRONG AND HANNI 801 323 2037 P.08 
11. The terms of the Trust provide that the remainder of the Trust estate shall be held in 
trust to provide Ruby Womack with income* 
12, Ruby Womack, as Trustee of the Trust, has not provided a full accounting of the 
income of the Trust except to state that in 1999, the Trust earned only approximately $300 in 
income. 
13. The terms of the Trust do not provide that Ruby Womack, as a beneficiary, is entitled 
to any distributions from principal of the Trust. 
14, The terms of the Trust do not provide that Ruby Womack, as a beneficiary, is entitled 
to any remainder or residuary interest in the Trust 
15. The terms of the Trust provide that under Paragraph 1., of the Special Provisions and 
Article IIL B, of the Trust, that Marcia Snow, or her issue, is the remainder beneficiary of the Mobile 
Home at the death of Ruby Womack or if her interest is otherwise terminated as provided in the 
Trust, and that after the death of Ruby Womack, Petitioner is also the remainder beneficiary of all 
other Trust assets. 
16, The attorney's fees incurred by Ruby Womack were incurred in her role as a 
beneficiary and not as Trustee. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There is no issue of material fact regarding the construction of the Richard D. Snow 
Trust and the Court should construe his Trust as a matter of law. 
2. The Mobile Home is an asset of the Trust and the Court should order Ruby Womack 
to place title of the Mobile Home in the name of the Trust. 
OCT-05-2000 09:48 STRONG AND HPNNI 801 323 2037 P.m 
3. Ruby Womack shall not be entitled to any remainder interest in the Mobile Home. 
Her interest is limited to the right to reside in the Mobile Home until she either dies, or no longer 
desires to reside therein, or in the event she remarries. If any of the foregoing events occurs, then 
under Paragraph 1 of the original Special Provisions and under Article III of the Trust Marcia Snow 
should be distributed the Mobile Home. 
4. Paragraph 3 of the Special Provisions to the Trust should be and hereby is construed 
to provide that Ruby Womack is entitled to income only from the Trast and is not entitled to any 
principal distributions from the Trust. Based on statutory or constructive rules, income is defined 
as the return in money or property as stated in U.C.A. §22-3-4(1). When the Trust and the 
Amendment are read in conjunction with the definition of income. Ruby Womack is entitled only 
to the income generated from principle of the Trust, and not the principle. 
5. Paragraph 3 of the Special Provisions to the Trust should be and hereby is construed 
to provide that Marcia Snow is the beneficiary of any remainder and residue of the Trust, and that 
Ruby Womack has no interest in the remainder or residue of the Trust at her death. 
6. At the death of Richard D. Snow, his estate was the owner of a 1995 Chevrolet 
Custom Van, subject to indebtedness secured by the Van in the amount of $7,034.67, The Trust 
provided at Paragraph 2 of the Special Provisions for the distribution of the Van to Ruby Womack. 
Based upon the absence of an exoneration clause in the Trust and in accordance with Section 75-2-
609, U.CA., as amended, and Utah law, Ruby Womack, as a beneficiary was not entitled to receive 
a distribution of the Van free and clear of indebtedness or to have the debt secured by the Van 
exonerated. 
4 
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7* Judgment should be entered against Ruby Womack, as Trustee and Beneficiary for 
the amount of $7,034,67, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of payment of the debt secured 
by the Van. 
8. Ruby Womack as Trustee, and as Beneficiary, was not entitled to use Trust principal 
in the amount of approximately S 17,000 to move the Mobile Home, and should be ordered to 
provide a full accounting to the Court for the exact amounts so used, and to immediately repay the 
full amount, plus interest at the legal rate, to the Trust, 
9. Ruby Womack as Trustee, and as Beneficiary, was not entitled to use Trust principal 
in excess of $ 10,000 for attorneys fees and costs in this litigation. Since the attorney's fees incurred 
by Ruby Womack were incurred in her role as beneficiary and not as Trustee, those fees are not a 
proper expense of the Trust. The Court relies on the authority of Ashton v. Ashton. cited in the 
briefs of Petitioner, in making this conclusion of law. 
10. Ruby Womack, as Trustee and as Beneficiary should be ordered to account to the 
Court for all attorneys fees and costs expended by her from assets of the Trust and judgment should 
be entered by the Court for the amount of such fees and costs, plus interest at the legal rate from the 
date such fees and costs were paid. 
DATED this day of August 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this £r day of August. 2000,1 served by mail a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon the person(s) named below, by 
placing such document in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, and addressed to: 
DelB.Rowe 
Robyn Rowe Walton 
ROWE & WALTON, P.C. 
750 South Main, Suite #104 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
\.J 
/ 
s^zr 
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OUOZ-N HASNA f EARCE, CSR,RPR,CP 
Page 41 
1 vehicle identification number we just looked at: 
2 1994, make G-u-r-e, again. I'm assuming that 
3 refers to the Guredon mobile home. Is that the 
4 certificate of title that you surrendered to the 
5 state? 
6 A. Must be, yeah. 
7 Q. Or a copy of it? 
8 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
9 Q. That says that it's canceled; is that 
10 couect? Was that Certificate of Title canceled? 
11 A. It probably is, because I got a new 
12 one. 
13 Q. I'm showing you another document, some 
14 of the information is discernible. I 'm going to 
15 ask you just if you can decipher that It does 
16 bear your name at the top, Ruby J. Womack. 
i 17 A. It must be — I signed there for the 
118 vehicle. 
j 19 Q. Tnen attached to that is - it looks 
20 like the second page of the trust amendment. Did 
|21 you supply a copy of the trust amendment to the 
i22 state? 
23 A. I don't remember. 
24 Q. Okay. Your best memory is that appears 
25 to be the document that you filed with the State of 
Page 42 
1 Utah? 
2 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
3 Q. Is the mobile home in your name now? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Is it in your name as trustee? 
6 A. I don't think so. I think it's just in 
7 my name. 
8 Q. And why didn't you put it in the name 
9 of the trust? 
10 A. I don't know. I don't know, I can't 
11 answer that. 
12 Q: Were you instructed how to do that name 
13 change? 
14 A. No - well, before Richard died, we 
15 were going to go have the title changed, he told me 
16 this. And he got sick, then we couldn't go get it 
17 changed. So when I went in, I just thought this is 
18 what he wanted me to do, so I did it. 
19 Q. Isn't the mobile home an asset of the 
20 trust? 
21 A. I guess it is. 
22 Q. So shouldn't it be titled in the name 
23 of the trust? 
24 A. We could do that. 
25 Q. Now, is it true that you've also 
Page 43 
1 changed the title to the van into your name? 
2 A. Yes, I did. 
3 Q. Then you used the trust bank account to 
4 pay off the loan on the van? 
5 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
6 Q. I'm going to show you what I've marked 
7 as Deposition Exhibit No. 5. 
8 Let's take a break. 
9 (Break.) 
10 Q. (By Mr. Astill) Back on the record. 
11 I'll show you what's been marked as Deposition 
12 Exhibit No. 5. It's a copy of a warranty deed in 
13 the county recorder's office. It bears the name at 
14 the top of Richard D. Snow as the grantor. The 
15 grantees are Gregory Low and Linda Low, husband and 
16 wife as joint tenants. It refers to Lot 409, 
17 Eastview No. 4. It's dated May 26, 1993. It bears 
18 the signature of Richard Snow. Are you familiar 
19 with that document at all? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Have you ever seen that document? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Is that Mr. Snow's former residence? 
24 A. That's were he lived, yes. 6186, 
25 yeah. That's where he lived. 
Page 44 
1 Q. So you knew him at the time that this 
2 sale occurred? 
3 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
4 Q. But it was before you were residing 
5 together? 
! 6 A. Right. 
j 7 Q. On the life insurance policies, 
8 Mrs. Womack, who were the beneficiaries named in 
I 9 those? 
10 A. I think it was a trust, wasn't it? 
11 Q. I don't know. I haven't seen the 
112 beneficiary designations. 
113 A. I think that's the trust. I put them 
i 14 into the trust. 
115 Q. Did the policies themselves say that 
116 they would be payable to the trust? 
117 A. I couldn't tell you. 
18 Q. How did you decide to put them in the 
19 trust? 
20 A. I didn't put them in. Dick must have 
21 put them in the trust. You just showed me a page 
22 where he had put them in. 
23 Q. Well, I guess what I am referring to is 
24 you applied for and received the proceeds? 
25 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). That's what he 
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DENNIS M. ASTILL #0140 
MICHAEL S. LOWE #8529 
STRONG &HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ; 
RICHARD D. SNOW, DECEASED, AND ] 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY ] 
TRUST, ; 
) JOINT STIPULATION FOR ORDER 
) OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
\ Probate No. 993900093 EF 
Judge Glenn KL. Iwasaki 
This matter came before the Court and the Court granted a Partial Summary Judgment in 
favor of Petitioner on July 31,2000. Based upon the Order of the Court, and in the interest of finally 
resolving this matter, the parties agree to the entry of a final judgment in this case reserving only 
those matters set forth herein for further action of the parties. In entering into this stipulation, Ruby 
Womack represents that the amounts set forth herein represents the full amount of any funds used 
by her for the matters described. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby stipulated and agreed that a Final Judgment be granted in 
favor of Petitioner and against Respondent as follows: 
FILED 
THIRD D^~?!HT COURT 
2^ 00 AUG 23 PH 3 : 3 7 
:OUHTY 
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1. Judgment should be awarded against Ruby Womack and she should be ordered to re-
pay the Trust in the amount of SI 8.687.35, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal rate from the date 
any such funds were utilized until the judgment is entered, in full repayment of any use by her of 
Trust principal for moving of the Mobile Home. 
2. Judgment should be awarded against Ruby Womack and she should be ordered to re-
pay the Trust in the amount of $11,557.11, for attorney's fees paid to her attorneys in this action 
from principal of the Trust, plus pre-judgment interest from the dates paid until the judgment is 
entered. 
3. Judgment should be entered ordering Ruby Womack be removed as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Richard D. Snow and removed as Trustee of the Richard D, Snow 
Family Trust for the inappropriate use and distribution of estate and trust assets. 
4. Judgment should be entered ordering that Marcia L. Snow, who is the named 
Successor Trustee to the Richard D. Snow Family Trust and Personal Representative to the Estate 
of Richard D, Snow, be appointed as the Special Administrator of the Estate of Richard D, Snow and 
as Trustee of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ruby Womack has 
expressed her intent to appeal the decision of the Court. Therefore, the Court should order that this 
removal be suspended and not put into effect pending the filing of the appeal. However, the removal 
of Ruby Womack shall be immediately effective upon the expiration of 30 days from the entry of 
the Court's Order, if an appeal has not been filed within that 30-day period: or. if Ruby Womack 
2 
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files an appeal in this matter within the prescribed 30-day period, the removal of Ruby Womack shall 
be effective upon the appropriate court of appeals rendering a final decision either upholding the 
Court's Summary Judgment or the final Order in favor of Petitioner. 
5. It should be ordered that upon qualification and acceptance, the Court shall issue 
letters of special administration in favor of Petitioner. 
6. Ruby Womack should be ordered, that from the date of this stipulation, she shall not 
remove, distribute, or expend any principal or income of the Estate of Richard D. Snow or of the 
Richard D. Snow Family Trust, and shall continue to hold any funds in the Granite Credit Union 
Account Number 59669-4, and shall provide monthly, within 10 days of receipt, copies of all 
statements to Petitioner or her counsel. 
7. Ruby Womack shall not receive any distributions of income from the Trust until she 
has repaid in iull all amounts ordered to be repaid to the Trust herein. 
8. Any action on Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Counterclaims, 
Petitioner's claims for attorney's fees, and the counterclaims of the Respondent shall be postponed 
until the expiration of the time for appeal from the entry of the final judgment of the Court, or until 
the appropriate court of appeals renders a final decision on Respondent's appeal. Petitioner and 
Respondent each reserve all rights to assert the counterclaims and obtain a decision on the Motion 
to Dismiss, once a final judgment is rendered either by passage of time for appeal or by a final 
decision by the appropriate court of appeals. Any defenses of the parties for waiver by virtue of 
passage of time as a result of this stipulation are hereby waived. 
3 
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DATED this i&iiiay of August, 2000. 
Michael S. Lowe 
Attorney for Petitioner 
QryiQAjrln 2 SftcfQ 
Marcia L. Snow 
Petitioner 
Robin Row^ Walton 
Attorney for Respondent 
7\IAJLA . fjJstryy~>c?cfc 
Riiby ^ornack 
Respondent 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
RICHARD D. SNOW, DECEASED, AND 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY 
TRUST, 
ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
Probate No. 993900093 EF 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter came before the Court and the Court granted a Partial Summary Judgment in 
favor of Petitioner on July 31,2000. Based upon the Order of the Court, and in the interest of finally 
resolving this matter, the parties have submitted a Joint Stipulation for Order of Final Judgment in 
this case. The Court, having reviewed the Joint Stipulation, pleadings, and record on file, and 
therefore being fully advised, now orders and adjudges as follows: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: 
1. Judgment is awarded against Ruby Womack and she is hereby ordered to re-pay the 
Richard D. Snow Family Trust in the amount of S18,687.35, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal 
rate from the date any such funds were utilized until the judgment is entered, in full repayment of 
any use by her of Trust principal for moving of the Mobile Home. 
2. Judgment is awarded against Ruby Womack and she is hereby ordered to re-pay the 
Trust in the amount of $11,557.11, for attorney's fees paid to her attorneys in this action from 
principal of the Trust, plus pre-judgment interest from the dates paid until the judgment is entered. 
3. Ruby Womack is removed as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard D. 
Snow and removed as Trustee of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust for the inappropriate use and 
distribution of estate and trust assets. 
4. Marcia L. Snow, who is the named Successor Trustee to the Richard D. Snow Family 
Trust and Personal Representative to the Estate of Richard D. Snow, is appointed as the Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Richard D. Snow and as Trustee of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ruby Womack has expressed her intent to appeal the decision of the 
Court. Therefore, the Court orders that this removal be suspended and not put into effect pending 
the filing of the appeal. However, the removal of Ruby Womack shall be immediately effective 
upon the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the Court's Order, if an appeal has not been filed 
within that 30-day period; or, if Ruby Womack files an appeal in this matter within the prescribed 
30-day period, the removal of Ruby Womack shall be effective upon the appropriate court of appeals 
rendering a final decision either upholding the Court's Summary Judgment or the final Order, in 
favor of Petitioner. 
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5. Upon qualification and acceptance, the Court shall issue letters of special 
administration in favor of Petitioner. 
6. Ruby Womack is ordered that from the date of the joint stipulation between the 
parties, she shall not remove, distribute, or expend any principal or income of the Estate of Richard 
D. Snow or of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust and shall continue to hold any funds in the Granite 
Credit Union Account Number 59669-4, and shall provide monthly, within 10 days of receipt, copies 
of all statements to Petitioner or her counsel. 
7. Ruby Womack is not to receive any distributions of income from the Trust until she 
has repaid in full all amounts ordered to be repaid to the Trust herein. 
8. Any action on Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Counterclaims, 
Petitioner's claims for attorney's fees, and the counterclaims of the Respondent, shall be postponed 
until the expiration of the time for appeal from the entry of the final judgment of the Court, or until 
the appropriate court of appeals renders a final decision on Respondent's appeal. 
DATED this ^ 2 d a y of August, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
